


3 APRIL 1990



FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPBS-TAC-90-009

CONTENTS

3 April 1990

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA

Helicopter Enhances Air Strike Force <i>[J. Taljaard; BEELD 16 Jan]</i>	1
Rooivalk's Night Vision System Similar to Apache's <i>[BEELD 16 Jan]</i>	1
Helicopter's Weapons System Rated World-Class <i>[BEELD 16 Jan]</i>	2
ARMSCOR Strategy Following Defense Cuts <i>[FINANCIAL MAIL 9 Feb]</i>	2

CHINA

War Threats During Detente Examined <i>[JIEFANGJUN BAO 16 Feb]</i>	4
Development of 'Star Wars' Program Viewed <i>[Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION No 9, 26 Feb]</i>	5
Bright Prospects for Disarmament Seen <i>[Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION No 10, 5 Mar]</i>	7

EAST ASIA

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

First Asian Nuclear Cooperation Forum Opens	10
Japan Takes Initiative <i>[Tokyo KYODO 12 Mar]</i>	10
Conference Closes in Tokyo <i>[Tokyo KYODO 12 Mar]</i>	10

INDONESIA

Minister on Tentative Date of Satellite Launch <i>[ANTARA 20 Mar]</i>	10
Minister Comments on Planned Nuclear Reactor <i>[ANTARA 20 Mar]</i>	11
British Defense Official Offers Weapons Sale <i>[ANTARA 24 Mar]</i>	11

JAPAN

Defense Chief on U.S. Bases in Okinawa <i>[RYUKYU SHIMPO 16 Mar]</i>	11
Kaifu on Defense Policy, U.S. Presence <i>[KYODO 19 Mar]</i>	12
USSR 'Preparing To Export' Space Technology <i>[KYODO 19 Mar]</i>	12

NORTH KOREA

Japanese Arms Buildup Considered 'Offensive' <i>[KCNA 17 Mar]</i>	12
U.S. Must End 'Adventurous Anti-Libya Campaign' <i>[KCNA 19 Mar]</i>	13
U.S. Introduces B-52 Bombers Into South Korea <i>[KCNA 20 Mar]</i>	13
Response to Disarmament Talks Proposal Urged <i>[KCNA 21 Mar]</i>	14
Transfer of U.S. Missiles to ROK Reported <i>[KCNA 21 Mar]</i>	14
Committee Criticizes New Weapons Delivery <i>[KCNA 21 Mar]</i>	14
Statement Distributed at Disarmament Meeting <i>[KCNA 22 Mar]</i>	15

SOUTH KOREA

Navy Reportedly Tracks Soviet Submarine 17 Mar <i>[YONHAP 17 Mar]</i>	15
Defense Minister Comments on Disarmament <i>[YONHAP 22 Mar]</i>	15

PHILIPPINES

Envoy Urges 'Neutral and Nuclear-Free' Future /J.G. Ebro; *BUSINESS WORLD* 21 Mar] 15

SINGAPORE

Australian Defense Chief on Regional Defense /D. Nathan; *THE STRAITS TIMES* 17 Mar] 16

TAIWAN

Mainland Military Moves Viewed with Alarm /Taipei Radio 17 Mar] 17

EAST EUROPE

ALBANIA

Soviet East Europe Troop Withdrawals Welcomed /A. Karapici; *ZERI I POPULLIT* 6 Mar] 18

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

General Details Arms Production Phase-out /ROLNICKE NOVINY 15 Mar, etc.] 18

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

National People's Army Missiles Dismantled /R. Funke; *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND* 16 Mar] 19

HUNGARY

Soviet Military Aircraft Withdrawal Begins /MTI 21 Mar] 19

LATIN AMERICA

CHILE

More Details Provided on Iran-Corfo Arms Deal /HOY 12-18 Mar] 20

CUBA

Soviet Arms Linked to Relations With U.S. /Mexico City NOTIMEX 23 Mar] 21

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Finance Minister Says \$9.2 Billion for Defense /Hong Kong AFP 19 Mar] 22

French Nuclear Plant for Pakistan Causes Concern 22

India Conveys Concern /Delhi Radio 22 Mar] 22

French 'Willingness' Cited /Delhi Radio 20 Mar] 22

Commentary on French Reactor /I. Malhotra; *Delhi International* 20 Mar] 22

IRAN

Libyan Envoy Assails U.S. 'Propaganda Attacks' /Tehran TV 17 Mar] 23

Velayati Interviewed on Disarmament, Resolution 598 /Tehran TV 18 Mar] 23

ISRAEL

Expatriate Paper Reports Upcoming Ofeq-2 Launch

/T. Yehezgeli; *YEDI'OT AHARONOT* 25 Mar] 24

LIBYA

Signing of Chemical Weapons Treaties Recalled	<i>[JANA 19 Mar]</i>	24
U.S. 'War Secretary' Cited on Libyan Missiles	<i>[JANA 22 Mar]</i>	24

PAKISTAN

Communications Satellite Launch Planned for June	<i>"Islamabad Radio 16 Mar"</i>	25
Factory Begins Producing Tanks, Armored Vehicles	<i>[Hong Kong AFP 19 Mar]</i>	25

SOVIET UNION

Maj Gen Sein Response on Number of Troops in Baltic MD		
<i>[V. Sein; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 3 Dec]</i>		26
Volkogonov Interviewed on His Vision of Armed Forces in Year 2000		
<i>[D. Volkogonov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 1 Jan]</i>		29
French Armed Forces Reorganization Described	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan]</i>	30
Development of French Missile, Israeli AWACS Discussed	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Jan]</i>	30
U.S. Reluctance to Liquidate Binary Chemical Weapons Challenged		
<i>[POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA No 4, Feb]</i>		31
Kortunov Discusses Nuclear Stability, Parity, Sufficiency		
<i>[S. Kortunov; MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 2, Feb]</i>		32
Cheney's Message on Troop Cuts, Modernization of Forces Questioned		
<i>[G. Gerasimov; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 9, 3 Mar]</i>		38
Dutch Reconnaissance Aircraft Purchase	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Mar]</i>	39
Arms Negotiator Richard Burt Interviewed on Progress of Talks	<i>[R. Burt; TRUD 21 Mar]</i>	39

WEST EUROPE

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar Exchanges 'Frank', 'Revealing'		
<i>[J. Reingenberg; Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 2 Feb]</i>		41
Paris, Madrid Sponsor Disarmament Seminar	<i>[H. Vernet; Paris LE QUOTIDIEN 5 Mar]</i>	42
Woerner Against Increase in NATO Arms Budget		
<i>[Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 21 Mar]</i>		43
NATO's Woerner: Nuclear Weapons 'Necessary'	<i>[Hamburg DPA 24 Mar]</i>	43

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Post-CFE Forces Planning Guidelines Emerging	<i>[H. Bruemmer; WEHRTECHNIK Feb]</i>	43
Stoltenberg Comments on Security, Disarmament		
<i>[G. Stoltenberg; WELT AM SONNTAG 18 Mar]</i>		47
Genscher Sees Disarmament as 'Key Issue'	<i>[DPA 25 Mar]</i>	50
Rhineland-Palatinate Urges U.S. Troop Removal		
Secret Government Paper on Sites	<i>[DER SPIEGEL 26 Mar]</i>	50
Chief on Vacating Bases	<i>[DPA 26 Mar]</i>	51
Armed Forces Planning Reduced Troop Strength	<i>[DPA 26 Mar]</i>	51

FRANCE

Chief of Staff Schmitt on USSR, Disarmament	<i>[M. Schmitt; LE MONDE 23 Mar]</i>	51
---------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	----

SOUTH AFRICA

Helicopter Enhances Air Strike Force

34010071A Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*
16 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Jan Taljaard: "Prototype Compares Well With Russian Havoc and U.S. Apache: Rooivalk Is a Hit"]

[Text] With the introduction of the Rooivalk attack helicopter, South Africa becomes a member of a select group, which probably includes only the designers of the Russian Mi 28 Havoc and the U.S. Apache.

The prototype of the Rooivalk was introduced yesterday at Atlas headquarters in Kempton Park. The helicopter has completed its ground tests and will begin flight tests next week.

Production of the helicopter will not begin immediately.

Besides the fact that the Rooivalk will probably cost significantly less than the estimated \$12 million (around 33 million rands) for the comparable Apache, it also has systems that alone will attract a great deal of interest on the foreign market.

Mr Kobus Eksteen, chief executive officer of ARM-SCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], revealed yesterday that the helicopter, as well as the systems built into it, will possibly be marketed internationally.

Nose sensors in the front of the Rooivalk also revealed yesterday that these systems could possibly consist of sophisticated night-vision equipment and target-tracking systems.

Similar systems are very expensive abroad—the Apache system costs an estimated \$900,000—and there is great demand for them. A locally developed missile system for destroying tanks is probably another part of the systems that will be marketed separately.

The Rooivalk thus lends the South African air strike force its first opportunity to actually take advantage of the so-called "third-dimension battlefield"—the air space between 0 and 30 m above the ground.

In this "third dimension," a helicopter like the Rooivalk can provide much better close ground support for troops than fixed-wing aircraft, with its relatively high speed and wide rotating circle.

The bad news for the pilots in the Air Force and the good news for taxpayers is that the Air Force is in no hurry to buy the helicopter. Maj Gen James Kriel, chief of Air Staff Operations, said at the presentation that the threat against South Africa has lessened considerably since the Air Force realized for the first time in 1976 that it needed an effective attack helicopter.

However, it is good to know that a weapon like the Rooivalk will be available in case circumstances change, he said. Still, further development of the Rooivalk will not be accorded the same priority as in the past.

Atlas began development of the Rooivalk in 1984 after the Air Force indicated its need for a new attack helicopter. Subsequently, Atlas introduced the Alpha XH-1 in 1985, which was to serve as an intermediary in the development of a full-fledged attack helicopter.

The Alpha is based on the fuselage and propulsion system of the Alouette III, and in 1986 the XTP-1 came out. This helicopter, which at first glance looked like a Puma with armored wings, was used to develop sub-systems for an attack helicopter.

Around 600 engineers, designers, technicians, and trained specialists worked on the project during development of the Rooivalk.

Rooivalk's Night Vision System Similar to Apache's

34010071B Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*
16 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] One of the biggest surprises during the presentation of the Rooivalk yesterday was the helicopter's nose sensors, which themselves indicate the possible presence of highly sophisticated night-vision equipment and guided weapon systems.

Although Atlas and ARMSCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] did not want to say much, nor did they permit a look at the cabin of the Rooivalk, the sensors on the nose of the Rooivalk are comparable to the same type of sensors on helicopters such as the U.S. Apache or the Italian Mangusta.

According to the Americans, it was precisely these systems on the Apache that largely contributed to the military success of the recent night attack in Panama, when the Apache had its baptism of fire.

These sensors are part of the systems that allow the pilots to use infra-red technology to "see" at night and that make target tracking and weapon guidance possible using lasers, among other things.

As with the Apache, TV cameras can also peer through the openings in the nose, while the image in the cabin can be enlarged for the pilot and weapon operator to improve their vision of targets and potential dangers.

In the Apache, the system is known as the PNVS/TADS (Pilot Night Vision System and Target Acquisition Designation Sight). PNVS uses infra-red imagery and is based on the principle that all objects emit infra-red waves of differing wavelengths.

In contrast, a system like TADS can consist of various integrated systems. In the Apache, it consists, among other things, of a laser source that uses its beams to read

the distance between the helicopter and targets and to guide the extremely expensive Hellfire missile to its target.

It is unlikely that South Africa—or most other Western countries—will ever use a system as expensive as the Hellfire missile system, but the Rooivalk is clearly a suitable platform for use of the system. It will in turn permit it to once again compete against the Apache on the international arms market.

However, the Rooivalk's system for target tracking can also be used to fire wire-guided anti-tank missiles, such as the European HOT and the U.S. TOW system.

Helicopter's Weapons System Rated World-Class

34010071C Johannesburg *BEELT* in Afrikaans
16 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] In the words of Maj Gen James Kriel, chief of Air Staff Operations, the Rooivalk is regarded at this stage of its development more as a platform for a variety of weapons than as an aircraft with a group of predetermined weapons.

Whatever the case, the first look at the provisional weaponry of the prototype shows that the Rooivalk is a helicopter that can compete with the best in the world with its current and provisional weaponry.

Not only does it have sensors that will make it possible to use the most sophisticated weaponry; the launch tubes for wire-guided missiles, unguided 68 mm rockets, and the Kukri air-to-air missile on its armored wings also indicate that it will be able to hold its own in any theater of combat. It is especially the launch tube for four wire-guided missiles under each armored wing that is significant. This is the first time that such a system has been seen locally, while it is regarded worldwide as the most effective system for eliminating tanks.

Probably only the Hellfire laser-guided missile system of the Americans and the vaguely comparable AT 6-Spiral of the Russians are more effective, but at the same time those two countries are also the only ones that can easily afford such systems.

Almost all other countries—in the West and in the East Bloc—use wire-guided systems, such as the American TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) or the comparable European HOT system.

These systems consist of a missile that is fired at a target and then guided by the weapon operator towards the target using sensors and wires. In the case of the Rooivalk, the sensors are in the nose.

Unguided rockets continue to comprise a significant part of the arsenal of all attack helicopters throughout the world, and the 68 mm rockets in the Rooivalk have already been thoroughly tested in combat by the pilots of Mirage jet fighters, for example.

In contrast to the U.S. Cobra attack helicopter, which supports the weight of the Sidewinder missile only with difficulty, the Rooivalk, with an estimated power output of nearly 3,400 brake horsepower, has more than enough power to carry and use the comparable Kukri missile.

That missile is used in the air-to-air role, and is exceptional in that it is coupled to a helmet visor that allows the weapon operator to aim the missile at a target simply by looking at it.

Then there is the nose-mounted GA 1 20 mm gun, which was developed locally and has been tested over the last few years in combat in Namibia and Angola. With a firing speed of 600 cartridges a minute and a muzzle speed of 720 m per second, this gun compares outstandingly with others of its type.

However, the GA 1 weighs only 39 kg, in contrast to the comparable French GIAT at 47 kg and the German Rh 202 at 75 kg. And weight, or rather the lack of it, counts for a lot in a helicopter.

This lack of weight leaves the Rooivalk, with its maximum takeoff weight of more than 8,000 kg, with room for more weapons and protective armor.

However, it is unusual that the gun, and obviously its ammunition as well, hangs right under the front end of the Rooivalk. In a combat situation, the Rooivalk will quickly fire its ammunition, which means that the helicopter's center of gravity will shift. This will in turn have an effect on the handling of the helicopter.

In contrast to this, the Americans shifted the Apache's 30 mm gun and ammunition more to the center of the helicopter, so that firing ammunition will not cause a change in the center of gravity.

But as can be seen from several other more visible improvements in the Rooivalk compared to other attack helicopters, Atlas's engineers have perhaps already built the solution into their helicopter.

ARMSCOR Strategy Following Defense Cuts

34000453C Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 9 Feb 90 p 87

[Text] Independence for Namibia. Peace talks in Angola and Mozambique. It's great news for regional stability but not for SA [South Africa's] armaments industry.

And the local industry is not suffering alone. Defence contractors and arms manufacturers in the US and Europe have been hard hit by the global easing of tensions in the past year. In SA, the R10bn-a-year [rand] electronics industry, in particular, is facing a tough adjustment after the sweeping cuts announced last month by the SA Defence Force (SADF).

Though the cuts are unlikely to stem the growth in SA's electronics industry, there is little doubt there will be a

major shift in business from military applications to the commercial sector and a greater emphasis on exports.

State-owned Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], the procurement agency for the SADF as well as the holding company for about 20 subsidiaries, has begun rationalising its operations substantially. The company's 26 000 employees will be cut by 10% this year.

The strategy of the trimmed-down Armscor over the next five years, according to human resources director Peet van den Heever, will be to maintain the viability of the SA armaments industry and remain technologically innovative in selected niche markets. Thus electronics technology, which is an increasingly important component of defence systems, could escape the most severe cutbacks.

Armscor is estimated to have spent more than R500m on defence electronics systems last year. This does not include electronics "embedded" in high-technology equipment such as aircraft, artillery and specialised vehicles. Several Armscor subsidiaries, including Kentron, Atlas Aircraft Corp and Eloptro, are involved in the development and manufacture of electronics equipment.

"Armscor intends looking after its existing clients, particularly the SADF, but will diversify its products and market base," Van den Heever says. He adds that replacing imports and boosting exports in collaboration with private industry are a priority.

However, contractors in the private sector still fill the bulk of Armscor's electronics needs. Grinaker Electronics, Altech and Barlow Rand's Reutech are among Armscor's largest electronics contractors. These companies, as well as many smaller electronics suppliers, are

expected to increase efforts to diversify their business away from defence contracts.

Anglovaal's Grinaker Electronics has already diversified into underground communications for mines and electronics systems for toll roads and other applications. It also has increased exports substantially. MD Sybrand Grobberlaar says that even though the company's Armscor business has grown in the last few years, it had declined as a percentage of total turnover. He does not expect the defence cuts to reduce profits, adding that the Armscor contracts have helped raise the quality of design and reliability of its products—all of which is ensuring strong sales in the domestic commercial and export markets.

The full extent of the defence cuts will not be known until the Defence budget is tabled in parliament on March 14. But government is understood to be considering a 20% cut in defence spending, from about R10bn last year to R8bn. The SADF has already cancelled 11 weapon and equipment projects and a further 49 are expected to be scaled back or suspended. The SADF is by far Armscor's largest customer and provided the group with revenue of more than R2bn last year. Other buyers include the SA Police, the prison Service and, to a much lesser degree, the private sector.

In the last 10 years Armscor has become one of SA's largest exporters of manufactured goods. Market research firm Business & Marketing Intelligence estimates that Armscor's exports of military electronics equipment generated about R150m last year. But Armscor's Van den Heever points out that exports are a small part of the group's revenue. He acknowledges that growth in this area will not be easy. "There is a worldwide downturn in the military market. Many countries are experiencing defence cuts and are trying to sell products all over the world. It's very competitive."

War Threats During Detente Examined

HK0503131590 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 16 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Cheng Feng (7115 6912): "Beware of War Threats during a Relaxed Situation"]

[Text] So far, most wars that have broken out in human society have been limited wars and armed conflicts. Since the end of World War II, no other world war nor worldwide war has occurred, but nearly 200 limited wars and local armed conflicts have broken out. Naturally, limited wars and local armed conflicts as the main component of wars in human society have become a noticeable question.

In recent years, with the relaxation of U.S.-Soviet relations, the East-West arms race has slowed down somewhat, and the level of military confrontation has also been lowered gradually. Those involved in several sizable limited wars [ju bu zhan zheng 1444 6752 2069 3630] have turned to seek political solutions. In these circumstances, some people abroad said that "the cold war has come to an end" and "the military struggle is giving way to political and economic struggle." Many people have obviously reduced their concern over limited wars and armed conflicts, and are too optimistic about the world situation in the 1990's.

While noticing the general tendency of detente in the current international situation, I do not think that we can neglect the fact that various unstable factors still exist to a serious degree. As members of the Armed Forces, we must maintain a sober head and sufficient vigilance against war threats.

In order to more clearly note the possible outbreak of limited wars and armed conflicts in the 1990's, it is necessary for us to first briefly review the situation in the world's military struggle in the 1980's.

The decade began with a superpower's armed invasion of Afghanistan by dispatching 100,000 troops, and ended with another superpower's armed invasion of Panama by using 25,000 troops to achieve absolute military predominance. Over the past 10 years, there were at least 40 limited wars and armed conflicts of various sizes in the world. Apart from such wars, in which large countries bullied small ones as in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of Panama and Grenada, there was also a full-scale war between Iran and Iraq that lasted for eight years; a war between Britain and Argentina to contend for territory and offshore resources on the Malvinas [Falkland] Islands; the U.S. air raid on Libya; Israel's blitzkrieg against Iraq's nuclear reactor; the air battles between Israel and Syria in Lebanon's territorial air; and the air battles between the United States and Libya over the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, there were such wars as the Cambodian War, the Arab-Israeli War, the Lebanese Civil War, and many

civil wars, and wars between different countries in Africa and Central America, which were all extended from the 1970's.

The frequent wars were all linked with interest conflicts. The interest contradictions between different countries will become more complicated and intense along with the intensification of competition. Moreover, it is still impossible to eliminate hegemonism and power politics in the contemporary world. Therefore, limited wars and armed conflicts will continue to exist in the 1990's, and some new hot spots may appear.

First, we should note that the military interference by the superpowers and other military powers in weak and small countries may continue to be a major cause of the outbreak of new limited wars and armed conflicts in the 1990's. In the past decade, the Soviet Union has somewhat scaled down its external expansion because its strong position declined, and it was faced with internal and external difficulties. The United States got the upper hand against the Soviet Union in the balance of strength, and obviously increased the actions of direct military invasion and military interference, and enlarged the scale of these actions. This tendency of the United States and its influence over other military powers cannot but cause people's vigilance.

Second, many wars that did not come to an end in the 1980's, such as the civil war in Afghanistan, the Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia, the U.S. military intervention in Panama's political situation, the civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the civil war in Lebanon, will continue to be the major component parts of the limited wars and armed conflicts in the 1990's.

In particular, we must not neglect the fact that the basic contradictions in the world have not been solved because of the general detente tendency in the world situation, and some unstable factors have been developing in recent years. This will not only lead to tensions in some regions, but may also lead to the outbreak of new armed conflicts and even limited wars. Although the U.S.-Soviet arms race has been slowed down, the two sides are still continuing the development of high-tech weaponry and equipment of high quality.

The two sides are still trying to seek new "test grounds" for their new weapons and new military technologies. When invading Panama not long ago, the United States used its latest F-117 invisible fighter planes for the first time. According to the arms development periods in the United States and the Soviet Union, both countries will put a number of important weapons and equipment into use in the first years of the next century, thus raising their arms race to a higher level. In particular, the United States is still developing and deploying the star wars system, and this is very likely to upset the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the U.S. military posture will become more offensive and adventurous. At the same time, the multipolar

tendency of the world will develop more rapidly, and the influence and control capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union will be relatively weakened. Being stimulated by this situation, some intermediate countries and regional powers will try to expand their political and military influence, and speed up the pace of developing their military strength. Some of them may also increase their desire for conducting external military interference. For example, Japan and India have been increasing their military expenses at a fairly high rate for many years in the past, and their military strength has been built up steadily. They will maintain this tendency in the 1990's, and this will have major impact on the security situation in the Asian-Pacific region. In addition, some internal problems caused by racial and religious conflicts and social unfairness in some Third World countries and East European countries, may give rise to new turmoil there; it will be hard to eliminate the interest conflicts between some countries; when various countries in the world pay more attention to their competition in comprehensive national strength based on their economic strength, the contention for territory, territorial seas, and maritime resources will become more intense. All this will become the hotbed for engendering new conflicts and wars. It will be very dangerous if we are confused by the superficial peace.

Development of 'Star Wars' Program Viewed

HK0803134490 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 9, 26 Feb 90 pp 28-29

[Article by Wen Deyi (3306 1795 5030): "Development Trends of the U.S. 'Star Wars' Program"]

[Text] Seven years have passed since the impressive U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" program, or the "Star Wars" program, as is usually called in the press circles, was officially put forward on 23 March 1983. Over the past seven years, some major successes have been scored in the large-scale hi-tech research and development project for national defense, but it has also faced numerous difficulties and obstacles. After numerous adjustments and revisions, the U.S. Government has lowered its excessive expectations and people's understanding of this program also has undergone marked changes. How will this program develop in the 1990's? We shall make a brief review and forecast here.

Major Successes Already Scored

Concentrating on the development of advanced defense technology and contention for future military supremacy in outer space, this program also covers many research and development plans. Over the past seven years, the U.S. Congress has appropriated \$21.4 billion for this program; the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization of the Defense Department has organized over 700 research units, corporations, and universities at home and abroad to conduct extensive studies on various

necessary key technologies and signed research contracts covering over 5,000 items, with over 28,000 people joining in the program.

To establish an effective ballistic missile defense system, it is necessary to develop the necessary technologies, including detection technology capable of spotting and identifying targets, arms technology capable of intercepting and destroying incoming missiles, and technology capable of organically linking detection system with defensive weapons and forming operational management, command, control, and communications into an integrated whole. Over the past seven years, the "Star Wars" program has made major headway in developing these technologies. For example, in the field of detection technology, it has studied and tested various types of detectors capable of spotting and identifying targets. During a large-scale space experiment in September 1986, as many as 42 detectors were tested, which provided bases for making the best option. In the field of defensive weapon technology, extensive studies and experiments have been conducted on two advanced categories of weapons, kinetic energy and directional energy. Kinetic energy weapons refer to those using high-speed intercepting warheads to destroy targets by direct collision. Experiments show that a rocket-propelled kinetic weapon can successfully intercept and destroy a flying ballistics missile and its warhead, and that major breakthroughs have been made in reducing the size of this weapon and cutting production cost. Directional energy weapons refers to a new type of weapons which train a highly concentrated and directional energetic light beam or atomic particle beam to a target and destroy it. They chiefly include laser weapons and neutral-particle-beam weapons. Although directional energy weapons are still in the stage of laboratory research, remarkable headway has also been made in terms of technology. For example, an option has been made on land-based free electronics laser weapon. An experiment on neutral-particle-beam weapon technology was conducted in the air for the first time in September 1989. In the field of operational management, an initial system plan has been worked out and the existing equipment has been used to demonstrate the feasibility of command and control.

Over the past seven years, the "Star Wars" program has effectively prevented the Soviet Union from violating the anti-missile treaty and promoted U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. In an effort to check implementation of the "Star Wars" program, the Soviet Union agreed in September 1989 to dismantle the huge missile early-warning radar [xiang kong zhen dao dan yu jing lei da 4161 2235 7109 1418 1734 7315 6226 7191 6671] built in Krasnoyarsk, and admitted that the radar facility violated the anti-missile treaty. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has also made major concessions in the arms control talks by agreeing to substantially cut its offensive strategic nuclear weapons.

The various advanced technologies studied in the "Star Wars" program has extensive potentials for application.

A prompt shift of these technologies to civilian departments and other weapons is of great economic and military significance. The United States has begun studying the use of these technologies in medical treatment, agriculture, oil drilling, and environmental protection, which is also boosting the development of conventional weapon technology.

The Difficulties and Obstacles Faced

Given the numerous difficulties and obstacles faced by the program, the U.S. Defense Department has, over the past seven years, had to annually adjust and revise the plan, lower the target requirements, reduce the planned scale, and delay the planned progress.

Technical difficulties: The "Star Wars" program is a technologically complicated one and many technologies are not so easily solved as originally expected. The United States once placed its principal hope on directional energy weapons but the results in the past seven years show that, even by the most optimistic estimate, the United States should at least spend 10 to 15 years of ample research and raise their performance by over 100 times before their application in defense ballistic missiles can be taken into consideration. Operational management is the most complicated problem in this program. To enable all-round coordination of the strategic defense system, it is necessary to have several million and even up to 10 million computer commands. It is impossible to make sure that so many commands will not go wrong. Survival capability is a key requirement which must be met in a strategic defense system, and many studies hold that undermining this system is easier and more cost-saving than deploying it.

Political obstacles: To enable the program's research work to advance continuously, it is necessary to carry out practical tests. But the anti-missile treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 laid down strict restrictions on these tests. Over the past seven years, the Soviet Union has always used this treaty to pin down the "Star Wars" program. To this end, it has not hesitated to make major concessions. The U.S. Government has proposed redefining the anti-missile treaty in order to pave the way for testing this program, but the Congress insisted that traditional definition of the treaty must be observed, thus making it impossible for the U.S. Defense Department to carry out some experiments for this program.

Insufficient funding: The "Star Wars" program needs huge investments. According to initial calculations, it was necessary to invest \$26 billion in fiscal years 1985-89 but, in fact, the Congress approved only \$16.5 billion. In the 1990 fiscal year, the Bush administration applied for \$4.9 billion in expenses but the Congress has approved only \$3.7 billion. This represents the first minus growth.

In the face of numerous difficulties and obstacles, the U.S. Defense Department has repeatedly adjusted and revised its "Star Wars" program: In terms of guiding

thinking, it has shifted from stressing all-round defense to limited defense, thus lowering the program to a means of stepping up nuclear deterrent. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney explicitly pointed out: The establishment of an all-round defense system is a thing of the distant future. In terms of development priority, it has shifted the emphasis from directional energy weapons to the development of relatively mature kinetic energy weapons. In terms of development steps, it has put forward a plan for phased deployment and is studying various first-phase deployment options which are feasible technologically, politically, and economically. It has thus continuously lowered its demands and delayed its progress.

Development Trends in the 1990's

Where there is a lance, there is a shield. All weapon technologies develop in the struggle between lances and shields. Since the late 1950's, to counter the threat of ballistic missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union have been studying the technology against ballistic missiles. It can be predicted that, in the future, they will not give up studying this technology. The United States is in a technologically superior position. Thanks to its ability to blaze new trails technologically and push forward other technologies, the "Star Wars" program has displayed its strategic deterrent capability. For this reason, the program will still maintain its momentum in the 1990's and serve as an ace with which the United States maintains its status as the overlord of the world. However, with the change in Soviet and East European situation, U.S.-Soviet detente can no longer be reversed and the demand to speedily establish a strategic defense system has been lowered. Meanwhile, to reduce the budget deficits and make a detente posture, the United States will also cut its defense budget, and the funds allocated for the development of the program will at most remain at the present level and will even be reduced. Given this great environment, the development pattern of this program in the 1990's is likely as follows:

First, emphasis will be laid on studying key technologies. The United States will not rashly violate or abrogate the anti-missile treaty but, in a way conforming to the anti-missile treaty, will continue studying and developing advanced strategic defense technologies, with the stress on studying detection technology and kinetic energy weapons. In so doing, not only will it not run a political risk but it will also cost less money. It can also use this technological capability as a means of deterrence.

Second, it sticks to the tough stand of preparing to deploy these weapons. The program is an ace with which the United States displays its technological strength; it is also a bargaining chip in the arms control talks with the Soviet Union. To exert pressure on the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government will stick to its tough stand of preparing for deployment when the conditions are mature in order to force the Soviet Union to make major concessions and seek strategic gains. Meanwhile, the United States will, in the near term, still seek to revise

the anti-missile treaty to allow for more tests and push the development of anti-missile technology to a mature stage.

Third, there is little possibility that the strategic defense systems will be deployed in the 1990's. Before the year 2000, there will be no more than three possible strategic defense systems which can be achieved technologically in the "Star Wars" program: 1) the protection system preventing a small number of accidentally-fired missiles; 2) the limited protection system protecting land-based intercontinental missiles; and 3) the system which the U.S. Defense Department insists on deploying in the first phase. The first one does not violate the anti-missile treaty but it does not have any practical significance; the second and third ones necessitate the abrogation of the anti-missile treaty but there is little possibility given the current development trend of the international situation. But the United States will probably deploy a space-based detection system in the 1990's, which can be used to collect information about missile tests conducted by the Soviet Union and other countries and which can also be used as a verification means in the arms control, in order to create conditions for the future deployment of the strategic defense system.

Bright Prospects for Disarmament Seen

HK1303034190 Hong Kong *LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION* in Chinese No 10, 5 Mar 90, pp 26-28

[Article by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501): "Prospects for Disarmament Talks Appear Good"]

[Text] A French diplomat forecast at the turn of the year: 1990 would be a "disarmament year." In the first two months of this "disarmament year," new progress could be seen in arms control and disarmament. Probably it is expected that such a good beginning will push some items in disarmament talks to a new height of initialling and implementing some new treaties.

Very Hopeful Disarmament Momentum

A new momentum is taking shape with regards to arms control and disarmament, a universal concern, on the basis of the initial results last year.

On 11 November, the United States and the USSR concluded a new round of routine negotiations on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and both sides expressed that they would work harder to maintain various clauses in the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On 15 January, the sixth round of the U.S.-USSR talks on restricting nuclear tests began to seek an accord on how to guarantee observation of restricting all nuclear tests. On the following day, the multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons resumed to seek the formulation of an accord on banning production and possession of chemical weapons. Meanwhile, the U.S.-USSR talks on chemical weapons were also under way to discuss technical cooperation between the

two sides on destroying chemical weapons. On 22 January, the 13th round of U.S.-USSR talks on cutting back strategic arms began, and the two sides reached an accord on mutual monitoring of nuclear warhead tests. On 8 February, the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers met for the sixth time since the Bush Administration took office. The Soviet side announced its new position that it would no longer insist on linking the talks on cutting back strategic arms to implementing the treaty on anti-ballistic missiles. On 12 February, a U.S.-USSR accord was reached in Ottawa. The two sides planned to cut back each of their troop levels deployed in central Europe to 195,000. On the same day, 23 foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) convened an "open sky" conference, the first of its kind in history, and unanimously agreed on the "open sky" project, which includes four basic themes. This new progress in disarmament talks has laid a sound foundation for future talks, and in addition has created conditions for reaching accord on some disarmament items within this year.

Close-up of Disarmament Positions

True, there are inherent causes for the emergence of a new disarmament momentum, but more important is the fact that those countries that have direct interest from disarmament have one after another readjusted their own disarmament policy to various degrees to meet the development needs of their domestic and international situation. Such readjustments have helped in reducing the antagonism of each other's aims, and increasing their acceptability to each other, with the surfacing of a gradual converging trend in each disarmament position.

Based on the development of the situation in Eastern Europe and changes in the world security environment, the Bush Administration has recently readjusted its disarmament policy by a wide margin, and decided on a five-point goal for its disarmament strategy: 1) To force a rather wide-scale disarmament on the USSR so as to reduce its military threat to U.S. security and interests; 2) to settle the knotty issues resulting from the difficulties in military expenditures for arms development in order to maintain its key strategic deterrent and major research and development projects; 3) to urge their alliance to take up greater obligations in "common defense," in order to hold together the Western "collective security" system; 4) to help Gorbachev tide over his difficulties, and to guard against a reversal of the Soviet political and economic reforms that are tending to converge with the West; and 5) to get rid of the difficulties in U.S.-USSR relations resulting from military confrontation, and to build a new strategic relation with the USSR. The Bush Administration has made important readjustments of its disarmament strategy and policy aims precisely to achieve a lower balance through the channel of mutual disarmament in order to ease the pressure that Gorbachev is facing at home, to consolidate his position, and to urge the USSR to turn its attention from competing with the United States to dealing with regional

conflicts in joint efforts. According to this newly-set five-point strategic goal, the Bush Administration's position on disarmament is all the more flexible and positive.

Gorbachev's stand on disarmament has all along been rather flexible and positive; his proposals on disarmament were frequent, and could be surprising sometimes; and on several occasions, important concessions were made. Especially recently, Gorbachev has changed his stand on certain key issues of nuclear and conventional disarmament to meet the demands of the United States and the West. Gorbachev's major intentions are: 1) To reduce the heavy burden on the national economy resulting from arms development by large-scale unilateral disarmament; 2) to dispel the West's anxieties through unequal disarmament to show Soviet sincerity in seeking relaxation, and to further seek help from the West for the Soviet economic reforms; 3) to force the United States to cut back and eventually pull out all its troops stationed in Europe through European conventional disarmament, and to make use of its geographical advantages to shape into its strategic advantages; and 4) to change the Soviet political image through pulling out its troops in Eastern Europe, to avoid the difficulties of the unpopular sentiment toward Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe.

Although there are differences in the obligations of various West European countries in the NATO defense system, they take a rather unanimous stand on major issues of disarmament, especially on European conventional disarmament. West European countries have continuously harmonized their positions and have played an increasingly greater role. West European countries' main considerations are: 1) To force disarmament by a wide margin on the WTO and the Soviet pullout from Eastern Europe through talks and initialing treaties to eliminate the existing factors of war or conflicts in Europe in order to safeguard their own security and interests; 2) to shape an atmosphere of further relaxation between Eastern and Western Europe through disarmament, and to create a more favorable climate for East European countries to evolve in the direction of Western "democratization"; and 3) to gradually weaken the military significance of NATO and the WTO through lowering Europe's armament level, to change their functions, and to give play to the political and economic impacts of West European countries and eventually unify Europe following the pattern of the West. Because West European countries have not entirely dispelled their anxieties over the Soviet and WTO threats, they desire that the presence of U.S. military forces be maintained at the lowest level, as a security guarantee to West European countries.

Because of the recent drastic changes in the political situation, East European countries have changed their traditional practice of echoing whatever the Soviet Union said. Moreover, they have actively proposed to cut their own military forces, and encourage Soviet disarmament by pulling out its troops stationed in their countries. Through disarmament, East European countries attempt: 1) to ease the heavy burden of armament

on their already very slack national economies in order to guarantee the economic stability of the current governments; 2) to create a security environment acceptable to the West in order to draw economic aid from Western countries; and 3) to get rid of Soviet bondage in the form of a military pact on the sovereignty of East European countries as best they can, and to eliminate the military pressure from the Soviet Union rather than Western Europe. At present, many East European countries have demanded the Soviet Union pull out its troops stationed in their countries out of the need to force the United States to pull out its troops from Western Europe; on the other hand, they did so out of their anxieties for the Soviet military presence; they worry that the Soviet Union would resort to armed intervention as it did before on the grounds of quelling "internal turmoil."

Many Good Signs

Four main items are under discussion in the bilateral and multilateral talks on arms control and disarmament; namely, talks on cutting back strategic arms, European conventional disarmament, overall ban on chemical weapons, and restrictions on nuclear tests. Many good signs have recently surfaced in all these talks, indicating possible great progress to be scored this year.

On the talks on cutting back strategic arms. The U.S.-USSR talks on cutting back strategic arms began in 1985. Although the two sides have reached unanimity on each cutting its nuclear delivery systems to 1,600, each side's strategic nuclear warheads to 6,000, and each side's intercontinental and submarine-launched guided-missile warheads to 4,900, and set the basic framework on the draft accord, the hurdles in the way of some major issues have not been removed. In September last year, the two sides made concessions one after another at the fourth meeting of U.S.-USSR foreign ministers; consequently, marked progress was made in the talks on cutting back strategic arms. The Soviet side renounced its persistent stand that talks on cutting back strategic arms must be linked to the "Strategic Defense Initiative project," and proposed that the issue of sea-based cruise missiles be settled as a single issue instead of insisting on the issue being included in the treaty on cutting back strategic arms. At the same time, the United States also retreated from its original position to ban land-based mobile intercontinental guided missiles. Early this year, the two sides reached an accord on reciprocal checkup of ballistic guided missile warheads. In addition, the Soviet side pronounced that it would retreat from its position of insisting on linking talks on cutting back strategic arms to observing the treaty on anti-ballistic guided missiles, while the U.S. side even expressed its intention of agreeing to discuss the Soviet proposal on the second phase of cutting back strategic arms right away. With the removal of one hurdle after another, now only one thorny issue remains in the talks, namely the ceiling for the number in each category of intercontinental guided missiles, cruise missiles, and bombers. It is estimated that this thorny issue will be settled in the coming round of talks. At present, both the U.S. and Soviet sides are

actively making preparations for the summit to be held in late June this year, and will do their best to initial an accord on cutting back strategic arms.

On European conventional disarmament. Talks on European conventional disarmament that began in March 1989 have entered their fifth round. The talks involve 23 nations of NATO and the WTO; moreover, the categories of arms involved in the cuts are manifold, and the difficulty can be rather great. However, under the situation of the East-West relaxation and the drastic change in the USSR and East European situation, progress in the talks can be rather smooth, and all hurdles in the way of some major talks have been gradually removed. Last year, NATO and the WTO reached a unanimous accord on the ceiling of tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopters (namely, 20,000 tanks, 28,000 armored vehicles, and 1,900 helicopters,) while the United States and the USSR also agreed to cutting the number of each of their troops to 275,000. However, differences remain on the ceiling of combat planes and artillery, the definition of tanks and armored vehicles, and the cutting of naval forces in the European sea area. This year, the United States and the USSR as well as the two blocs have made new concessions one after another to initial a treaty on European conventional disarmament as soon as possible: NATO has agreed to the ceiling of 4,700 combat planes, and the definition of tank and armored vehicles as proposed by the WTO; while the USSR and the WTO agreed to Bush's proposal of the U.S. and USSR each maintaining 195,000 troops stationed in central Europe, and the U.S. maintaining another 30,000 troops stationed in other areas in Europe. Now the remaining obstacles are the ceiling of artillery, naval disarmament, and checks on conventional forces. It is estimated that these issues will be settled in talks this year, and accords may be reached by the end of the year.

On talks on chemical weapons. Talks on chemical weapons include the U.S.-USSR bilateral talks and multilateral talks among some 40 countries. Marked progress was made in the U.S.-USSR talks last September. The two sides initialled a memorandum of understanding on reciprocal checks of chemical weapons and data exchanging. Both sides have made important concessions: The United States advocated that each side cut

back its stock of chemical weapons to 20 percent of the U.S. existing stock. As soon as the pact on banning chemical weapons comes into effect, the United States will immediately halt the implementation of its project for modernizing binary chemical weapons. The USSR has not only agreed to the U.S. proposal, but even proposed to thoroughly destroy all chemical weapons of the United States and the USSR. At present, all major hurdles in the way of the talks have been removed. It is generally estimated that the possibility of reaching an accord on cutting back chemical weapons within this year is rather great. Compared with it, the multilateral talks on overall banning of chemical weapons are in a stalemate, while incessant talks on some important clauses remain fruitless. Consequently, it is rather difficult to foretell a date for initialling the pact on banning chemical weapons.

On the talks on restricting nuclear tests. Marked progress has been made after several rounds in the U.S.-USSR bilateral talks on this issue, which began in November 1987. Long ago, the two sides reached an accord on the major clause in restricting nuclear tests, namely, limiting underground explosions for military and civil purposes to an equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT. Current talks have focused on measures for checking. Talks are not being conducted between the two sides on formulating new clauses on checking based on the data obtained from the joint on-site surveys as negotiated. In view of the fact that no major differences exist in their bilateral talks, both the United States and the USSR have expressed that a new protocol on checking would be initialled at the coming summit.

The good beginning surfaced in the sphere of disarmament early this year has really brought new hopes to people who seek peace and stability; at the same time, it has instilled new factors in the tendency of world relaxation. However, we must also see that many hurdles remain in the way of arms control and disarmament at present. A good beginning does not mean that the fruit of initialling a treaty is reaped. Even if a treaty is initialled, its implementation may not be guaranteed; even if a treaty is signed on several items in the talks, there are still many items in the entire sphere of disarmament awaiting to be dealt with. The realization of everlasting and overall world peace and stability involves still greater efforts.

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

First Asian Nuclear Cooperation Forum Opens

Japan Takes Initiative

OW1203075090 Tokyo KYODO in English 0701 GMT
12 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 12 (KYODO)—Japan intends to take initiative in the promotion of nuclear power cooperation in Asia, Japan's science and technology minister told a gathering of senior Asian atomic energy officials Monday.

Tomoji Oshima, state minister in charge of the Science and Technology Agency, made the pledge in an opening address to the First International Conference for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia, sponsored by Japan's Atomic Energy Commission, an advisory body to the prime minister.

Representatives from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Japan are participating in the two-day meeting.

Oshima said Japan, which has so far helped nuclear power cooperation mainly through exchanges of nuclear specialists, intends to promote cooperation further to ensure effective use of the region's limited resources.

The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, a trade group affiliated to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, has sent missions to the participating countries over the past two years to sound out ways of how Japan can apply its technology and financial assistance in the field of atomic energy, conference officials said.

In Monday morning's session, Djali Ahimsa, director general of Indonesia's Atomic Energy Agency, spoke of the present status of nuclear energy development in his country, and Chen Zhaobo, vice president of the China National Nuclear Industry Corporation, spoke about China's future nuclear energy plans.

Ahimsa confirmed that Indonesia has asked for Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to conduct a feasibility study on the site for a planned nuclear power plant in Java.

Indonesia, however, has also asked the United States and France to assist with the feasibility study and has not yet decided which country will carry it out, Ahimsa said. Government officials said that while Japan cannot provide ODA for building a nuclear plant abroad, the aid can be used for feasibility studies.

Chen said China is steadily building nuclear power plants by its own efforts and is actively applying radio-isotope and radiation technology in the industrial, agricultural and medical fields.

Conference Closes in Tokyo

OW1303225190 Tokyo KYODO in English 1341 GMT
13 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 13 (KYODO)—A gathering of senior Asian atomic energy officials closed a two-day sess on Tuesday with a pledge to hold the conference annually and explore regional cooperation for the development of safe uses for nuclear power officials said.

In the first international conference for nuclear cooperation in Asia, Japan suggested the region jointly develop experimental atomic reactors. Japan also proposed cooperation in the development of radiation techniques to reduce damage to agricultural products and to cure uterine cancer, which is common in women in the region, officials said.

Participants from China, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Japan called for the training of safety specialists who can help insure the safety of nuclear power, the officials said. Many nations urged regional cooperation to promote public acceptance of nuclear power citing growing criticism following the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in the Soviet Union in 1986, they said.

The group agreed the first step toward regional cooperation programs should include such things as financial burden-sharing and coordination of goals, they added. Japan will face the task of securing financial support, including governmental official development assistance (ODA), officials of the Science and Technology Agency said.

On Monday, participating nations lectured on the status of nuclear energy development in their countries. The conference was sponsored by Japan's Atomic Energy Commission, advisory body to the prime minister.

The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, a trade group affiliated with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, has sought ways Japan could contribute technology and financial assistance to the field of atomic energy and has sent missions to the participating nations during the past two years.

The next meeting, expected by March 1991, has not been set officials said.

INDONESIA

Minister on Tentative Date of Satellite Launch

BK2003135490 Jakarta ANTARA in English
1309 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Jakarta, March 21 (OANA-ANTARA)—The Palapa B-2R satellite, which will support Indonesia's domestic telecommunication system, will most probably be launched before mid-April, between April 9 and 12, Minister of Tourism, Posts, and Telecommunication Susilo Sudarman said to the press after his meeting with

President Suharto at Bina Graha [Presidential Office] here on Tuesday [20 March].

The problem is that before the B-2R satellite, several other satellites, mainly for defence and security needs, have to be launched, he said, adding that everything which has to do with the last preparations of the B-2R launching, will be reported from the USA on March 22.

Although the launching of the Indonesian communication satellite has to wait, but it will not upset Indonesia's telecommunication system which is currently in operation. The satellite which will be replaced by the B-2R satellite is still able to operate for at least another year, the minister said. [passage omitted]

Minister Comments on Planned Nuclear Reactor

*BK2003133590 Jakarta ANTARA in English
1305 GMT 20 Mar 90*

[Text] Jakarta, March 21 (OANA-ANTARA)—Indonesia will only concentrate on building a nuclear reactor with a capacity of 600 mw [megawatts], despite the construction of nuclear reactors with capacities between 800 to 1,000 mw in advanced countries, Research and Technology Minister B.J. Habibie said here on Tuesday [20 March].

Answering reporters after the opening of a seminar on nuclear energy, which was jointly organized by the BPPT (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology), Batan (National Atomic Energy Agency) and the Japan-based Mitsubishi Corp. Ltd., Minister Habibie said that the building of a nuclear reactor with a capacity of only 600 mw was to fit in with the state electricity company's nuclear energy requirement which at present is already approaching the 600 mw.

Indonesia, he said, is expected to use nuclear energy for power generating early in the next (21st) century, so that preparations should be taken by mid-1990.

Habibie went on to say that the building of a nuclear power plant is safe against possible radiation dangers because of the vast experience in this field. Based on research results, it is evident that nuclear radiation is far smaller compared with coal radiation, he said.

On the price of electricity generated by nuclear power, it is very competitive because it is almost the same as that of electricity produced by coal-fueled power plants, Minister Habibie said.

British Defense Official Offers Weapons Sale

*BK2403052090 Jakarta ANTARA in English 0328 GMT
24 Mar 90*

[Text] Jakarta, March 24 (OANA/ANTARA)—Britain is willing to sell to Indonesia various kinds of war equipment, such as jet fighters, warships, and missiles in the framework of enhancing the Indonesian Armed Forces' capability, Britain's Minister of Defense Archie

Hamilton [title as received], told ANTARA here on Friday [23 March]. Hamilton, who arrived here on Wednesday, has held talks with a number of Indonesian officials.

"We are discussing about the possibility of selling warships, jet fighters, as well as missiles," he said. As the visit of the British defense minister is still exploratory in nature, no contract has been made. The Indonesian and British officials have also discussed the advancement of the education program for the Indonesian Armed Forces members in the West European country.

Hamilton expressed his hope that military cooperation between the two countries will be increased in the future, saying that the result has been satisfactory.

Asked about the aim of a recent demonstration made by two British Air Force Tornadoes in the country, Hamilton said that it was only intended for introducing the fighters to the Indonesian people especially the Indonesian Armed Forces.

"I will rejoice if Indonesia wants to buy this aircraft," he said.

JAPAN

Defense Chief on U.S. Bases in Okinawa

*OW1703065090 Naha RYUKYU SHIMPO in Japanese
16 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1*

[Text] Defense Agency Director General Yozo Ishikawa granted an interview on 15 March to a RYUKYU SHIMPO reporter for the first time since he took office. Regarding the U.S. military bases issue in Okinawa, he said: "We have no plans to review the security treaty. However, we want to promote the realignment of the bases as a basic policy. If our nation does not tackle the issue with a firm goal, but only with the conventional policy, the realignment will not materialize." Thus, he indicated a positive posture on realignment.

Commenting on the remarks made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney, during his visit to Japan, about U.S. plans to cut U.S. troops in Asia he said: "I heard that the United States plans to reduce its forces in Asia by more than 10 percent in the next 3 years. However, I do not think that it will affect Japan's defense policy. If the United States advances a specific plan, we will study it and deal firmly with it." As to the relationship between the U.S. plan to reduce its troops in Asia and the issue of the realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, he said: "The pace of realignment has been slow. Since 75 percent of U.S. forces in Japan are in Okinawa, realignment should be implemented in accordance with a basic policy. With regard to practical matters, our nation can not do anything unless it tackles them not only with policy, but with a firm goal. He thus indicated a positive posture on resolving the realignment issue. Asked whether he plans to implement realignment by reviewing the security treaty, he said: "I think that the return of U.S. bases in

Okinawa will materialize within the existing framework without having to resort to a review of the security treaty involving a policy shift. As some military facilities are to be returned under an agreement between Japan and the United States, we should carry out the agreement step by step."

Kaifu on Defense Policy, U.S. Presence

OW1903141190 Tokyo KYODO in English 1128 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Manila, March 19 (KYODO)—Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu has indicated support for the retention of U.S. strategic bases in the Philippines, saying America's military presence contributes to peace and stability in the region.

In an interview published Monday in the PHILIPPINE STAR, Kaifu also reiterated that Japan would not feel impelled to rearm if Manila rejects an extension of the lease on the U.S. bases after it expires in 1991. "Basically, this is a bilateral matter between the United States and the Philippines," said Kaifu, when asked about his government's attitude toward the U.S. bases in the country. "Generally speaking, however, I consider that the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability in this area." Preliminary talks on the fate of the two key air and naval bases and four other minor facilities are expected to begin in mid-April.

"Japan's fundamental defense policy under its peace-oriented constitution is to maintain an exclusively defensive posture and not to develop into a military power that could pose a threat to other countries," Kaifu said. "This policy of Japan shall firmly be maintained in the future." Kaifu made his remarks in a seven-page written reply to questions posed by STAR publisher Maximo Soliven. "The basic aim of Japan's defense policy is to prevent aggression of our country by possessing an adequate defense capability of our own," he said.

In the same interview, Kaifu said he intends to pursue efforts "to bring about a major breakthrough" in Japanese-Soviet relations by deepening and expanding dialogue between the two countries. He cited visits to Tokyo by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze later this year and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. "We sincerely aspire to normalize Japanese-Soviet relations as soon as possible by settling the northern territories issue and signing a peace treaty," Kaifu said. "This would benefit both Japan and the Soviet Union and, I believe, contribute to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and also to the further improvement of East-West relations."

Kaifu also declared that "Japan will maintain a position of extending as much support as possible to the government of President Corazon Aquino in its nation-building efforts." He pointed to Japan's large official development assistance to the Philippines, its strong support to

the multilateral assistance program, and its investments in the country, which rank as the second-highest next to the United States.

USSR 'Preparing To Export' Space Technology

OW1903165690 Tokyo KYODO in English 1321 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 19 (KYODO)—The Soviet Union is ready to provide Japan with its advanced space development technology, a top Soviet official in charge of the nation's space program said here on Monday. Alfred Shestakov, deputy minister of the Soviet Machine Building Ministry who arrived in Japan last Saturday, said Moscow is preparing to export its advanced space development technology to foreign companies in line with "perestroika." Shestakov made a speech before business executives from Japanese space-related companies at a meeting in Tokyo sponsored by Horie Planning, a Japanese trading firm specializing in the space industry.

Horie purchased the Mir space station from the Soviet Union last October in an effort to promote domestic development in the field for what it termed a bargain price of 10 million U.S. dollars. The Mir station was later sold to a Japanese construction company in Hokkaido. A study of the Mir station is expected to provide the industry with valuable know-how on manned space flight.

In his speech, Shestakov said the plan to sell its advanced space products will include its launching vehicles such as the Energia, a life support system, and other technical systems, all of which have been developed by the Soviet Union over the past 40 years.

NORTH KOREA

Japanese Arms Buildup Considered 'Offensive'

SK1703111290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1039 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang, March 17 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today hits out at the Japanese reactionary ruling quarters which are stepping up arms buildup, seeking overseas expansion.

The voluble talk of the Japanese reactionary ruling quarters about "moderate armed forces," "defence" and "peace" is nothing but a deception aimed at dispelling apprehensions as to the militaristic danger of Japan and concealing their criminal arms buildup for overseas aggression.

In the signed article titled "'Unsinkable Carrier' for Overseas Aggression," the author charges that the Japanese reactionaries are dreaming of overseas aggression and subordinating everything to its realization.

The Japanese reactionary ruling quarters, he notes, are reinforcing the "self-defense forces" into an offensive form.

The article further says:

The Japanese air "SDF" is to be equipped with the fighter plane of new generation called "FSX" in the not distant future and the naval "SDF" plans to purchase the "Aegis" warship equipped with a missile system of latest type capable of catching and attacking several targets at a time.

The restructure of the combat equipment of the ground "SDF" is also a step for arms buildup geared to the overseas aggression operation.

Now the weaponry system of the ground "SDF" is being recast as a whole to meet the demands of the offensive operation.

The "SDF" has grown into huge armed forces capable of overseas aggression.

When the present five-year arms buildup program ending this year is fulfilled, Japan is said to become the second biggest military power after the United States in the capitalist world.

The adventurous arms buildup of the Japanese reactionaries is to meet the demand of the Japanese monopoly capital. The Japanese monopoly capital that has grown corpulent is getting greedy and seeking undisguised ambition for overseas expansion.

Such being the situation, it is unthinkable that the Japanese reactionary ruling quarters, the henchmen of the monopoly capital, refrain from overseas expansion.

The Japanese reactionaries are directing the sharp edge of their reinvasion to Korea, first of all, the paper says, adding:

The Japanese reactionaries are nowadays employing a cunning and sinister artifice, drivelling about "improvement of relations" with the DPRK while stepping up the preparations for reinvasion behind the scene. The aggression forces of Japanese militarism pose a constant threat to our country.

The Korean people are following this with heightened vigilance. The Japanese reactionaries should act with discretion.

U.S. Must End 'Adventurous Anti-Libya Campaign'

*SK1903102590 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1010 GMT 19 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 19 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists must immediately cease their adventurous anti-Libya campaign, says NODONG SINMUN in a signed article today.

Alleging that Libya has started again the production of chemical weapons, the U.S. imperialists have launched into an anti-Libya campaign including the reinforcement of their Armed Forces in the Mediterranean.

Due to their moves now a new danger has befallen Libya and the situation in the Mediterranean is tense, notes the article.

Saying it is the U.S. imperialists who must be denounced for the production of chemical weapons, the article points out that they have resumed the production of notorious binary chemical weapons and already proliferated and stockpiled a large number of chemical weapons. It is the height of sarcasm for them to carp on others, calling the Rabta plant which produces medicaments a chemical weapon producer, the article says, and continues:

The Libyan people resolutely oppose the U.S. imperialists' moves toward aggression and intervention and are valiantly fighting to consolidate the independence of their country and defend sovereignty under the banner of anti-imperialist independence. The U.S. imperialists who do not like it have hated Libya and taken issue with it arbitrarily in an effort to find an excuse for aggression and interference in it.

A proof of this is that they are now charging Libya with producing chemical weapons.

Noting that "anti-terrorism" is another pretext invented by them for their anti-Libya campaign, the article says this is a cock-and-bull story.

It goes on:

The brutal bombing on Tarabulus and other residential quarters in April 1986, the shooting down of a Libyan fighter plane in January last year and so on were their undisguised anti-Libyan terrorist atrocities and a crude infringement on the security and sovereignty of Libya.

At present, they are massing their armed forces in the Mediterranean, which is a danger signal that they may commit such criminal acts again.

Facts show that their aggressive and dominationist nature has never changed and they will stop at nothing to gratify their wild ambition.

U.S. Introduces B-52 Bombers Into South Korea

*SK2003215590 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1518 GMT 20 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 20 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialist aggressors sent three Guam-based B-52 strategic bombers to the sky above an operational zone of South Korea to stage a bomb-dropping exercise simulating a nuclear strike at major targets in the central and inland areas of the northern half of Korea from around 12:00 to 17:00 on March 19, according to military sources.

They sent a total of 25 B-52 strategic bombers to the sky above South Korea in aerial war exercises from March 13 to 19.

And the number of the warplanes of various types including F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers they have let fly in the air above South Korea ran into more than 780 on March 19 alone.

This fully shows that their frenzy for northward invasion has gone to extremes.

Response to Disarmament Talks Proposal Urged

*SK2103103090 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1025 GMT 21 Mar 90*

[“Military Equilibrium Must Be Achieved Through Arms Cut”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 21 (KCNA)—Now that it is a trend of the times worldwide to realize military cuts and withdraw troops from others' territories, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets must manifest their readiness to slash their armed forces, if they truly want the relaxation of the tension and peace on the Korean peninsula, says NODONG SINMUN in a signed article today.

Noting that now the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are crying for “equilibrium of strength” after inventing fictions about the North’s “military predominance” and “threat from the North,” the article brands this as a ruse to justify their arms buildup. Military equilibrium on the Korean peninsula must be achieved through arms cut, stresses the article.

It says:

Military equilibrium in Korea is chiefly aimed at removing the actual danger of armed conflict and outbreak of another war between the North and the South.

Hence, military equilibrium must be achieved on the principle of retaining an equal size of armed forces at the minimum level required only for self-defence, with which neither the North nor the South is capable of attacking the other. Less than 100,000 troops are the minimum force required only for self-defence; either in view of the requirements of a modern warfare or in view of the specific conditions of our country, neither side can attack the other with them.

If military cuts are realized to keep the balance of forces between the North and the South at such lowest level and all foreign troops are withdrawn the danger of armed conflict and recurrence of war will be removed and the Korean peninsula will turn into a peace zone.

The disarmament proposal of the DPPK Government for reducing the troops of the North and the South to less than 100,000 and getting the U.S. troops withdrawn

from South Korea is winning ever greater sympathy of the world public with every passing day for its reasonable and realistic content.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets, however, are scheming to keep the U.S. Forces in South Korea, reinforce their armed forces and “modernize” the puppet army behind the facade of “troop cuts,” in disregard of our Republic’s disarmament proposal.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry in a recent statement reclarified the DPRK’s principled and consistent stand toward disarmament and repeatedly urged them to respond without delay to our proposal for disarmament negotiations involving the North and the South of Korea and the United States.

The United States must show an affirmative response to this proposal of ours and take practical steps for its troop pullout from South Korea.

Transfer of U.S. Missiles to ROK Reported

*SK2103044890 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0442 GMT 21 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 21 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists decided to transfer to the South Korean puppets 21 Sparrow missiles and a launching system worth 33 million dollars.

NODONG SINMUN today denounces this as a vicious challenge to our peace efforts and a criminal act aggravating the military confrontation and the tensions on the Korean peninsula.

This reveals again their intention to hasten the modernization of the South Korean puppet army and use it as a shock force for aggression on the North, says the news analyst of the paper, and continues:

The U.S. imperialists’ new war provocation moves eloquently prove that their talk about “detente” and “peace” is no more than a lie and hypocrisy. They are now racing headlong along the road of war, not peace and detente. The arms buildup of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets is an anti-peace act going against the demand of the times for peace and reunification of Korea.

The U.S. imperialists must stop the reckless arms buildup and military maneuvers against the DPRK and immediately withdraw from South Korea, taking along their nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and aggression forces.

Committee Criticizes New Weapons Delivery

*SK2103215590 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1500 GMT 21 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 21 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists must stop their criminal move to deliver large quantities of new types of weapons and equipment to the South Korean puppets and withdraw their occupation

Forces and nuclear weapons and all other aggression forces from South Korea as early as possible as unanimously demanded by our people and the world people.

The Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in its Information No. 562 today recalls that the U.S. Defence Department March 16 informed Congress of its plan to deliver to the South Korean puppets 21 Sparrow missiles and a guided-missile launching system to be installed in South Korean destroyers of a new type.

It is part of the U.S. imperialists' criminal moves to equip the puppet army with up-to-date military hardware and use them as a shock brigade in a war against the North, the information said, and went on:

The above said 21 Sparrow missiles account for about 10 percent of the Sparrow missiles which the puppets have now. It is a very dangerous military move to increase the strike rate of the puppet navy.

It is a deliberate criminal move to incite war fever to fight against the North among their stooges and aggravate tensions on the Korean peninsula that the U.S. imperialists announced the plan to supply missiles to the South Korean puppets, timing to coincide with the adventurous "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises which have entered a stage of full scale offensive.

Statement Distributed at Disarmament Meeting

SK1203053090 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0521 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang, March 22 (KCNA)—The statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea released on March 5 in connection with the issue of disarmament was distributed as an official information document of the Secretariat of the Geneva Disarmament Conference to 40 odd member nations and 33 observer nations on March 12.

SOUTH KOREA

Navy Reportedly Tracks Soviet Submarine 17 Mar

SK1703075790 Seoul YONHAP in English
0743 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Navy announced Saturday that a Soviet submarine cruising southward in the East Sea is being shadowed by its patrol boats and aircraft.

The 2,500-ton Foxtrot class submarine, which is diesel-powered, was spotted steaming southward in international waters some 40 miles east of Ulnung Island in the East Sea at 11 a.m., the Navy said.

A Foxtrot with a crew of 75 can cruise at a speed of 16 knots.

Defense Minister Comments on Disarmament

SK2203094390 Seoul YONHAP in English
0918 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 22 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Defense Ministry has ordered a military-wide review of spending to meet changes in the situation on the Korean peninsula, including the pull-out of American forces stationed in South Korea.

In a directive to commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force on Thursday, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun ordered coordination of priorities so that substitute military capacity for outgoing U.S. forces and deterrence against North Korean attack is ensured.

Yi ordered all three branches of the Armed Forces to step up practical combat capability by putting top emphasis on munitions, for instance, in implementing the Armed Forces modernization project that was begun in 1974 and to cut spending on facilities and real estate as much as possible.

On possible arms reduction between South and North Korea, Yi said: "Our policy on arms control is to begin with confidence building between South and North and to develop it into arms limitation and arms reduction gradually, based on the change in North Korea's attitude.

"Unless the North changes its current policy toward the South, only consistent improvement of capability and confident defense preparedness can bring the North to the conference table to discuss practical disarmament."

Yi urged military commanders to remind servicemen that "the Army and the Communist Party in the North are our enemies as long as Pyongyang sticks to its policy to communize the South by force."

PHILIPPINES

Envoy Urges 'Neutral and Nuclear-Free' Future

HK2103025790 Manila BUSINESS WORLD
in English 21 Mar 90 p 2

[Untitled article by Jose G. Ebro]

[Excerpt] To protect the country's interest, it must take steps to influence the formation of a new regional strategic order in the light of upheavals in Eastern Europe and the changed superpower relationship.

This was the call of Philippine envoy to Kuala Lumpur Rodolfo Severino in a secret memo to the Department of Foreign Affairs' Asia-Pacific Office dated last March 16.

"The internal political and economic reforms within the Soviet Union seem to militate against any aggressive tendencies which Moscow may have," he observed. "As a consequence, the U.S.' own military presence in East Asia is losing much of its justification as a putative

deterritorial to the presumed Soviet threat and as a balancing force to the Soviet presence."

With a U.S. pullout seen as an eventuality some years down the road, the Philippines is in a position to assert its voice in the formation of such an order by virtue of its being situated "athwart major sea lanes for international shipping" and its involvement in territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Mr. Severino stated.

The present transition period from bipolar to potential regionalized tensions and conflict is "the right juncture...for the nations of Southeast Asia to work together to shape the destiny of their region," he said, warning that to "wait and watch passively would be to invite and tempt outside powers to intervene again."

Philippine efforts in conjunction with ASEAN would be aimed at ensuring that the region does not again become an arena for superpower conflict; that regional disputes can be peacefully resolved and managed; and that China and Japan will be unable to dominate the region "either by intent or by default." To achieve these objectives, Mr. Severino suggested that ASEAN "undertake simultaneous and parallel efforts" toward:

- The dismantling of all foreign bases in Southeast Asia and the denuclearization and neutralization of the region, in other words, acceleration of the realization of Southeast Asia as zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and as a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, as proposed repeatedly by the leaders of the ASEAN countries. It may now be realistic to ask the world's nuclear powers to guarantee the neutral and nuclear-free future of Southeast Asia;
- The convening of an international conference on the South China Sea. In view of its claim to sovereignty over all of the South China Sea, Beijing may resist such a conference. But enough support for the idea, may just put enough pressure on Beijing to accede to it, no matter how grudgingly;
- The building, for both economic and strategic reasons, of bridges to Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia instead of passively going along with the hardline stance of China, Singapore and, to some extent, the United States. Building bridges to the regimes in power in Indochina would be similar to the approach taken by current Thai policy or at least, the Chatichai version of it. Vietnam has left Cambodia almost entirely but remains a regional power to contend with, while Hun Sen and his group appear destined to be a force in Phnom Penh, whether by itself or in coalition with the other Cambodian factions; and
- The development of a cohesive ASEAN approach toward defining, together with Japan and other interested countries, Japan's future relations with Southeast Asia. The same thing could be done with China at a later stage. [passage omitted]

SINGAPORE

Australian Defense Chief on Regional Defense

BK2003103590 Singapore *THE STRAITS TIMES*
in English 17 Mar 90 p 25

[Untitled article by Dominic Nathan]

[Excerpt] Despite improvements in Superpower relations and a general easing of tensions worldwide, it was still premature for countries in the region to change their defence postures. Making this observation on the size and ability of defence forces in the region, the visiting Chief of the Australian Defence Force, General [Gen] P.C. Gration said: "The defence posture and hence the defence spending of regional countries was not predicated on the superpower confrontation."

Gen Gration, who was speaking at a press conference at the Australian High Commission yesterday, noted that the positive developments in global situation, although welcome, did not have a direct impact on regional security.

Considering the possibility of a withdrawal of United States forces from the Philippines, Gen Gration said that there was increasing uncertainty in the region over this, which could make regional issues and tensions more prominent.

He said that although Australia hoped for a continued US presence in the Philippines, his country was strongly committed to the region's defence, regardless of developments in the Philippines. This was because "we view Australia's security as very much tied up with the security of the region".

Gen Gration pointed out that the practical demonstration of this commitment was the deployment of two or three Australian navy ships in this region at any one time, and one aircraft squadron for between six and eight weeks in Malaysia. Australia's commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) was also part of its involvement in the region, he said.

The FPDA was signed by Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore in 1971 to provide multilateral consultation in case of an external threat to Singapore and Malaysia.

Gen Gration is here to view the progress of a major four-day air defence exercise, held under the FPDA, which ended yesterday.

Asked how Australia viewed Singapore's offer to host some US forces, Gen Gration said that it was a welcome initiative, as a continuing US presence in the region was an important contribution to regional security and stability. He noted that it did not impinge on the FPDA, as it was a bilateral arrangement between Singapore and the US. [passage omitted]

TAIWAN

Mainland Military Moves Viewed with Alarm

OW1703113390 Taipei International Service in English
0200 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Station commentary: "Sabre Rattling Across the Taiwan Strait"]

[Text] Unusual Chinese communist activity just across the strait from Taiwan has caused the armed forces of the Republic of China [ROC] on Taiwan to go on a rare full alert. Attaching logic to Communist China's maneuvers is nearly impossible in the otherwise tranquil strait. The KYODO NEWS AGENCY of Japan first spoke the news of unusual military buildup in the coastal areas just opposite Taiwan. It reported four days ago that Communist China was deploying its modern fleet of F-8 fighter bombers along the coast, apparently in some sort of preparation for military strikes against Taiwan. The armed forces of the ROC on Taiwan have taken the buildup seriously, but continued to wonder just what it is Peking is up to. Some political commentators in Taipei have suggested that Peking is sabre rattling to discourage politicians on Taiwan from leaning toward an independence line. Presidential elections are slated for next week and the handful of opposition politicians have been making noises about independence issues. Both Taipei and Peking outlaw the Taiwan independence movement. Both agree that Taiwan is an inalienable part of historic or cultural China. They don't agree on who is the legitimate government of all China. Peking has made

clear and repeated policy announcements that it will consider invading Taiwan if an independence movement begins kicking up too much dust on the island. It has also said it will invade if Taiwan went nuclear, aligned with the Soviet Union, or ran into social and political turmoil. Some observers have asserted that Peking is not sabre rattling over the independence issue but rather in the belief that Taiwan is currently embroiled in political turmoil. The reality couldn't be any more different. In recent weeks, politics on Taiwan has been enlivened by a surge of democratic voices within the ruling party, the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. The party's standard bearer ticket for the presidential and vice presidential election was briefly challenged, perhaps giving Peking the impression that things were getting out of control on Taiwan and that an independence movement might somehow emerge. But that is all nonsense. If Peking really views the situation that way, it shows just how unsightful the Chinese Communists are about Taiwan affairs. There is obviously danger in that kind of ignorance. A misjudgment by Peking could lead to tragedy in the Taiwan Strait. It is the potential for misjudgment that worries the armed forces on Taiwan most. Otherwise, they discount any danger to Taiwan and report that Peking is up to sabre rattling and nothing else. For four decades now, Taiwan has prospered under the watchful, sometimes hateful, gaze of Communist China. As Peking continues to drift back into hardline communism against the world trend, there is some concern in Taiwan about the island's ever present precarious security problem. But few people believe Peking is stupid enough to miscalculate and risk the peace.

ALBANIA

Soviet East Europe Troop Withdrawals Welcomed

*AU1603131790 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
6 Mar 90 p 4*

[Article by Arben Karapici: "Soviet Troops on the Way Home"]

[Text] Recent developments have brought to the fore the familiar problem of the superpowers' military presence in Europe. Some East European countries are insistently demanding talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories; such a process is starting in some places, and in others is well under way. Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel returned from Moscow with an agreement for the withdrawal of 73,500 Soviet troops. Hungary and the Soviet Union have begun the final phase of talks for the total withdrawal of military forces and, despite all the misunderstandings and obstacles, it is expected that they will reach their goal by 10 March. Meanwhile, Romanian President Ion Iliescu underlined in an interview with the French daily *LE MONDE* that "the new political conditions render superfluous the further existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as military blocs."

The opposition to all forms of the superpowers' military presence in Europe and the growing demands for its removal are based on a very strong political motivation, which involves the destinies of the continent's peoples and sovereign countries. The European peoples, who have been subjected to the full and increasing burden of the threat and danger of the foreign military presence, have been the most concerned of all. As REUTER reported, a battalion of East German soldiers recently refused to take part in a planned joint maneuver with the 380,000 Soviet troops that are still in the GDR. A wave of anger against the presence and activities of the Soviet troops in Poland has swept over the entire Polish people. Polish disgust at the acts of brutality and crimes committed by Soviet soldiers and officers reached such a level as to force the high-ranking military official Mieczyslaw Debicki to make a statement which observers considered "a very harsh criticism of the Soviet troops in Poland."

Expressed in various ways, this opposition has been continually increasing, and has simultaneously involved a strengthening of the lofty national feelings of the European peoples. One consequence of the masses' legitimate demands has been the standpoints of the governments of European countries, which have been forced to take these feelings into consideration.

As the Soviet troops make their way home, a welcome, Europe-wide process has begun which encourages hope for a more healthy climate of trust and security throughout the continent. This is in accordance with the lofty national aspirations of the European peoples, who consider the dissolution of the blocs and the withdrawal

of U.S. and Soviet troops as a precondition for their truly free and independent development.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

General Details Arms Production Phase-out

AU2103153690

[Editorial Report] Several Czechoslovak newspapers of 15 March publish correspondents' reports on a news conference with Lieutenant General Jaroslav Kovacik, "representative of the Federal Ministry of Metallurgy, Engineering, and Electrical Engineering for questions of special technology," held in Prague on 14 March and dealing with the conversion of the Czechoslovak arms industry to civilian production programs.

Bratislava ROLNICKE NOVINY in Slovak on 15 March on page 2 carries a 250-word "am"-signed report on the news conference, entitled "End to the Production of Tanks," which quotes Kovacik on the timetable of Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from arms production. The report states that the Czechoslovak arms industry will not produce any more tanks after the end of this year and that the production of armored personnel vehicles "will most likely end with similar speed" even though originally their production was to be phased out by 1993. The production of "rocket technology" will also be completely halted in Czechoslovakia. The ROLNICKE NOVINY report quotes Kovacik as saying that the changes in the arms industry will affect "between 200,000 and 250,000 employees, 60 percent of them in Slovakia."

Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech on 15 March on page 2 carries a 700-word Josef Tucek report entitled "Tractors Preferred to Tanks." The MLADA FRONTA report quotes Kovacik's statements on the development of arms production in Czechoslovakia and its profitability. According to the MLADA FRONTA report, arms production in Czechoslovakia culminated in 1988 when it accounted for 8.3 percent of the total output of enterprises administered by the Federal Ministry of Metallurgy, Engineering, and Electrotechnical Industry or 2 percent of Czechoslovakia's national product. Profits from this production are said to have been "double those of comparable civilian enterprises" and about 75 percent of the industry's output is said to have been exported. According to a government decision, the current production volume will be cut to roughly one-fourth by the year 1993. The MLADA FRONTA report also mentions that the cancellation of contracts for military supplies and the resulting need to transfer manpower to lesser paying jobs has created unrest in some enterprises, such as the Dubnica Heavy Engineering Works where "2,000 employees staged a two-hour strike" or Meopta Přerov where "turmoil is mounting."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 March on pages 1 and 2 carries an 800-word undated interview with Jaroslav Kovacik, entitled "The State Will Provide Assistance Where Inevitable." In the interview, Kovacik focuses on the impact of the government's conversion program on individual enterprises. As Kovacik points out, enterprises manufacturing military technology had known about the need to reduce their output since 1988, even though the original plans had not been as "radical" as the present scheme. In spite of this, Kovacik continues, the ministry's scheme foresees that 98 of the 111 enterprises affected by the conversion program "will have to come to terms with the change in their production program without the participation of the state." According to Kovacik, the state will assist only the following 13 enterprises—ZTS (Heavy Engineering Works) Martin, ZVL (Ball Bearing Plant) Povazska Bystrica, ZVS (General Engineering Works) Brno, Vihorlat Snina, Brezno Bridge-Building Works, Uhersky Brod Moravian-Slovak Engineering Works, Aero Prague, Tesla Liptovsky Hradok, ZVT (Computer Technology Works) Banska Bystrica, Palmagnetron Kromeriz, Tesla Roznov, and Vlasim Engineering Works—which are expected to lose about 50 billion korunas in profits on account of the production change. Under the ministry's scheme, these enterprises should receive from central funds a total of eight billion korunas over the next four years. The Bratislava PRAVDA item also mentions that enterprises administered by the Federal Ministry of Metallurgy, Engineering, and Electrotechnical Industry account for 95 percent of Czechoslovakia's total production of arms technology.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

National People's Army Missiles Dismantled

AU2203140990 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 16 Mar 90 p 1

[Rainer Funke report: "The National People's Army Disarms Its Missiles—When Will the Bundeswehr Follow?"]

[Text] On-site inspection for the international media on Thursday [15 March]: the 5th Missile Brigade of the National People's Army [NVA], Demen, 2715, near Schwerin. Since the end of 1985 operational "Oka" tactical missiles of the NVA had been stationed here, known as SS-23 in the NATO code, including four launch pads, and an equal number of transportation trucks. Since 1 February the technical equipment has been destroyed on the orders of Premier Hans Modrow. About 20 men of various ranks, from soldier to lieutenant colonel, needed about 14 days to reduce one pad to scrap and to prepare another one for the same treatment at the same time.

So far over 15 tonnes of this metal have been cut to pieces that can be used in industry for further peaceful processing—the SERO [secondary raw material economy] combine is happy. By 30 April the work is to be concluded. One launch complex will be left to posterity—in the Dresden Military History Museum. A question to Brigade Commander, Colonel Gerhard Pfeifenzner: Where are the 24 missiles with their conventional warheads? "The Missile Technology Service of the Neubrandenburg Military Bezirk [area] has taken them over. At the moment it is being checked when and where they will be destroyed. They will be destroyed before the end of 1990 in any case."

In the facility there are still older type missiles. Why are the modern ones being scrapped. Says Colonel Gerd Apitz, deputy press spokesman of the Defense Ministry: "With a view to a future security system in Europe, we start with the missiles by which the other side feels threatened the most. And we expect that the Bundeswehr, for instance, does the same."

The soldiers are doing their work with visible energy. Private Gerd Kristen (25), welder from Magdeburg, says: "I do not know how many hours I spent keeping this equipment ready for use. Contributing to disarmament as a soldier is a good feeling."

HUNGARY

Soviet Military Aircraft Withdrawal Begins

LD2103091490 Budapest MTI in English
0003 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 20 (MTI)—The first military planes left Debrecen military airport on Tuesday morning. Brigadier General Aleksandr Gusev, air chief of the Soviet Southern Army Group, said within 48 hours after signing the agreement, the first Soviet unit left Hungary.

He stressed "we are worth our promise and comply with the requirements of the intergovernmental agreement, and will go on with the withdrawal according to the timetable."

The first day, five MiG planes and one AN-26 carrier plane left for the region of Lvov, about 500 kms far.

Brigadier General Gusev announced that the Debrecen air regiment was to do service in the north, where a base is being built for it. According to an unconfirmed MTI source, the regiment will be deployed in the vicinity of Murmansk in the service of the Soviet Navy Fleet.

The evacuation of the Soviet military airport in Debrecen will continue during the forthcoming weeks to be completed by May 25.

CHILE

More Details Provided on Iran-Corfo Arms Deal

PY2503003590 Santiago HOY in Spanish
12-18 Mar pp 20-24

[“Second and final” part of interview with Bernard Stroiazzo by Gilberto Villaruel in Madrid; date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Villaruel] Did Operation Foxtrot, the offer of a Chilean Air Force [FACH] F-5 plane as compensation for the fighter plane lost by Iran, and the negotiations to sell 15 similar planes, develop when you were still a hostage?

[Stroiazzo] Yes, a high ranking Iranian Government official confirmed to me that the Chileans had been sending telex messages to the NIOC [National Iranian Oil Company] behind our backs. They offered an F-5 as compensation and offered to continue the trade by selling Sidewinder missiles, mines the size of a room, and whatever they wanted. The Iranians followed along and decided to negotiate. They told me not to worry, and in July 1987 they sent me to Chile with an Iranian Government official. My son remained as a hostage. Together with Hosseini we negotiated Operation Foxtrot: an airplane as compensation and the possibility of another \$100-million contract, including the sale of bombs and maritime mines. Also, the FACH offered us 15 F-5 planes with all the equipment and 90 Sidewinder missiles.

[Villaruel] Did the Iranians expect to make the deal even though they were aware that the United States had also ordered an embargo on the sale of weapons to Chile? This would have had to have been an undercover sale.

[Stroiazzo] Yes, the Iranians knew perfectly well what they wanted from the Chileans. They were only seeking to be compensated for the plane they had lost and to free me from my problem. After so many years at war they knew perfectly well that it was impossible to carry out that sort of operation behind the back of the United States. And this is precisely what happened. The president of the Parliament, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, authorized me to leave to give the Chileans the impression we were interested in that market. Hosseini, who was a NIOC engineer and Rafsanjani's private secretary, traveled to Chile to get the aircraft that Famae [Army Ordnance] was offering to replace the one that was lost.

[Villaruel] With whom did you negotiate Operation Foxtrot in Chile?

[Stroiazzo] With Famae, Ferrimar [expansion unknown], Aldo Pesce, Fernando Perez, and, later on, with some FACH generals. At Famae we talked with Commander Carlos Carreno, who picked us up the airport to avoid having to go through passport control. Our talks lasted six days. Hosseini found out that the Chileans wanted to pay for the Phantom plane with an advance on the \$100-million letter of credit they were

going to get. The Iranians wanted the compensation first as a sign of good faith. They maintained that Van Meer, who was the son-in-law of a FACH general, had contacts in other countries to carry out a “triangular operation.”

[Villaruel] It has been said that Commander Carreno, before he was abducted, was getting ready to travel to Iran to personally make the final arrangements. How did this trip come about?

[Stroiazzo] He was invited by the Iranian Government, unaware that the talks had failed. The Iranians did not open the letter of credit and the war was getting worse. Within the country, which was in an uproar, there were groups who were against me hoping the talks would fail. I was helped to flee from the country. In late August Carreno, who thought things were running smoothly, contacted me at the Hilton Hotel on three or four occasions, telling me that everything was going well and that the operation could be carried out. I told him that, if he wanted to, to go ahead and explain it to the chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. He sent me his personal data for a visa.

[Villaruel] What happened after that?

[Stroiazzo] I lost contact with Carreno, who was abducted. When I saw what was happening, I fled.

[Villaruel] What happened before the 1988 plebiscite, when government authorities proposed a new deal to you?

[Stroiazzo] I felt as if I had been in a nightmare after leaving Iran. I did not want to talk about that with anyone. But Dino Seferian contacted me again in March 1988 to tell me that Chile wanted to compensate me for damages. Cesar Hidalgo and Attorney Jaime Alonso of Madrid visited me. They told me they could arrange things to compensate me for the damages I had sustained. At first I could not care less, because everything felt like a nightmare. They insisted and obtained an invitation for me from General Hugo Salas.

[Villaruel] The CNI [National Intelligence Center] director at that time.

[Stroiazzo] That is right. I told these gentlemen that I did not want to talk about weapons anymore and that if there was anything to do in Chile I would only trust high-ranking authorities. I received the official invitation in July, and traveled to Chile on 6 August. I was received by Salas at a secret CNI location where I gave them all the details of what had happened. He very honestly asked me: “What can we do to compensate you?” There were several alternatives but nothing appealed to me until we started talking about the environment and energy resources. He told me there was a project with a Canadian enterprise to be carried out in the Atacama Desert. “If you want, we can get you a license, an authorization.” The idea interested me, as I knew that the problem of industrial waste in Europe was serious. So Salas called Colonel Guillermo Letelier, vice president of Corfo

[Development Corporation], and ordered him to give me a letter of intent in the exact terms I wanted for the Atacama project. Letelier was interested in what had happened.

[Villarroel] You started negotiations in that regard through the Were Enterprise. Was it created especially for this operation?

[Stroiazzo] That is right. I went to London and met with experts who advised me to create an enterprise that would head the international group that was going to get involved in this project. The project was great from the ecological point of view because the Atacama Desert is the most arid in the world and humidity is the worse thing for toxic waste. [passage omitted]

[Villarroel] The lawsuit filed at the 19th Civil Court in Santiago has not gone through many changes. Corfo Vice President Brigadier Guillermo Letelier has said that there is no connection between the sale of weapons to Iran and the Were-Corfo deal. In your opinion, where is the connection?

[Stroiazzo] It is quite simple: I am the connection. The answer is that I am involved in both cases. [passage omitted]

[Villarroel] The lawsuit filed before the 19th Civil Court in Santiago states that all the negotiations carried out by Chilean officers and authorities could not have been carried out without the authorization of the Army commander, General Augusto Pinochet. Does the Were Enterprise have any concrete information to support these charges?

[Stroiazzo] Were, as well as Spanco, has the necessary evidence to show that the Chilean Government's highest authorities were aware of this operation.

[Villarroel] Including the commander in chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet, as is stated in the lawsuit?

[Stroiazzo] Including him. These documents will be presented at the appropriate time.

[Villarroel] Will their contents be released?

[Stroiazzo] Later on in the trial.

CUBA

Soviet Arms Linked to Relations With U.S.

FL2403015390 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish
2344 GMT 23 Mar 90

[Text] Washington, 23 March (NOTIMEX)—The Soviet Union will reduce its arms shipments to Cuba if that country will improve its relations with the United States, Soviet Ambassador to Havana Yuriy Petrov said today.

In a report originating in Havana and intercepted here, Petrov said that the best way in which we can reduce the shipment of weapons to Cuba is for there to be an improvement in Cuban-U.S. relations. The diplomat said that the possibility of a reduction in the shipment of weapons to the Caribbean island has been under discussion by Moscow and Havana authorities for some time now. He stressed that the feasibility of this depended and continues to depend on the state of relations between Havana and Washington.

The Cubans still feel threatened by the possibility of a U.S. military invasion, which is why they have maintained their request for weapons, Petrov said. The Cubans are our friends and one should help his friends, the diplomat added.

INDIA

Finance Minister Says \$9.2 Billion for Defense

BK2003010090 Hong Kong AFP in English 1734 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] New Delhi, March 19 (AFP)—The Indian Government has earmarked 9.2 billion dollars for defence in fiscal 1990-91, hiking spending on the million-strong Army and on ordnance factories, Finance Minister Madhu Dandavate announced Monday [19 March]. The hike of 600 million dollars on defence over last year brings India's total planned spending of 55.60 billion dollars for fiscal 1990-91 beginning April 1 to a sizeable 18 percent of total budget expenditures.

"The increase in the defence expenditure is not of our choice. It is a direct result of the situation on our borders," the finance minister told parliament in an obvious reference to Pakistan, as members thumped desks in approval.

The defence budget proposal by Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh's new government awards 4.77 billion dollars to the Army which in fiscal 1989-90 was sanctioned expenses of 4.49 billion dollars. The budget also proposes 147 million dollars in fiscal 1990-91 for ordnance factories—a hike of 22 million dollars over the present fiscal year ending March 31, the minister said. Spending on India's Air Force and Navy, which expanded considerably in the past two years, did not show a significant rise in the current budget proposals, but military strategists said the two armed services have already graduated to par with mini-superpowers of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Dandavate's comments on the country's borders follow recently soured relations with Pakistan over disputed Kashmir where Moslem-led demands for an end to military rule has forced India to divert its military attention to the region.

India's Navy, with two aircraft carriers and a leased Soviet nuclear submarine and over 50 small and large warships, has been allotted 530 million dollars in running costs against last year's 502 million dollars. Air Force spending has been hiked by 95 million dollars over last year's total expenses of 1.12 billion dollars, Mr. Dandavate said in a prepared statement.

Last year the former government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi trimmed 133 million dollars from the previous year's defence budget, apparently banking on world detente and a slight improvement in relations with Pakistan and China—the two countries with which it has fought four wars since 1947. However defence experts and Mr. V.P. Singh had both strongly hinted that military spending would rise in the coming year under the new government's budget that has stung the elite and the upper middle class.

The current hikes follow regular increases in military spending which has more than tripled since the start of the 1980's and jumped by 31 percent in 1986.

Interestingly the budget on nuclear energy experiments is slated to rise from fiscal 1989-90's 31 million dollars to 35 million dollars, but budget papers did not specify if the spending would be in the military or civilian field. India, which exploded a nuclear device in the mid-1970's, says it has no ambition to manufacture atomic bombs, but has warned that its nuclear policy could "be reviewed" should Pakistan show signs of flexing its nascent nuclear muscles.

French Nuclear Plant for Pakistan Causes Concern**India Conveys Concern**

BK2203090890 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0830 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] India has conveyed its concern to France through diplomatic channels over the sale of a nuclear power plant to Pakistan. In a written reply in the Lok Sabha today, the external affairs minister, Mr. I.K. Gujral, said that the sale is likely to strengthen or expand the weapons oriented and clandestine nature of Pakistan's nuclear program. He said France has, however, stated that the nuclear power plant will be under international atomic energy safeguards. It considers the sale a commercial proposition.

In another reply, Mr Gujral said that India's serious concern over the supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan beyond that country's legitimate defense requirements has been conveyed to the United States.

French 'Willingness' Cited

BK2003094990 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0730 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] France has indicated its willingness to cooperate in the setting up of two pressurized water nuclear power reactors in India. Giving this information in the Rajya Sabha in a written reply, the minister of state for science and technology, Professor M.G.K. Menon, said the terms of cooperation are under discussion between the two countries.

Commentary on French Reactor

BK2003115790 Delhi General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Commentary by Inder Malhotra: "French Nuclear Reactor for Pakistan"]

[Text] France has decided to give Pakistan a nuclear reactor as was ostentatiously announced during the recent visit to the latter country by President Francois Mitterrand. This by itself need not cause too much alarm, because the reactor will take at least seven years to

be operational. In any case, Pakistan is not dependent on the French reactor to go nuclear. For this purpose, it has already built adequate facilities of which the centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment at Kahuta near Islamabad is the kingpin. Only those determined to delude themselves doubt any longer that Pakistan is already a nuclear weapon country for all practical purposes.

The U.S. intelligence agencies had said four years ago that Pakistan was only a turn of the screw driver away from the bomb. Now, the same agencies have stated that Pakistan already has six nuclear bombs. This is what in nuclear parlance is called the bomb in the basement. And yet, in spite of all this, the French offer and the gleeful Pakistani acceptance of it add up to a very significant and disturbing development. This is so because the French decision lends legitimacy to Pakistan's frantic but clandestine efforts to become a nuclear weapon power even while stoutly denying that it is doing so.

No wonder then that French decision has evoked protests and criticism, not least from the United States. Mr. Mitterrand was still in Pakistan when Washington deplored the nuclear deal. On Pakistan's behalf, its foreign minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Ali Khan, bluntly declared that American criticism was not well-founded.

There is a further irony to what President Mitterrand has done. In 1977, France under President Giscard d'Estaing had canceled an agreement with the father of the present Pakistani prime minister to set up a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan. It was then that Pakistan embarked on its present clandestine quest for nuclear equipment and technology and built up the Kahuta plant. It was then agreed among nuclear suppliers informally that no nuclear reactor be given to Pakistan even under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, as the French reactor would be. The whole purpose of this restriction has now been virtually destroyed.

China, which does not yet have a nuclear reactor of its own, is offering Pakistan one imported ironically from the West. The Soviet Union may follow suit, as its ambassador in Pakistan has indicated. The U.S. attitude toward the Pakistani bomb has been remarkably ambivalent. On the one hand, America makes a lot of fuss about nuclear nonproliferation. On the other, it has consistently overlooked the Pakistani nuclear activity and indeed given waivers from American laws in order to maintain U.S. military and economic aid. This is said to be due to America's strategic compulsions. The irony of it all is that the Americans have tried to equate bomb building Pakistan and India, which never followed up its 1974 underground peaceful nuclear experiment with any weapon program. The U.S. wants both India and Pakistan to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which this country rejects totally as inequitous and discriminatory. Other proposals put forward by Pakistan amount to the same thing. In the circumstances, India has followed the only policy it can consistent with its security. While developing nuclear technology, it does not want to exercise the nuclear option. But it has also made it

crystal clear that it would have to do so, if Pakistan is not persuaded to retreat from the nuclear path even at this late stage.

IRAN

Libyan Envoy Assails U.S. 'Propaganda Attacks'

LD17031 *Tehran Television Service in Persian*
1600 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Following U.S. propaganda attacks against Libya in connection with the explosion at the pharmaceutical factory in that country—propaganda to the effect that chemical substances are produced at the factory—the head of the Libyan People's Bureau in Tehran, in a press conference, described U.S. propaganda attacks as a conspiracy and said they served as a cover for the issue of the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.

Referring to the past history of U.S. attacks on Libya, he said: No factory in Libya produces chemical weapons or substances, and by raising such an issue, the United States is trying to prepare the groundwork for interference in the Middle East, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea. We therefore announce: If the United States attacks Libya, the Libyan Jamahriyah will be able to retaliate. He said: A committee has begun examinations in that regard in order to clarify the cause of the explosion. Announcing that reporters would soon be able to visit the plant, he said: We ask international organizations to view the factory on the condition that they first visit the chemical factories of the United States and Israel.

Velayati Interviewed on Disarmament, Resolution 598

LD1803194890 *Tehran Television Service in Persian*
1600 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Foreign Minister Velayati, during an interview given to reporters today, explained the issues raised at the recent disarmament conference in Geneva and the trend of the talks on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598. Referring to the trend of the talks in the Resolution, Velayati said: The UN secretary general has recently proposed a plan on the implementation of the resolution, and the UN Security Council has also expressed relatively clear support, more decisive than in the past, for this proposal. [video shows Velayati talking to a dozen reporters around a table] He added: Perez de Cuellar has taken a positive step and we evaluate the Security Council's support for this plan as relatively positive too. The secretary general's proposal, however, has some vague points that we hope will be removed by the UN secretary general during his talks and consultation with our envoy at the United Nations before resumption of the new round of talks.

In another part of this interview, referring to the fact that the articles of Resolution 598 are clear and referring to the point that this is an unprecedented resolution in the

United Nations, Velayati divided the existing problems in the talks into two main groups; adding: The first group are the problems created by the Iraqi regime, and the second group stems from the Security Council's past, generally vague, approach which lacked any direction. Thanks to the efforts undertaken in recent months, the Security Council has taken a step forward and has declared support for the secretary general's efforts. Nevertheless, had the Iraqi regime ever intended to sincerely implement Resolution 598, there would have been no reason for such a long wait just to discuss ways of implementing the resolution.

Velayati stressed: We believe the withdrawal of the forces and the exchange of POW's are the two major problems, and this proposal is still workable and can reduce the region's tension to bring a lasting peace.

Referring to the recent Geneva conference on chemical weapons disarmament, Velayati said: The essential point, which was endorsed by the Islamic Republic of Iran [IRI] at the chemical weapons disarmament conference, is that for the time being we have decided not to manufacture chemical weapons, but the future of this decision depends on setting up a comprehensive convention soon.

In continuation of this interview, referring to the reflection among the participants at the conference of the IRI's revelation on the Iraqi regime's manufacturing and stock pile of the chemical weapons, Velayati said: Today the IRI is the main reviver of the idea to combat chemical weapons in the world; and the IRI's stand in the conference was extensively covered by the global mass media.

At the conclusion of the interview, Velayati said: During the past six years, the IRI was victimised by the UN Human Rights Commission due to the allegations of enemies and opponents. But thanks to the recent trip by the secretary general's envoy to Iran and his report to the secretary general on the prisoners' treatment, freedom and respect for human rights in the IRI, the false reports by the enemies were exposed.

ISRAEL

Expatriate Paper Reports Upcoming Ofeq-2 Launch

TA2503113090 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 25 Mar 90 p 1

[Untitled article by New York correspondent Tzadok Yehetzqeli]

[Text] Israel will launch the Ofeq-2 satellite into space within the next few days. This was claimed by YISRA'EL SHELANU [Our Israel], a newspaper published by expatriate Israelis in the United States.

The report was attributed to the paper's Israeli correspondent and asserted the Israel Aircraft Industries had completed the satellite's preparation, and that it would

be launched before the end of the month. According to the report, this satellite is more sophisticated than the first one launched.

LIBYA

Signing of Chemical Weapons Treaties Recalled

LD1903151990 Tripoli JANA in Arabic
1400 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Tripoli, 19 March (JANA)—Replying to a question by JANA about the remarks made by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis yesterday in Cairo to MENA, a source at the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation recalled the Great Jamahiriya's previous stands in regard of the question of banning the production, storage, and use of all kinds of chemical weapons.

The source said: The Great Jamahiriya 29 (?February) 1971 signed the Geneva agreements of 1925 regarding the banning of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. On 19 January 1982 it also signed the international agreement banning the production, development, and storage of bacteriological and toxic weapons and their destruction. The Great Jamahiriya also actively participated in the Paris conference on banning chemical weapons and officially welcomed the Soviet-U.S. communique issued on 10 February 1990 in Moscow on the agreement of the two countries' foreign ministers on the necessity to eliminate chemical weapons in the world and their intention to work towards the signing and implementation of a multilateral agreement banning the production and use of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles at the internal level.

Concluding its reply to the agency question, the source reiterates the Great Jamahiriya's preparedness to join any international agreement to be concluded and signed by the international community in this regard.

U.S. 'War Secretary' Cited on Libyan Missiles

LD2203092190 Tripoli JANA in English
0808 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Rome, al-Rabie [March] 22 (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)—The U.S. secretary of war expressed his country's fears from the defense capabilities of Great Jamahiriya saying that the U.S. is in great need for the space shield not only against the Soviet nuclear missiles but also against the possible Qadhafi missiles.

The U.S. war secretary gave an example on that the Libyan attack on the Lampedosa base when Libya fired two rockets against the U.S. installations on that Italian island.

On another development, he was quoted by the Italian newspaper LA STAMPA as saying yesterday that the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union are doubtful. He said that the Soviet enemy still exists but it has changed.

He pointed out that the U.S. cannot be sure about the process of change in the Soviet Union.

PAKISTAN

Communications Satellite Launch Planned for June

BK1703075090 Islamabad Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Pakistan's first indigenously produced satellite, Badr-A, will be launched in June this year. The chairman of Suparco [Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission], Dr. Mohammad Shafie, said in Karachi today that the satellite, while in space over Pakistan, will perform two major tests. In the first test, messages will be sent from Karachi via satellite to Lahore station. The second test will be of the digital communication experiment, during which information will be sent to the satellite, stored in it, and later sent to another ground station.

Factory Begins Producing Tanks, Armored Vehicles

BK2003011890 Hong Kong AFP in English 1817 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Islamabad, March 19 (AFP)—Pakistan's first indigenously built tank and armoured personnel carrier rolled off the factory line at a defence production complex near here Monday [19 March], official sources said.

The sources added that the country had also started producing an armoured recovery vehicle, designed to

recover damaged or broken-down tanks on a battlefield, at the heavily rebuilt Taxila factory 20 kilometres north of here.

The new vehicles, named the T69-11 MP, the M113-A2, and the ARV W-653 respectively, would take part in the joint services parade on Pakistan Day in Islamabad on March 23, they said.

Pakistan last year manufactured its own long-range surface-to-air missiles and the sources described the latest products as "another milestone" in the country's defence production.

The chief of the Army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, who presided at the ceremony, termed it the "most significant achievement" towards self-sufficiency by Pakistan in vital defence equipment, adding that the tank had been produced three months ahead of schedule. The first prototype of the tank is expected to be ready for trials in June 1991.

The new tank would be "one of the best in the world," the general said, adding that the most important feature of tank manufacturing in Pakistan was the acquisition of the capability to design, develop and build the tank, the first time such technical know-how had been available to Pakistan.

Defence Ministry sources said the new tank was fitted with a 105 mm gun and a more powerful engine.

The factory will be able to manufacture 200 tanks a year.

The ARV W-653, which has a boom capable of rotating through 360 degrees, should be produced at the rate of 50 each year. The M113-A2 is an improved version of the M113-A, including a more powerful engine which would provide selected elements of the land forces with considerable mobility, the sources said.

Maj Gen Sein Response on Number of Troops in Baltic MD

*90UM0172B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 3 Dec 89 pp 6-7*

[Article by Maj Gen V. Sein, first deputy chief, Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District: "The People and the Army: Who Benefits From the Opposition? Notes on the Demilitarization of Estonia and Certain Aspects of the NFE Electoral Platform".]

[Text] The report by Tynis Avikson in the republic newspaper RAHVA HAAL (organ of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Estonia) on 29 October was some dozens of lines long, but, I believe, did not pass unnoticed. The author comments on information given to TASS by General of the Army M. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff, USSR Armed Forces. It concerns the reduction in the numerical strength of the forces in the Leningrad and Baltic military districts by 40,000 men and 1,200 tanks, planned by 1991. The justification given for this was quite clear-cut: In recent years relations in the world have warmed markedly, and there has come greater trust in the relations between the USSR and the northern countries. Then Tynis Avikson, citing anonymous Western sources, states that, first, the changes in the army are associated not with external, but with internal factors, particularly with the demands of the people's fronts of the Baltic area about demilitarization of the region. Second, Gen Moiseyev's information, he says, does not correspond to reality, since the number of forces in Estonia alone has already reached 120,000-150,000.

Such a small paragraph. And how many questions arise! And not only in me, as a military man. No doubt this is because in it are intertwined in the most amazing way many of the signs of our time: the claims of some social organizations in the Baltic area to a role as political leaders, the syndrome of distrust toward official sources of information, and the calculation that any falsehood from abroad will be "swallowed." And what if one pays attention to the unproven, frequently unsubstantiated accusations levied at the Soviet Army? The desire to render judgement about it, without wanting to hear anything about the changes that are taking place, both in the Armed Forces as a whole, and in the psychology and consciousness of each serviceman, can be seen even with the naked eye.

One can see this most recently by opening up the issue of the newspaper NOORTE HAAL of 31 October 89. That about which Tynis Avikson spoke in general is here specified. The newspaper gives the reader "accurate" information about where, how many, and what kind of forces are stationed in the republic. Obviously, the official data given by the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces did not suit the press organ. Preference is given to "Westerners."

The divergence of the data cited from the truth is striking (it is hard to expect another reaction from a competent

person). In some places there are up to three, four and even five instances of misinformation! It is stated, for example, that 4,5th military personnel are stationed in Khaapsalu. In fact there are 4.5 times fewer. The information about the presence of personnel in Kokhtla-Yarve is inflated by more than 2,500 men. It is also reported that there are 25,000 military specialists in Paldiski, while according to the information of the local soviet of people's deputies, there are a total of only 10,000 people residing in this town.

As we see, facts and evidence refuting the fabrication of "well-wishers" of all stripes are more than sufficient. They will also be discussed below. But the deed, as the saying goes, has been done: the freshly cooked "goose" is walking not only about the Estonian SSR, but also beyond the boundaries of the republic. It is not difficult to imagine the subscribers to NOORTE HAAL the publication excitedly. And, of course, it is difficult to expect a loyal attitude toward the army from them.

Judging by everything, the Estonian People's Front [NFE] fully shares this position. For the umpteenth time it has advanced the slogan of full demilitarization of the republic and the entire Baltic area, as is graphically indicated by one of its most recent documents, the NFE election platform. Is this not the chief essence of such publications and statements, in which is contained the common thread: everyone who is not with us is against us? Obviously the time has come to remember that the ostracism of the "man with a gun," in which certain informal organizations and publications have had success, may have far-reaching consequences: A people that does not respect its army, speaking in the words of a prominent military authority of the past, is doomed to feed the army of its enemy.

Attempting by dubious methods to form public opinion favorable to itself, the NFE is committing, in my view, a major political error. Mixing up cause and effect, it is attempting to ensure so-called demilitarization by unseemly activity, directed against the army of its own state. But, under conditions of the existence of different socio-political systems, we must not go to extremes, and reduce the slogan of demilitarization to complete disarmament on a unilateral basis, without taking into account the political, economic and military realities that exist in the world. Do not these factors dictate to us the level of our current military capability, and find embodiment in the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency?

Yes, today we have the right to speak about the triumph of the new political thinking, about a certain "thaw" in international relations, in short, about everything that is associated with perestroika. But, this in no way means that the threat of a nuclear war has been eliminated completely and finally. Military conflict is a harsh reality of our day. It is enough to say that the NATO bloc in the European region has 3,660,000 men, more than 7,000 combat aircraft, 5,300 combat helicopters, approximately 30,000 tanks, and 500 major surface ships. Of

this huge grouping there are numerous forces quite near Estonia, in direct firing range, if it can be so expressed. The question arises, what is the real basis for the slogan of demilitarization, put forth by the NFE and certain other social organizations?

We also, I believe, must not fail to take into account political realities. Say, Mrs. M. Thatcher, speaking in Guild Hall, emphasized that "times of changes entail especially great uncertainty and even danger." In this connection, she calls for a strengthening of the military-political alliance of the Western states in every way possible, including of the NATO bloc. Since any opinion of a military man evokes distrust in a number of Estonians, and not only in them, why then not listen to Mrs. Thatcher?

We are not hypocrites, and in a period of a warming situation, we believe in further relaxation. Who is against curbing the arms race or reducing the Armed Forces? But, on an intelligent basis, taking into account the interests of the security of our borders. So that the citizens of the USSR, including Estonians, may quietly engage in peaceful, creative labor. We do not believe in aggression (and did the Baltic believe that Hitler would attack?), but we believe in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, still so needed by the people, and capable of crushing any aggression.

We military people know well the combat capabilities of the U. S. strike carrier task forces, and the NATO naval forces, which are superior to the forces of the USSR Navy many times over. We also consider the disposition of first strike weapons, say, cruise missiles, the flight time of which to the borders of the Baltic area is only a few minutes. Can we really close our eyes to all this and "stack arms," as the NFE calls upon us to do?

This is far from an idle question. Here is something for us all to think seriously about, without fussiness, haste, or unfounded accusations.

Of course, we can only welcome the interest of society, awakened by perestroika and glasnost, toward such an important aspect of our lives as the organization of the country's defense and the organizational development of its armed forces. However, the discussion, I believe, should be conducted on a sufficiently high and responsible level, and proposals should be well-justified, businesslike and constructive. It is hard to count on this when entire production collectives, scientific establishments, informal associations, etc., are frequently drawn into the orbit of disputes, larded with an anti-army syndrome.

This, unfortunately, is the totality of many public statements and utterances about the Soviet Army. Those writing about it frequently adhere to a discursive, and frequently simply hysterical note, which is far from true democratism. Nor did the NFE avoid this. It wrote in one of the sections of its electoral platform: "In the Estonia in which we live the number of Soviet troops is such that it seriously threatens the interests of the

permanent residents, and creates the soil for social, economic and national conflicts."

And what is the truth of the matter? There cannot be two truths, and we want the residents of Estonia to know the truth. First, this year callup into the Soviet Army was reduced by eight percent. Personnel in the forces decreased by four percent. Approximately a thousand students, 85 percent of whom were junior commanders and experienced specialists, were discharged from the Armed Forces and left Estonian territory. One asks on what the "truth-mongers," who are confusing the people, base their remarks?

The number of weapons and amount of military equipment are also declining. Estonia was "relieved" of intermediate and shorter range missiles, or, more precisely, all the missiles provided for by the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles have been destroyed. Units of missile troops have been disbanded and their personnel have returned to their homes.

In connection with the reorganization of forces in a number of garrisons, the number of tanks within Estonia has sharply declined. In some aviation garrisons the number of aircraft has been reduced by almost 10 percent. Also a reality is the fact that this year not a single offensive tactical exercise has been held on Estonian territory. The number of trips to the field by units has been reduced in half.

And here, despite all these serious reorganizational measures, there are those who continue to shout hysterically about the "dominance of the military," and deliberately wish to undermine the authority of the Soviet Army, and drive a wedge between the Estonian people and the military personnel.

Who benefits from this?

Frequently we hear that national self-consciousness has awakened in Estonia, and that Estonia is a republic of high education and culture. But, the attitude toward the army is itself an indicator of the level of civilization of a people. In no civilized state is its own army called an occupation army.

Let us clarify this question as well.

So, what is an occupation, and who are occupiers? In the Soviet country? Where did so many "democratic occupiers" come from, who allow themselves to be insulted and demeaned, and put up with anti-occupation slogans and demands? True occupiers, as history bears witness, conduct themselves differently. They unleash repressions against a people, introduce harsh procedures, take power fully into their hands, and prohibit the activities of all formal and informal social and political organizations. And what is the case in Estonia, and in the Baltic area as a whole? Five thousand such organizations exist. Do the "seers" prophesying about the "occupation regime" of the Soviet Army really not know about this?

Perhaps the Soviet Army limited the political and civil rights of Estonians, and of the entire native population? It is exactly the opposite. Substantial infringement of the rights of military personnel is evident, including one of the main rights, that to vote and be elected. And no occupation power would allow such discrimination.

They say that facts are a stubborn thing. And they indicate precisely that it is namely the Soviet soldiers who are first to rush to the aid of the population if a calamity occurs. In the last five years alone more than 32,000 explosive articles left over from the times of World War II have been disarmed on the territory of the Estonian SSR. And recently in one of the areas of the republic a man was killed—a mine clearing group immediately went out to conduct its difficult and dangerous work. I can imagine vividly how all of this took place, and think with bitterness: It is they who are called occupiers!

No less dangerous in this planned and purposeful action is the second aspect, the moral aspect.

There is nothing more absurd than when a people considers its own sons to be occupiers. This inflicts a wound that will not heal, not only upon the army, but also upon the people. There is nothing more unnatural than when mothers give hostile sendoffs to their sons, and even in general push them into crime, calling upon them to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces. And the "inspirers" of the refusals will not answer to anyone or in any way. Do they really not think about how their sons will grow up? And what authority will the parents have in the eyes of their children?

It is not for nothing that the people say: The echo responds to the call. After this is there any reason to complain about the disrespect of young people toward their parents, family, the law, and the state? And this is dangerous.

So, whom does this benefit in such a difficult political situation?

I believe that local party and soviet organs could give a balanced and constructive assessment of such attacks against the Soviet Army. The desire to not notice these attacks, and to close one's eyes to how the authority of the USSR Armed Forces is being undermined, and their historical role distorted, is also a position. And, to be frank, it is a troubling position.

By manipulating public consciousness, some figures, intentionally or unintentionally, are creating a picture of the army as the enemy of perestroika, and an organization that exists solely owing to force and in the name of suppressing the individual. The thesis about the creation of national-territorial military formations in the Baltic area is being insistently exaggerated. It has also been advanced in the NFE electoral platform, where, amidst the final goals of the activity of this organization, the following is also defined: "...To ensure the defense of the

state border of the USSR on the territory of Estonia on the basis of national-territorial military formations."

What can be said about this? In the 70 years of its existence, our army has passed through the territorial militia system, extraterritorial and inter-ethnic (mixed) manning, and through national formations within the framework of a single army. Having experienced everything, frequently through trial and error, it began to be structured on the existing cadre military organizational system, developed by the party. This system withstood testing in both the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars. This is the main argument in its defense. Needless to say, the currently existing system of military organizational development needs improvement. This work is being carried out on the basis of precise calculations and sober assessments. Let us recall the heated debates and discussions at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. And how do the NFE leaders see the material basis of the national-territorial military formations?

Let us imagine that the 8th Guards Estonian Rifle Corps is reconstituted, a question that is being raised sharply at this time at various levels. Immediately a mass of questions arises. For example, who will serve in this corps? Since we are talking about a national formation, to all appearances it will be Estonians. But where, in this case, are command cadres to be obtained? If one gathers together all of the officers of Estonian nationality now serving in the USSR Armed Forces, this corps will be manned by only seven percent of the required number of officer cadres. It is also no secret that time, and no small amount, is required for their training. One can only deplore the fact that last year only 21 Estonians entered military schools, and this year even fewer—only 15.

This is, so to speak, about the leadership element. And where are the personnel to be obtained? Today all of the military commissariates in the republic can call up (full annual callup) enough compulsory service personnel to satisfy only 25 percent of the requirements of a modern corps. If it is taken into account that among those called up there are many who have convictions (8.4 percent), and another 25 percent are not suitable for service for reasons of health, the picture becomes still more painful. But that is the truth.

At times we apprehend badly everything that is spent on defense. And this is correct. It is necessary to save funds, and this is being done today on a countrywide scale. And what would the Estonian Republic spend to maintain this national division, taking into account its modern technical equipment, and solving social, everyday living, and cultural questions? Without getting into details I will say that Estonia would have to put into the defense fund amounts significantly surpassing those that the entire republic puts into the state fund today. As the saying goes, there is no need for comment.

Moreover, it must be taken into account that there are different population densities in various regions of the country. That is, in some places (including Estonia)

callup resources are very limited. This means that their redistribution to maintain a reliable defense of the homeland is simply inevitable. This is true despite the fact that, as is known, the USSR Ministry of Defense has met halfway the numerous wishes of the Baltic republics, and today more than 20 percent of the inductees from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain to serve in the Baltic Military District. I believe that a categorical demand that all youth of the indigenous nationality carry out military service on the territory of "their own republic" is unacceptable. This is in essence a proposal against the extraterritorial manning principle that is accepted in all civilized countries in the world. Imagine that the U. S. split its army into 50 parts, the activities of which were regulated not so much by the interests of state defense, as by the plans of local authorities. It is absurd! It is entirely obvious that decentralizing the management of the Armed Forces will have a fatal effect on their combat might.

For this very reason, I believe, the point in the NFE electoral program cannot be approved that speaks about creating effective monitoring by the government organs of the activity of military commissariats and troop units, deriving from the program provisions of the NF and the Estonian constitution. Essentially we are talking about the same thing, about the resubordination of the army. A willful attempt is being made to remove from the USSR a function that belongs to it. Meanwhile the army, as before, is doing everything to see that not only in wartime, but also in years of peace, people feel that the Armed Forces of the country are a part of the people, living its pains and hopes.

A great number of examples of the advisability of such cooperation can be cited. Take only conversion. The troops of the Baltic Military District have transferred to the economy, as well as to cooperatives in the Baltic region, equipment, facilities and material valuables in the amount of 4,081,000 rubles. Motor vehicles of various makes alone have been transferred valued at 1,392,000 rubles, engineer equipment at 920,000 rubles, and communications property and equipment at 300,000 rubles. Moreover, equipment and property valued at 640,000 rubles has been sold through the district material funds department. A significant portion of these valuables is being used today for the benefit of Estonia.

I am concluding these remarks on an optimistic note not accidentally. The more rapidly the anti-army moods in the republic are blown away, and the unjustified attacks on military persons halted, the sooner we will find mutual understanding, and the more effective, I believe, will be Estonia's steps on the path of perestroika.

Volkogonov Interviewed on His Vision of Armed Forces in Year 2000

90UM0214B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 1 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Colonel-General D. Volkogonov, chief, Institute of Military History, USSR Ministry of Defense, by N. Panyukov; date and place not given]

[Text] [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] How do you envision the Soviet Army of the year 2000?

(The above question is answered by Col Gen D. Volkogonov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and chief of the Institute of Military History, USSR Ministry of Defense.)

[VOLKOGONOV] I can answer your question very briefly by saying that the Army will continue to exist. I am convinced of that, even though some hotheads feel that there no longer is any need for it. The Army will continue to exist as long as the world is split and as long as the world remains polarized. Even if the world becomes multipolar by the year 2000, the Army will stay.

The fact that the Army apparently will continue to evolve into a professional corps is another matter. We have already taken definite steps in this regard: In the submarine service and the missile troops, for example, the majority of specialists are officers and warrant officers—and they are real professionals.

By the year 2000, it must be assumed, the Army will become considerably smaller. Perhaps it will be half or a third of its present size. This is largely dependent on the successes attained in talks dealing with further reductions in nuclear weapons.

As banal as it may seem, I also think that as the reduction progresses the Army should undergo qualitative improvement and take on a more scientific structure.

I am a "utopian" to a certain extent, in the sense that I sincerely believe that the times can be good and kind. I even dream that on one fine day all the nuclear powers will agree to leave only one missile apiece in their respective arsenals, such that it will be possible to organize a unique worldwide holiday during which even the remaining monsters will be eliminated. The places of elimination—in the USA, Soviet Union, China, France, and England—will be marked by special plaques that symbolize the enlightenment of mankind, which did away with the "sword of Damocles" that for so many years threatened the life of our planet.

It is a dream, of course. However, in principle there is nothing that is unattainable. If the new thinking takes hold, I would say—speaking in a planetary manner—that this can become a reality. Then we would be able to approach the year 2000 with a small Army, the mission of which would be mere localization of some kinds of random conflicts.

Many outstanding thinkers of the past spoke of the need for general disarmament. For example, Immanuel Kant's thought of perpetual peace is beautiful. He stepped ahead 100 years into the future, into the 21st century. Remarkable thoughts of a world without weapons and wars have also been expressed by many other scholars. Their dreams were not to come true,

however. It seems that mankind is approaching this point only now, a time when the chance to realize them is at hand.

The use of force today is fraught with total destruction. At various stages of mankind's existence there always were leaders and forces of extremist inclination who could not resist taking up the sword to resolve problems of the times. This is a very dangerous trend, one which still cannot be eliminated entirely. That is why the year 2000 will still see an army.

French Armed Forces Reorganization Described

90UM0212A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA response to letter to the editors: "Under the Same Concept: Reorganization of French Armed Forces"]

[Text] *Dear Editors! The Soviet press has reported on the existence of a plan for reorganizing the French Army. Known as "Armed Forces—2000," it was developed by French Minister of Defense J-P. Chevenement. Could you provide more details?*

Senior Lieutenant S. Novitskiy, Belorussian Military District

According to statements made by official representatives of the French Ministry of Defense, the "Armed Forces - 2000" program is intended to bring national defense "into conformity with the concept of nuclear containment." It is all-embracing in nature. The forthcoming changes will have some effect on all components of the French Armed Forces: the Ground Troops, Air Force, Navy, and Military Gendarmerie.

The program consists of three major measures. First, it is planned to strengthen the corps that constitute the 1st Army and transfer this Army's headquarters to Metz so that it will be closer to the tactical air command and also to the underground protected command post in Rochonvillers (department of Moselle). Six territorial military regions and 22 territorial districts will be strengthened at the same time. In addition, 23 headquarters units will be either eliminated or severely reduced.

Since 1984, the French Army's operational structure has consisted of three army corps (with headquarters located in Metz, Baden, and Lille) and "rapid deployment forces" (Maisons-Laffitte) made up of five divisions. Under the "Armed Forces - 2000" plan, the new operational structure of the French troops will consist of two army corps: II Corps (Baden) and III Corps (Lille), and the "rapid deployment forces." The I Corps headquarters located in Metz will be abolished. Fifteen logistic support units, nine of which are full-strength regiments, will be inactivated.

In the new structure, II Army Corps will consist of the 1st Armored Division (Trier, FRG); 5th Armored Division (Landau, FRG); 3d Armored Division (Freiburg,

FRG); and the 15th Infantry Division (Limoges). The III Army Corps will undergo considerable reinforcement. It will include the 2d Armored Division (Versailles); 10th Armored Division (Chalons- sur-Marne); 7th Armored Division (Besancon); and the 8th Infantry Division (Amiens).

The composition of the "rapid deployment forces" remains the same. It will include the 4th Airmobile Division (Nancy); 9th Infantry (Marine) Division (Nantes); 27th Alpine Division (Grenoble); 11th Airborne Division (Toulouse); and the 6th Armored Cavalry Division (Nimes).

Thus, 1st Army will consist of two reinforced army corps of four divisions each, with three of the latter armored.

The Army and Gendarmerie will regroup into three territorial military regions: the Atlantic, North-Eastern, and the Mediterranean, with headquarters located in Bordeaux, Metz, and Lyons. The Atlantic Military Region will be divided into three military districts (Rennes, Limoges, Toulouse); the North-Eastern, into four (Strasbourg, Amiens, Chalons-sur-Marne, Besancon). Finally, the Mediterranean Region will consist of two districts: Lyons and Marseille. Paris will become an independent military district.

Instead of four zonal commands of the Air Force, there will be three, with the centers located in Villacoublay, Metz, and Aix-en-Provence. The military district headquarters located in Bordeaux will be abolished.

The Navy will have two instead of three command bases—in Brest and Toulon. The functions of the Cherbourg Naval Base will be transferred to the military district headquarters that is responsible for observation of navigation in the English Channel.

The plan calls for completing the above operational and territorial changes in 1991. In the words of French Minister of Defense J.-P. Chevenement, the "Armed Forces - 2000" plan is "in tune with the spirit of defense: an attempt to utilize to maximum advantage of the country's security and resolution of future problems the extremely limited forces available (to the Ministry of Defense)."

Development of French Missile, Israeli AWACS Discussed

90UM0212B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "In Arsenals and Proving Grounds"]

[Text] *Underwater Launch*

The French firm of Aerospatiale and the West German MBB are developing the Polyphem SM surface-to-air guided missile for employment by submarines. The proposed missile is designed to destroy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters flying at altitudes up to 5,000 meters at a distance of 10 km from a submarine.

It is intended to employ a special guidance system capable of homing in when the target position is not known exactly. Upon breaking the ocean surface, the missile is to fly a circular path of 1 km radius at an altitude of 500 meters, during which time the target coordinates are to be defined.

The Polypem SM missile is housed in a capsule that is launched through a torpedo tube. After the launch, the capsule assumes a horizontal position and travels under water on a programmed trajectory at speeds up to 15 m/s. It can be launched at various depths, from periscope level to 300 meters. After the capsule carrying the missile travels a distance of about one kilometer from the submarine, the capsule assumes a vertical position and surfaces. The capsule then opens, the booster ignites, and then the sustainer is initiated.

After the missile surfaces, control is by means of a fiber optic cable. Launch weight of the missile system is 106 kg, with the missile proper constituting 43 kg of that. The HE warhead weighs 3 kg.

Airborne Warning System

According to information supplied by the foreign press, the Israeli firm of Israel Aircraft Industries is developing an Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft equipped with the Falcon radar. This aircraft, a modification of the Boeing 707, will be fitted with a conformal phased-array radar. A model of this craft was exhibited at last year's Paris Air and Space Show.

Featured in this model are radar antennas located in the nose fairing, fuselage sides, underneath the tail section, and in the wing tips. The press states that this makes it possible to perform circular scanning, without serious effect on aircraft aerodynamics. The use of the phased-array antennas makes it possible to accomplish faster scanning and target location as compared with similar existing aircraft, such as the E-3A Sentry or the E-2C Hawkeye, in which the rotating antenna is positioned on top of the fuselage.

The Falcon system has been under development for about 3 years. Flight testing should start in the latter part of 1991, with initial deliveries to be made a year later.

U.S. Reluctance to Liquidate Binary Chemical Weapons Challenged

90WC0053A Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA
in Russian No 4, Feb 90 p 89

[Editorial reply to question submitted by reader D. Kukharuk: "For the Sake of Retaining Binaries"]

[Text] I have heard that the USA has refused to liquidate chemical weapons. Is this so?...D. Kukharuk, Kiev.

Washington has made no official announcement on refusing to liquidate chemical weapons. However, recently the newspaper WASHINGTON POST published a report which might be called sensationalist:

"The United States intends to continue producing chemical weapons even after the new agreement on their destruction goes into effect". President Bush came to this decision, the newspaper indicates, after studying the "top secret" analysis of policy in this sphere.

The WASHINGTON POST is too influential and popular a newspaper to be disbelieved. If the matter is really developing in this direction, then this testifies to a change in the USA's approach to the liquidation of chemical weapons. However, such an approach contradicts the positions of states participating in the development of a treaty on banning these barbaric weapons and on destroying their reserves. After all, it was envisioned that the production of toxic substances must cease immediately after the treaty becomes effective.

In connection with this we must remember that the Soviet-American announcement on this matter expressed without any reservations the adherence of the parties to the idea of banning the "silent death". The topic of discussion also centered around a specific agreement which would help to eliminate all existing apprehensions in the sphere of control. Thus, an understanding was reached on conducting a general experiment, in the course of which there would be an exchange of data on the military-chemical potentials of the USSR and USR, followed by on- site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information handed over by the respective sides.

Despite this fact, an administration representative informed the newspaper that in the nearest future the USA would propose a review of the text of the treaty draft on liquidating chemical weapons. Could this be for the purpose of retaining the right to produce toxic substances for military application? Evidently so, since one cannot prohibit chemical weapons in order to produce them. Here, undoubtedly, certain American circles are placing their stake on the existence of a new generation of chemical weapons—binary chemical weapons. We will recall that binary weapons consist of two components of relatively low toxicity which turn into a lethal toxic substance only at the moment of their combat application. In the opinion of Pentagon strategists, this will facilitate the storage and expand the possible sphere of application of combat toxic substances.

Quite recently, when the talks in Geneva were stepped up, the proponents of binary chemical weapons affirmed that the production of new toxic substances would, supposedly, force the Soviet Union to conduct negotiations in a constructive manner. However today, when literally a few steps remain to the conclusion of the treaty, it is specifically the existence of binary technology which inhibits the work of the conference in Geneva. Yet the Pentagon representatives pretend that they do not understand this fact, and call upon the President to continue the production of binary weapons even "after conclusion of the treaty", as reported by the WASHINGTON POST. They explain this by the fact that if in

the future the USA wants to get out of the agreement, it will have a ready "modernized chemical arsenal" at its disposal.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Radyanska Ukrayina", "Pod znamenem leninizma", 1990

Kortunov Discusses Nuclear Stability, Parity, Sufficiency

90WC0049A Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 2, Feb 90 (signed to press 24 Jan 90) pp 3-13

[Article by Sergey Vadimovich Kortunov, first secretary of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration, candidate in historical sciences: "Stability in the Nuclear World"]

[Text] At the threshold of the unofficial Soviet-American meeting in Malta, the administration of G. Bush experienced a sort of "Reykjavik syndrome". Many of its representatives feared that the Soviet side would again speak out with a large-scale proposal of a "propagandist character", a proposal such as complete and immediate elimination of nuclear weapons, which would be difficult to reject without serious political losses.

Their fears, however, proved unfounded. The discussion in Malta was not about a nuclear-free world, but about how to ensure rapid progress toward the agreements which were being prepared, including those in the sphere of deep cutbacks in nuclear weapons. At the meeting, what might be called a "political decision" was adopted to complete work on the agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons already this year. As for the more distant prospects of strategic relations between the USSR and the USA, the meeting did not lead to any noticeable rapprochement in the positions of the two sides. The fundamental difference of opinion on the question of the role of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their total elimination still remained unresolved.

Be that as it may, the readiness of the USSR and USA to concentrate now without any sort of propagandist rhetoric on the practical steps toward a radical reduction in the nuclear arsenals is a vital coinciding moment in their approaches to the problem of security. Its formulation reflects the mutual understanding of the fact that complete and overall elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved, as they say, in a single stroke. Nuclear disarmament is but a part of a much broader step-by-step process which proceeds through deep reductions in military forces and conventional weapons and their structural reorganization on principles of non-offensive defense, as well as through the ordering of control mechanisms called upon not only to ensure the realization of disarmament in all directions of this process, but also to create a sort of "psychological comfort" in inter-state relations. And finally, it proceeds through radical transformations in East-West relations as a

whole, the gradual replacement of military-force instruments of maintaining peace with guarantees of security in the political, economic, humanitarian and ecological spheres and their legal securing by corresponding bilateral and multilateral agreements.

And since this is the case, then—whether we like it or not—we should also admit the fact that over a period of a certain, perhaps lengthy, period of time, mankind will unfortunately be forced to live in a nuclear world. The problem, consequently, today consists not only of paving the most realistic way toward overall elimination of nuclear weapons, of developing and affirming its philosophical-conceptual basis, but also of ensuring reliable international security specifically in today's real world, in spite of all our aversion to nuclear weapons. And until they are fully removed from the arsenals of states—to strive toward the creation of such conditions under which the unfavorable development of an international situation, the emergence of a political crisis or conflict situation capable of growing into nuclear war may be excluded.

In the most general plane, the provision of such conditions encompasses the concept of stability of the strategic situation (strategic stability), i.e., the maintenance of a certain degree of stability of the world strategic balance, under which none of the states having nuclear weapons can count on their first strike application in the hopes of gaining the upper hand in a nuclear war, and none will even dare to entertain the thought of their application except in response to attack.

The situation, obviously, is far from ideal, since the members of the "nuclear powers club" view each other as potential aggressors and believe that they are holding each other back from attack with the threat of a response strike, or in other words—with the fear of reprisal. However, until the mutual mistrust, suspicion and all kinds of nervous notions about each other's intentions are overcome, this situation will be one of the fundamental realities of world politics. Consequently, the provision of strategic stability will remain one of the main problems.

The problem of stability is a multiplanar and multifaceted one. Therefore, it must be resolved comprehensively, in all the multiplicity of its military and political aspects. This article deals with only a few of these aspects.

What is the Argument All About?

It is quite evident that the primary role in solving the problem of strengthening strategic stability, which affects the interests of all countries of the world without exception, belongs to the countries which are the largest in a military sense—the USSR and USA. Also doubtless is the fact that in spite of all the differences in understanding national goals, in spite of all the differences of opinion in approaches to certain international problems, strategic stability is undoubtedly the field where USSR and USA interests coincide.

This is specifically why, with the beginning of the process of limiting strategic weapons, the question of strengthening strategic stability is reflected in all the most important Soviet-American documents. At the same time, one of the, we might say, dramatic realities of Soviet-American negotiations on military-strategic questions is the fact that as soon as the USSR and USA reached agreement regarding the general principles of disarmament and strengthening international security, quite often disagreement arose between them in connection with the interpretation of these principles.

Evidently, we must seek the reason for this in the fact that quite often the parties attributed different content to the authentic formulations coordinated at the price of mutual concessions and compromises. In this sense the concept of strategic stability, unfortunately, did not become an exception to the general rule. Taken out of context of the specific negotiations, it is no more than an abstraction, a good intention, which opens up a broad expanse for all kinds of subjective evaluations and arbitrary interpretations.

If the USSR and USA come to a single understanding of what the strengthening of strategic stability means in a practical plane, the negotiations on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons will become first of all more meaningful from the standpoint of formulating the problems which they are called upon to solve, and consequently also more effective in the plane of ensuring the security of both parties. After all, the ultimate value of any agreement in this sphere is determined not only by the quantity of reduced weapons and established limitations, but also by how greatly the threat of nuclear war is reduced.

Obviously, questions of strategic stability were always kept in view by the USSR and USA in the course of their negotiations on limiting and reducing strategic weapons. However, they were never the subject of direct discussion between them. Today the time is right for such a discussion. Evidently, it will be much more complicated than the negotiations on quantitative reductions of nuclear weapons under conditions of their continued development. In order to begin this discussion in earnest, the participants, i.e., the USSR and USA, must first of all realistically evaluate the level of military threat and on this basis determine for themselves how many and what kind of strategic weapons each of them must have to retain the stability of the strategic situation at a minimal level of opposition under a given variant of development of strategic interaction between the parties. Then they can begin a joint discussion on the question of the structure of strategic forces of the sides, which most greatly responds to the problem of strengthening strategic stability.

A Bit of History

The concept of "strategic stability" emerged in the American scientific literature in the late 50's in connection with efforts to interpret the phenomenon of Soviet-American nuclear opposition.

These efforts, obviously, were not some sort of intellectual exercise by American political scientists, but were engendered by the objective need of the US military-political leadership to give an evaluation of a principally new situation associated with the United States' loss of strategic invulnerability and the emergence of a sort of "nuclear interdependence" in Soviet-American relations. This meant, if not equality in potentials of nuclear power, then equal danger of its application for both sides.

This shift in American military-strategic thinking was undoubtedly an indication of the appearance of certain elements of realism there, conditioned by the interpretation of new realities. At the same time, this tendency, obviously, was superimposed over the persistent stereotypes of American foreign political thinking, the efforts to use nuclear strength for political purposes if not by direct, then by indirect means. And, as a result, it was also superimposed over the desire to retain the position of military supremacy at any cost. As a result, from the very beginning the concept of strategic stability began to be viewed in the USA in categories of military strength and refracted in such concepts as a "nuclear dead-end", "expanded containment", "balance of fear", "escalation domination", etc. Ultimately, it was specifically these military-force notions which led to the situation where the multiplanar essence of strategic stability, far from exhausted by purely military content, was in fact reduced by American specialists to the so-called "crisis stability", i.e., to a discussion of the question of the character of presumed actions by the sides in different situations of exacerbation of political tensions. It is also no accident that one of the key moments in the American conception from the very beginning was the "stability of the arms race", which not only did not exclude, but which in essence presupposed the continued competition of the parties in increasing and developing their nuclear potentials.

When the military-strategic relations between the USSR and the USA took on a new quality and began to be characterized by nuclear parity (i.e., approximate balance of power in the nuclear sphere), the American military-political leaders came to the conclusion that it would be expedient to control the continuation of the strategic nuclear weapons race by means of establishing through negotiations with the USSR certain limitations on its development in the most dangerous directions—those fraught with the danger of undermining strategic stability.

That is when the USSR and USA came to a clear understanding of the fact that under conditions of parity in strategic offensive forces, either party's acquiring additional defensive potential would be tantamount to its acquiring the potential of a preemptive nuclear strike. This understanding was reflected in the ABM Treaty of 1972, which—and about this we must say directly—in fact legalized the situation of "mutual nuclear containment" (or "mutual guaranteed annihilation").

In the course of further negotiations on strategic arms limitation, the American side, unfortunately, began to strive toward securing in the future agreement with the USSR such an interpretation of strategic stability which would correspond exclusively to American interests, having the goal of bringing the USA out from under a response strike, or at least of minimizing the losses in the case of a hypothetical exchange of nuclear strikes. In essence, the American side drew us into a discussion of scenarios of nuclear war which, we might add, began appearing at this time in official U.S. documents.

For the sake of fairness, we must note that we did not allow ourselves to get carried away with such discussions at the negotiations with the USA. In public announcements issued in the 70's-80's we also rejected the possibility of different variants of "limited", "drawn-out", etc. nuclear war. At the same time, by our actions in the sphere of military construction, we, in essence, followed the logic of our military rivals, the logic which was imposed on us by the other side. Thus, the Soviet Union allowed itself to be drawn into the strategic nuclear weapons race, which, while not increasing the country's security, led to an unjustified overstressing of its economy.

Judging by the development of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the task of maintaining military-strategic parity with the USA at any cost was set. This was understood at first as quantitative equality in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons, and then as approximate equality of combat capacities of strategic nuclear forces of the sides in various types of combat operations. Taking reciprocating steps in maintaining parity and striving to ensure for itself the capacity of inflicting equal damage on the USA in a nuclear war, the Soviet Union, judging by the available information, introduced a large number of types and modifications of ballistic missiles which, while doing little to add to its defense capabilities, in fact provoked the other side to continue the arms race. The vicious circle of "action-counteraction" had been closed.

What are Acceptable Losses?

At the present moment, there is a practical consensus understanding in the world regarding the fact that the current military balance is characterized by super-armament, particularly in the nuclear sphere.

In fact, if we retain basic common sense, we must admit that the nuclear potentials existing in the USSR and the USA have greatly exceeded all conceivable criteria of adequacy for ensuring a destructive response strike under any, even the most unfavorable, development of the situation and set of circumstances, and under any scenario of first strike by a potential aggressor. Even if we overlook the catastrophic ecological consequences of nuclear war (effect of "nuclear winter"), we cannot overlook the fact that any nuclear attack would be self-destructive for the side unleashing the nuclear war.

Nevertheless, contrary, it would seem, to any rational explanation, the growth and development of nuclear arsenals continues in full swing.

This monstrous paradox may be explained only by the inertia of the old way of thinking, in which the "pre-nuclear concept" of nuclear weapons still reigns supreme, forcing the sides to place too great a dependence on the quantitative factors of military strength. As applied to the United States, the traditional stereotypes of military-power thinking have been superimposed on them, and as applied to the Soviet Union—the effect of stereotypes inherited from the period of World War II should be added to them. These were also expressed in the increases in certain types of weapons in the conventional as well as in the nuclear sphere, increases which were not always justified.

The supremacy of such notions is what led to the situation in which the criteria for unacceptable losses in a nuclear war—this key idea in any conception of strategic stability—have turned out to be excessively high.

Of course such criteria are not subject to precise definition. They will always be subjective and rather conditional and, we might add, the militaristic circles make active use of this fact. As we know, R. McNamara included in the concept of unacceptable losses the loss of about 30 percent of the population and 70 percent of the industrial potential of the aggressor, while DeGaulle saw it as the destruction of 4-5 cities. In spite of the random nature of both criteria, DeGaulle, we must assume, was nevertheless closer to the truth. Even with the most superficial familiarization with the elementary internal political realities of the USA, it is entirely impossible to imagine that stake in nuclear war under which it would be ready to reconcile itself with the fact that, for example, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago would be turned into a radioactive desert. For the American side such a loss, without a doubt, would be unacceptable. Evidently, any serious American studies specialist would confirm this fact. However, the "threshold" of unacceptable losses lies, we believe, even lower. In any case, in the mid-50's the notion was expressed that, despite all the power of an American nuclear strike against the USSR, at least one Soviet bomber might get through to drop its deadly cargo on New York, for example. Such a notion was enough to cool even the hottest heads in Washington. From the human standpoint this is fully understandable. Would a mother agree to sacrifice even one of her own children for the sake of putting to death her worst enemy?

Based on this, it would evidently have been possible to deter the USA from attacking the USSR by using nuclear forces tens of times smaller than those currently present in the arsenal. In this sense, the situation of military-strategic parity from the standpoint of stability differs little from the already mentioned "nuclear interdependence" between the USSR and the USA which was formulated in the early 60's.

This is specifically what McNamara was referring to when he stated that Soviet-American nuclear parity had already existed during the time of the Caribbean crisis

(October 1962), when, according to his calculations, the USA had 5,000 warheads, and the USSR—only 300. Yet, despite the fact that the USA had a 17:1 supremacy in warheads, each side would have been capable of inflicting a devastating response strike if it had been attacked.

The situation which arose in the period of the Caribbean crisis synonymously testifies to the fact that it is not the quantitative ratio of nuclear forces, and not even the equality of destructive capacities of the nuclear potentials which is of decisive importance for strategic stability, but rather the character of the military-political thinking of the ruling circles of the states, and the degree to which they recognize the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war.

We must remember that war (including also nuclear war) for the USA, as for any other state, is not a goal in itself, but merely a means of policy. And if war ceases to be a means of policy, then policy, regardless of how irrational it may be, must cast it aside. Current nuclear missile weapons, which by their might exceed many times over all the weapons which mankind has known at any time in the past, cannot help but alter the traditional notions held by an aggressor regarding the character of a potential war in which such weapons may be used and, specifically, the notions on the possibility of achieving a victory in such a war.

At the same time, obviously, we also cannot underestimate the presence of confrontational thinking in certain U.S. circles. Nor can we underestimate the strategic illusions associated with the overestimation of our own might, as well as the expectations of "benefit" from certain scenarios of unleashing a war. Especially the variant of a first de- arming nuclear strike against a maximum number of Soviet military objectives.

The consequences of the possible application of nuclear weapons are so monstrous that they turn any scenario of their direct application into a military-strategic absurdity. However, despite this fact, such scenarios continue to be developed and included in the appropriate operative plans. If we think about this situation from the standpoint of common sense, then the sphere of operative planning—this "holiest of holies" of the military establishment—turns into some kind of "world beyond the mirror", where generals are enraptured with countless variants of war games developed on the screens of computer terminals, scrupulously counting up the number of surviving launchers and warheads. It turns into a sort of fantastic world, in which strategy counter-balances strategy, and one scenario battles another. Of course, we can only rejoice that such a "war" takes place only in the minds of the military leaders. At the same time, we cannot forget for one moment that such a psychological game which is not subject to any rational justification, unfortunately, has a material base in the form of actually existing nuclear weapons, whose tasks are determined based on the available scenarios of nuclear war. The mechanism of "nuclear destruction"

has been fully perfected, and the trigger mechanism is just a hair's breadth away from being immediately set into action.

All these circumstances do not exclude, at least in a theoretical plane, the emergence of such crisis situations in which common sense may simply fail in making military-political decisions. The decisive role in this may belong also to distorted notions about the opponent's policy, as well as subjective notions about the "expediency" of a first strike, erroneous actions of the military command, as well as the most varied unpredictable random happenings. Yet the result would be the same—pressing the nuclear button.

Thus, the current strategic situation is far from what we may call stable. Moreover, evidently, until nuclear weapons are fully eliminated from the arsenals of countries, a certain level of instability will be an inevitable attribute of international relations. The very nature of nuclear weapons is such that, no matter how few of them remain in the world, there will still be "too many". At the same time, even with their retention, the level of instability may be reduced to a minimum if we strive not only toward a peaceful solution to controversial problems, but also toward firm control over the course of events. In other words, [we can accomplish this] if we take timely appropriate unilateral and coordinated measures for strengthening strategic stability, and if we ensure through the efforts of the USSR and USA, as well as other nuclear powers, a maximal reduction in the probability of nuclear war.

We believe that the adoption of such measures lies primarily in the plane of political, and not military, decisions. After all, if Soviet-American relations, as well as the relations between all the nuclear powers as a whole, are built on trust, if they gradually overcome the "image of the enemy", then we may quite realistically expect that no crisis or conflict situation will grow into a nuclear confrontation. If in addition to this we create an effective mechanism of "de-escalation" of conflicts, i.e., preventing their growing into nuclear war, and also take additional measures to exclude the danger of its occurrence as a result of a random accident, miscalculation or provocation, then the risk of such a war will be reduced to a minimum.

Let us examine this question in essence. Soberly evaluating the phenomenon of nuclear opposition and abstracting ourselves from any sort of ideological and emotional stratification, we cannot help but conclude that the reason for creating a mechanism of "mutual guaranteed annihilation", this nuclear machine of "judgement day", just as the reason for the growth and development of nuclear weapons which continued in the post-war years, was primarily mutual mistrust and false interpretations of the real political intentions of the opposing sides. For example, in the Soviet Union many were convinced that the USA was striving toward military supremacy for the purpose of imposing a "Pax Americana" on a global scale and depriving the USSR of

its current status in the world community. Many people in the USSR—leaders as well as ordinary citizens—to this day hold the opinion that somewhere deep in American political consciousness there still lives the idea that the Soviet state is unlawful, created not by God, but by the devil, and that its existence must sooner or later be put to an end. In turn, most Americans have for many years sincerely believed that the Soviet Union professes and supports by military force the ideology which is oriented toward spreading communism throughout the entire world with the aid of subversive activity and forceful pressure.

In this case, each of the sides proceeded not from the actual intentions of the "enemy" but from an evaluation of that potential harm which he could inflict. In essence, this situation is absurd. After all, if we project it onto relations between people, our life would become intolerable, since each of us would have to see in every passer-by a potential robber, assaulter or murderer. Nevertheless, it is specifically such false notions which today reign supreme in the consciousness of a significant part of the military-political leadership of the countries, stimulating the intensification of the arms race.

Thus, it is specifically the political relations of the states which undoubtedly provide the basis for stability which, in essence, is their derivative. Ultimately, both the equipment of the armed forces with nuclear weapons and the ways of developing the means of their delivery, which have led to the position which currently exists today, are the result of political decisions.

On the other hand, political relations are obviously not a value which is independent of the military sphere and the building of nuclear forces. After all, military policy is ultimately the material reflection of true, and not publicly declared, political intentions of states.

For example, the strengthening of strategic stability is undoubtedly facilitated by the publication of defensive military doctrines and the acceptance of the responsibility of not being the first to use nuclear or other weapons. However, there should not be any inconsistency between such publicly proclaimed doctrines and the practice of military construction. The doctrine of not being the first to use nuclear weapons must correspond to such a structure of nuclear forces which would not give the other side reason to view it as a material base for a first-strike strategy, motivating it to seek protection under an anti-missile shield, which in turn may be perceived by the first side as a manifestation of aggressive intentions.

In this connection, until that time when mutual mistrust in the sphere of political relations between states is overcome, "non-provocative" defensive nuclear potential must evidently be exhausted by the function of inflicting an unacceptable (and not an equal) loss in a return strike. An indisputable trait of the current strategic situation is the fact that a relatively small portion of USSR strategic means can inflict such losses upon the USA.

One might say that the problem consists of the ability to deliver these means in a response strike, since a significant part of the nuclear potential may be destroyed as a result of the enemy's first strike. Yes, that is, of course, the problem. However, it should be solved not by means of continually increasing the number of warheads and launchers (thereby creating a larger number of targets for the other side), but by means of increasing the capacity for survival of the return strike potential.

Stability, Parity, Sufficiency

Concern has arisen recently in broad socio-political and scientific circles, as well as among military specialists, regarding the crisis of conceptions and doctrines based on the notion of military-strategic parity. It has become evident that the entry of the nuclear arms race onto a new plane, the reproduction of the "balance of fear" on a higher technological level, even with retention of the capacity of each side to impart equal losses in a nuclear war, lead to destabilization of the strategic situation. This alarming tendency was noted in the political speech of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress: "...the current level of balance of nuclear potentials of the opposing sides is excessively high. For now it ensures for each of them only equal danger. But that is only for now. The continuation of the nuclear arms race will inevitably increase this equal danger and may lead it to such limits when even parity will cease to be a factor in military-political containment."

What does this mean in a practical plane? First of all, it means that in order to ensure strategic stability, and consequently also our own security, the response actions of the USSR for the purpose of not allowing a break in military-strategic parity already prove insufficient. The need has arisen for joint actions by the USSR and USA on strengthening strategic stability.

This, however, certainly does not lead to the conclusion that unilateral actions on strengthening stability have fully exhausted themselves. On the contrary. However, these must be actions of an entirely different sort than in the past. They must be directed not at ensuring military-strategic parity at any cost, not at having at our disposal all the types of weapons which the other side has (this pursuit is just as unproductive as efforts, for example, to compete with the USA in the per capita crime rate), but rather at optimizing the military construction in such a way that the quantitative-qualitative parameters of the military potential do not provoke and do not evoke fears in the other side for its own safety. The continued realization of the principle of rational sufficiency assumes that the size and structure of the nuclear strategic potential must be calculated not for the "worst of the worst scenarios"—such computations are generally incompatible with the concept of sufficiency as such—but rather for the most probable variant of development of events. And this, in turn, presupposes not only an evaluation of the hypothetical capacities of the potential enemy, but also a dialectic analysis and consideration of his real intentions, and most importantly—his interests.

The logic of prudent sufficiency requires the unquestioned adoption of and strict adherence in our military construction to that principle which we publicly proclaimed. Specifically, that the nuclear potential of the USSR meets the task of preventing nuclear war, i.e., of imparting a return strike, but not a first strike.

In a specific plane, this means orientation in the construction of strategic offensive missiles toward low vulnerability systems with a declining portion of means equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles. For example, as concerns the ground component of the "strategic triad", to replace the heavily vulnerable systems with a large number of warheads, which are viewed by the USA as weapons capable of being used only in a first strike, we may gradually introduce lightweight single-warhead systems with mobile launch. In the naval component the emphasis would be placed on submarines which provide the capacity of high dispersal of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By means of these measures, which would reduce the concentration of warheads on launchers, we could increase the survival rate of the return strike forces, which along with strengthening and developing the guidance, warning and communications systems, could not only become the lever for stabilization of the strategic situation as a whole, but could also have a containing effect on the dynamics of American military construction, including also in the field of ABM defense.

Evidently, the line toward creating a strong material-technical base for preventing nuclear war with lower material expenditures, coupled with effective negotiations on nuclear disarmament, would open up significantly more possibilities for moving toward total liquidation of nuclear weapons by means of large mutual reductions, and toward preventing war on a principally different basis. As for the short-term prospects, such a line would create objective conditions to achieve from the USSR through the negotiation process a limitation, reduction, and subsequently also an elimination of those weapons which due to their characteristics are the most dangerous in the plane of undermining strategic stability.¹

In this connection, the primary goal of our efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future could become the joint creation with the USA of such a structure of strategic offensive weapons on radically reduced quantitative levels which under conditions of retention of the ABM Treaty would technically not ensure either of the sides the potential of a first strike.²

The Agreement Must Serve Stability

On the whole, the movement in this direction has already now begun, in the course of working out the agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, the draft of such an agreement prepared in Geneva has inherited, we believe, two main shortcomings from the previous approaches to this

problem which are characteristic for the negotiations of the 70's-early 80's. First of all, there is the primarily "arithmetical" character of reductions and limitations combined with the desire to retain at any cost the most current weapons which are being developed or planned within the framework of the military programs which have been undertaken. Secondly, there is the orientation toward retaining whenever possible the current, far from optimal, structure of strategic offensive weapons of the opposing sides, only at lower quantitative levels.

In this connection, it is no accident that in U.S. political circles, and primarily in Congress, the opinion is gradually being formed that the agreement on strategic offensive weapons in its current form would not only not reduce the nuclear threat, but would even be capable of leading to a destabilization of the strategic situation. Specifically, it is pointed out that the agreement will have little effect on the programs of modernization of strategic forces implemented in the USSR and USA, while the number of launch vehicles in their strategic arsenals, in accordance with the coordinated parameters of the agreement, would be sharply curtailed. Thus, the concentration of weapons on strategic launch vehicles would increase, and as a result, the level of stability would be reduced. After all, launch vehicles are not merely a means of delivery, but also potential targets for the nuclear forces of the opposing side.

The "strategic analysis" in the field of nuclear and space weapons which has dragged on in the USA, most evidently, is not a tactical move by the Bush administration for the purpose of slowing down the negotiation process. Rather, it reflects the gradually formulated new approach to deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons. We may assume that such an approach will much more than before be oriented toward achieving qualitative shifts in the strategic interrelations between the USSR and the USA in favor of increasing strategic stability, rather than simple quantitative reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two sides.

Under these conditions, we believe, working in conjunction with the USA we should introduce the necessary correctives into those parameters which comprise the basis of the future agreement on the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, with consideration for the need for strengthening stability, as well as long-term tasks in the sphere of optimization of military construction and nuclear disarmament. Such an approach, aside from all else, would create objective prerequisites for the prompt transition to the next step in nuclear disarmament.

The basic content of the next step in nuclear disarmament may be the reduction of USSR and USA strategic offensive weapons, say, by another 50-60 percent. In this case we might speak of complete elimination of such weapons systems which each of the sides considers most dangerous, provoking, and comprising the potential for attack. This stage in the reduction of strategic offensive weapons would to an even greater degree be aimed at the

qualitative structure of reorganization of USSR and USA strategic offensive weapons, and at reducing first strike capability. An important place in the context of these negotiations would belong to the development of a broad set of measures of trust in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons. In this context, the question of including other nuclear powers in nuclear disarmament would be presented in a new light.

The Role of Negotiations

Considering the excessiveness of current strategic arsenals from a military standpoint, the current conditions contain the possibility of certain unilateral actions which reduce the level of military opposition and strengthen strategic stability. At the same time, to proceed along this path alone at the given stage of historical development is hardly possible. Both in a military and in a political-psychological sense, we, despite our new thinking, are certainly not indifferent to how many and what kind of warheads are aimed at Soviet strategic objectives.

This is why a necessary condition for strengthening strategic stability is negotiations between the USSR and USA, and subsequently also between all the nuclear powers. Such negotiations are needed to determine what weapons systems are viewed by each of the sides as being the most dangerous, and to take joint steps for their reduction, and then their complete elimination. They are needed to cover the most "destabilizing" direction of development of military technology, and to establish strict rules of modernization and replacement of weapons. The negotiations are needed to introduce into the practice of bilateral, and then also multilateral, military-political relations new parameters of openness and control, leading to predictability of their development, which is one of the most important components of stability. Finally, they are important also in a moral-psychological sense as an instrument for strengthening mutual trust and eroding away the "image of the enemy".

At the present moment, the fact is ever more broadly acknowledged that the quantitative reduction in nuclear arsenals is far from a guarantee of strengthening stability. For example, if such reductions are accompanied by an increase in vulnerability of an ever greater portion of strategic forces, control and communication centers of both or even one of the sides, then the stability of the strategic situation would be decisively undermined.

In this connection, as long as we are speaking about really deep reductions in nuclear weapons (by 50, and then more percent), the main question at the negotiations must become the definition, from the standpoint of stability, of the optimal structures of strategic offensive arms which are retained by the sides after the reductions. The resolution of this question will make it possible to define the content of a certain stage of nuclear disarmament and to clarify when additional measures of trust must accompany it.

This path, obviously, is exceptionally complex. Yet any other one, perhaps, is hardly capable of leading to a true strengthening of international security, much less of laying the groundwork for the transition to a nuclear-free world. The sooner the sides begin serious talks in Geneva about strategic stability, the more effective the talks will be, and the greater the chances that the new agreement on strategic offensive weapons will not become merely a factor of a certain containment of the arms race, but rather that it will ensure a decisive breakthrough to a qualitatively new world status, in which the security of states will be based not on the guaranteed threat of application of nuclear military force, but on the guaranteed absence of such a threat.

We hope that the high level Soviet-American meeting which is to be held this summer will be a major step in this direction.

Footnotes

1. We are referring to such systems as the ICBM "MX", the SLBM "Trident-2", the "B-2" rocket, and nuclear SLCMs and ALCMs.
2. This problem is multiplanar, and its solution will require as a minimum the gradual exclusion from the strategic nuclear balance of such forms and types of strategic weapons whose capabilities in a preemptive strike significantly surpass their capabilities in response actions, as for example systems with a short approach time (specifically, SLBM with grazing trajectories), systems with increased accuracy, high throw-weight, and unpredictable flight azimuth (for example, SLCM'). At the same time, we must strive to prohibit means of combatting forces of response strike by the opposing side, including mobile based ICBM's (for example, the "B-2" with its corresponding rockets), as well as limitations on means of anti-naval combat, to whose capacities strategic stability becomes sensitive with radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons. With all this, obviously, the sides must reject the creation of large-scale AMB systems and new anti-satellite systems, and eliminate the already existing ASAT.

COPYRIGHT: MID SSSR. Obshchestvo "Znaniye", "Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn". 1990.

Cheney's Message on Troop Cuts, Modernization of Forces Questioned

90WC0050A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 9, 3 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by Gennadiy Gerasimov: "The Asian Aspect"]

[Text] Everything has become mixed up in the military-strategic situation in the APR, the Asian-Pacific region. The situation was rather well reflected in a cartoon published in the newspaper PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER. Uncle Sam is holding a sheepskin coat labelled "foreign bases" over a figure representing Asia. Meanwhile, the sun is shining, the iceberg of the "cold

"war" is melting, and a good-natured boy in a cap with the inscription "USSR" is saying that the weather has changed.

The cartoon appeared during U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's tour of the APR countries. In the past, such trips by Pentagon commercial travellers became a convenient target for the arrows of our commentators, who rightfully uncovered aggressive intentions in their baggage. This time the Secretary demonstrated a tendency toward dialectics or, upon closer examination, a split personality.

On one hand, speaking in Tokyo at the National Press Club, Cheney maintained that, as before, there is a "threat on the part of the USSR" in the APR. Specifically, he said that "even if the number of Soviet combat ships in the Far East is decreasing, the Soviet missile and aerial threat to Japan is intensifying due to modernization of forces".

Here, of course, the recorded growth of the "missile threat" is especially surprising. According to the agreement with USA, Soviet medium-range missiles are being destroyed. Specifically, at the large Soviet missile base in Novosysoyevsk, among the picturesque hills of Sikhote-Alinsk ridge, where Dersu Uzala wandered, and from where it is not that far to Japan. Other missiles are not being erected, and the USA and USSR are conducting talks on a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear missiles. How then can the Soviet "missile threat" in Asia be intensifying?

That is on the one hand. On the other, Cheney brought to Japan and to the other countries along his route (South Korea, the Philippines) the news of an approximate 10 percent reduction in American armed forces there. For Japan, in particular, this means the withdrawal of 5,000 American military personnel in the next 3 years.

Moreover, Cheney announced that "the USA does not want a significant increase in Japanese armed forces".

In both cases there were stipulations: The cutback does not mean a reduction in strength. It will be compensated by modernization. Budget considerations were also implied here. However, these two factors also existed yesterday, while the practical conclusion for military construction is being drawn only today. Somewhere there is hidden yet another reason for the change brought by Cheney.

It was unexpected. On the eve of the American defense secretary's visit, the official representative of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sigeo Takenaka predicted that the USA does not intend to cut back or withdraw its forces from the territory of Japan, at least in the nearest future. Thus, there is an inconsistency with the American position.

In response to the question of the rightfulness of using the term "threat", this same representative admitted that such an application leads one to think that the

Soviet Union is directly threatening Japan and this, in his opinion, does not correspond to reality. So, once again there is an inconsistency with the American position.

Be that as it may, the intersecting American-Japanese inconsistencies, coupled with the proposed 10 percent cutback in American military personnel in the region, may be viewed favorably—as indications of the adaptation of the American military department to the changes taking place in the world in their Asian aspect.

Dutch Reconnaissance Aircraft Purchase

90UM0356B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[*"In Arsenals and On Test Ranges: Superlight-Weight Aircraft"*]

[Text] As the weekly JANE'S DEFENSE reports, the Dutch ground forces have purchased four superlight-weight Omega aircraft (maximum useful load: 180 kilograms) from the West German firm VPM. They will be tested for reconnaissance and special operations.

What attracts specialists to this aircraft? First of all, its very low radar visibility, low noise, and comparative large flight range, which reaches 1,000 kilometers (when an extra fuel tank is mounted under the pilot's seat).

Arms Negotiator Richard Burt Interviewed on Progress of Talks

90WC0056A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Ambassador Richard Burt, head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, by Maj Gen Yuriy Lebedev, special APN and TRUD correspondent: "Complex Negotiations Are Under Way"]

[Text] Ambassador Richard Burt, head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, answers questions from Maj Gen Yuriy Lebedev, special correspondent for APN [Novosti Press Agency] and TRUD.

[Lebedev] Mr Ambassador, how would you comment upon the state of affairs at the talks and the changes that have taken place there following the Moscow meeting of the USSR and U.S. foreign ministers?

[Burt] I will take the liberty to express three thoughts regarding this.

First. This concerns the businesslike relations between the Soviet and American delegations. In my view, they are very good, and the Soviet Ambassador Yuriy Nazarkin deserves much credit for this. I believe that Yuriy Nazarkin is a pragmatic man when it comes to solving problems. In short, he is a good partner in negotiations.

I will say frankly that we have left far behind us that period that was characterized by unconstructive rhetoric.

Second. The meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush off the coast of Malta, as well as the recent meeting in Moscow between the USSR minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state, gave a new impetus in the delegations' work to resolve the fundamental problems of the negotiations. The issue of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) has basically been resolved. Quite to our surprise, we have also agreed upon an approach to resolving such a difficult problem as long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

[Lebedev] Why does this surprise you, Mr Ambassador?

[Burt] I think that both sides were largely of the opinion that the issue of SLCMs would be one of the last ones resolved at the talks. However, our ministers instructed us to take up SLCMs. And I hope we have been successful in this. If you will permit, I will continue my thoughts.

Lately the delegations have been working on the questions of undeployed missiles and access to telemetry information during missile tests. Thus, the sides have been seeking a solution to the basic issues of the talks. And, I think, rather successfully.

Third. This thought is not so positive in nature. The point is that during the course of the talks there are still indications of the old way of thinking on both sides. I do not mean those involved in the talks, but the bureaucrats both in Moscow and Washington who, in my opinion, have become accustomed to considering these talks perpetual. A more creative approach is needed here. It will be difficult to reach the end goal without such an approach.

[Lebedev] In your opinion, what else has to be done to speed up the drawing up of a strategic offensive arms (SOA) treaty?

[Burt] I hope that an agreement can be drawn up by this June. If we aren't able to do that, the treaty will have to be signed at the end of the year.

The reason I say this is that at talks such as these, as soon as one problem is solved, another one piles up on top of it. But, I re-emphasize, we can eliminate the unresolved major problems only by June.

Now the sides have accelerated the pace of the delegations' work. Ambassador Nazarkin and I meet daily. If

you would have occasion to be at our mission at about midnight last night, you could have seen for yourself that our staff members were still working in the offices.

[Lebedev] You have confirmed the possibility of drawing up a treaty by this June. But all the draft documents have more than 500 pages. This is a lot of technical work. Will both delegations have time to perform this work?

[Burt] Indeed, this is not one of the easy tasks. I think that the minimum of our possibilities is to examine all the basic problems namely by June. But we will be able to present the treaty as a whole and its associated documents only by the end of the year.

[Lebedev] Which of the remaining unresolved problems do you consider to be the most complex?

[Burt] In broad terms, this applies primarily to the problem of cruise missiles. Thus, for ALCMs and SLCMs we have to agree upon the maximum range to which these missiles should be limited. We still have not decided whether SLCMs will encompass both nuclear and nonnuclear missiles, or just nuclear ones. Another problem is the limitations on mobile ICBMs. For the time being there is no agreement on the level for each side. Associated with this is the question of how mobile ICBMs will be monitored. There is progress here, but the issue has not been resolved once and for all.

[Lebedev] What can you say about the future phase of the SOA talks?

[Burt] In Moscow, the American side for the first time expressed its agreement to begin an unofficial discussion of future talks. However, we do not yet have any conception on this point.

[Lebedev] Is the American side willing to do its part to speeding up SOA negotiations?

[Burt] Yes, absolutely. This was already expressed by the fact that Secretary of State J. Baker came to the Moscow meeting with a very large collection of ideas and thoughts.

[Lebedev] What would you like to pass on to the Soviet people?

[Burt] We realize that disarmament is a part of the process of perestroika in your country. In this sense, by conducting active talks in Geneva, the American side is making its contribution to the cause of stabilizing our relations and, to some extent, also to the process which Mikhail Gorbachev is now implementing.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar Exchanges 'Frank', 'Revealing'

90WC0041A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by Jan Reisenberg: "A First Attempt To Increase Awareness of the Others' Motives—the Vienna Military Seminar—Prague Admits Its Offensive Strategy—Abandonment of Old Doctrines"]

[Text] For three weeks, high-ranking officers from NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the twelve neutral and nonaligned countries of the Helsinki Accord discussed current military doctrine in Vienna. Their intent was to lay the foundation for new confidence. The seminar, taking place as part of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (NCSBM), was initiated by the East: The Soviet Union would like to provide proof of the change in their strategic doctrine from attack to defense. Despite all the general portrayals of Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev and other Soviet participants, Moscow remains the party that is due to show concrete proof of a change in many important areas.

That is not hard to understand. Military machinery does not change as quickly as politics. Still, this first seminar is an unprecedented event in military history. Not only were the general chiefs of staff of participating nations meeting, but they were all also bound to debate factually and to soberly represent facts without propaganda frills. The profound political changes in Eastern Europe make up the meeting's background. The representatives of the most important states of the Warsaw Pact are forced to break loose from conventional thinking and explain how their defense doctrine, the turn toward internal democracy, and the reawakening of national interests can be fitted to an ideology dictated by Moscow.

There was only one surprise at the Vienna seminar, when the Czech representative confirmed what NATO had assumed in the past to be a military target of the Eastern alliance: The East's offensive strategy called for quickly rolling over the enemy, moving out of well-prepared positions in the proximity of the German-German and German-Czech borders, and delivering devastating blows to the enemy on his territory. That has now fundamentally changed. The road and reinforcements network which was developed exclusively for this purpose is being taken apart, troops are being withdrawn from the frontier regions, and a new doctrine is being developed in Prague which has the goal of defensive protection of the homeland. The Moscow representatives listened silently. Moiseyev and the speakers following him listed the already-known figures regarding unilateral troop reductions in Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, and insured that the goals dictated by Gorbachev would be achieved in an orderly fashion. They reiterated that the Soviet Union would "never" be the first to attack or deploy nuclear weapons. They

further insured that the armed forces are not a "state within the state" but rather are only a functioning organ of the political leadership. Of course, they attacked—as in the past—the NATO concept of forward defense and the second echelon of combat in the case of war, just as they called for the incorporation of naval forces in the Vienna negotiations—true to the example followed in the NCSBM negotiations.

In the substantive discussions, it became clear that the need for information in the Warsaw Pact remains just as great as it has been in the past, due to the previous lack of factually-based analysis. This was because of the tight structure of the Eastern alliance. Western strategy was always portrayed as the destruction of the (socialist) system, and the Eastern representatives repeatedly asked what the foundation of that strategy was. In long discussions, representatives attempted to rectify the lack of knowledge and recognition of the others' motives. Remarkable openness and convergence were the results. "How do you really see us? How did you develop your current analysis of the threat? What is the true relationship between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons in your concept? Should pre-conflict conditions be restored, or is the old concept still in effect which considers occupied territory as a guarantee to end a conflict?" Such questions were openly asked.

The Eastern military people did not dispute that it is impossible to return to a pre-nuclear age, but they called for a "new model of stability," the form for which remains an open question, as were most topics. Deterrence, the kernel of NATO strategy, is purely a western concept, whereas in Vienna the East used the term "restraining" instead of the past "intimidation." It was easily observable in all of this how swiftly the strategic considerations and goals of Moscow's East European partners are changing. The seminar has posed the question again: What actually remains of the Warsaw Pact today? It became clear that in case of a conflict, the Soviet Union definitely cannot rely on any partner today. Above all, the (East German) National People's Army, which is in the grip of change in the GDR, would not move against the Germans in the West. The national centrifugal forces in the Eastern alliance showed through again and again.

Still, it will be a considerable time before deep-rooted fears and the old concepts are overcome on both sides. NATO, though, did present itself in this first meeting as an alliance of sovereign and free states which had common basic concepts of defense and security. The differences of opinion were openly shown and overcome. This remains their strength in the face of the changes in Eastern Europe, based on the transatlantic ties to the United States and Canada—which were recognized by the Eastern side, and were termed 'stabilizing' because of the German question.

The Warsaw Pact military spoke openly about their troop structures, modernization programs, reserve structures, arms and ammunition stockpiles, and the isolation from one another in which they lived. They are in

agreement with the West and the neutral countries that in the nuclear age and in the sense of the Helsinki Accord, only defensive doctrines are acceptable. The goal is to prevent war, and weapons alone cannot guarantee peace. How all of this will be applied to the existing armed potential and past principles of their use is the real question. The findings of the Vienna seminar will be useful to the NCSBM.

Paris, Madrid Sponsor Disarmament Seminar

90WC0052A Paris LE QUOTIDIEN in French
5 Mar 90 p 18

[Article by Henri Vernet: "Disarmament: Europe in Disorder"; first paragraph is LE QUOTIDIEN introduction]

[Text] How should conventional disarmament and European security be defined in wake of the upheavals that have just shaken the Old Continent? Fifty experts and diplomats met Friday in Paris to discuss these issues at the invitation of the Foundation for National Defense Studies and Madrid's Ortega y Gasset Foundation....

"We are leaving behind us an old world and entering a new one," began Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement, speaking to some 50 military experts and Europe-watchers who met Friday in Paris for a seminar on "Conventional Disarmament and European Security" organized by the Foundation for National Defense Studies and Madrid's Ortega y Gasset Foundation.

More precisely, it was a question of exploring "the policies of the various countries in light of the new situation resulting from the achievement of conventional disarmament (the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] negotiations in Vienna) and the politico-strategic changes in Eastern Europe."

What essentially came out of these sometimes impasioned and lively exchanges was the fact that this "new world" is in such a state of flux that it is of vital importance to reach an agreement in Vienna which can by itself provide a fairly stable basis for the emergence of a new concept of security for "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

The participants were quick to agree that the context prevailing at the time the CFE negotiations were first launched has been overtaken by events: "The Warsaw Pact is breaking up, six of the seven countries that make it up have new governments, the USSR is confronted with serious internal political and economic problems, the German people are moving ineluctably toward reunification," noted Carlos Miranda, director of disarmament in Madrid's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The main objective at Vienna was to reduce the danger of a massive surprise attack against Western Europe. Today, that threat is no longer credible." The Warsaw Pact, precisely because it is primarily a political organization rather than a mere military alliance, is nothing but a "walking corpse" now that it has been drained of its [ideological] substance,

according to the Defense Ministry's Dominique de Nayves, who even goes so far as to ask whether the Pact will be a competent partner to sign the CFE agreements. This worry is also shared by Philippe Guelluy, a French diplomat in Vienna, who notes that already "some East European governments are expressing ideas that do not conform to the initial position of the Pact."

What is so frustrating is that the logic of the blocs—however deplorable and (at least recently) obsolete it may be—has been with us for so many years that it cannot be bypassed now in the search for any agreement that will guarantee European security.

This is why the experts, faced with the disintegration of the Pact, are tempering their euphoria. And justifying the importance of the Vienna negotiations in terms of the "necessity of maintaining harmony, a 'linkage,' between a well-thought-out disarmament process and the ultra-rapid and chaotic political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe."

Weakening of the USSR

But while the USSR is perceived by everyone as "a vanquished power, it is still not ready to surrender." Vanquished first of all by an economic "knock-out." "In 1986, for the first time, Moscow's willingness to move forward in good faith on disarmament appeared dictated by its total economic failure." For too many years, explains Europe-watcher Thierry Malleret, the top brass of the Red Army shamelessly sapped the resources of the country, without contributing anything to the civilian economy. The result: "The productivity of their industry has been in constant decline, a number of new technologies have been ignored." A fact which prompted one Russian general to describe the USSR as "Zimbabwe with atomic bombs." Now all at once the civilians have cut the military off.

Paradoxically, the new situation has turned many Soviet generals into allies of Gorbachev, essentially because "if we give priority to the civilian economy for awhile, things will be better for all of us a few years from now." These military leaders also realize that since the Afghan conflict the Red Army has become very unpopular. This has tended to make most of them more docile. All the same, one top French weapons designer who recently went to the USSR noted signs of discontent within a military establishment that believes disarmament is coming too rapidly and worries about redeployment.

The USSR has also been vanquished by nationality problems. Italian General Carlo Jean sees the need to "prevent any chance of civil war as the critical factor underlying present and future Soviet troop withdrawals."

Defining a New Order

"The USSR has been profoundly weakened for a long time to come, 20 to 30 years probably. But Russia will remain a great military power. That is why we must not show ourselves overly anxious to sign something at all costs," says General Henri Eyraud. In other words, we

must not "disarm merely for the sake of disarming," participants agreed, because in conjunction with the CFE (which should be signed before the end of the year) it will be essential to define a new concept of European security.

This caution is all the more necessary, according to Soviet expert Christopher Donnelly, because Mikhail Gorbachev is counting on extracting from the West the highest possible price for his abandonment of the USSR's former satellites. He could exploit the thorny German problem to weaken the Atlantic Alliance (which, as all the seminar participants agreed, must be adapted to the new situation). "Gorbachev has realized that military confrontation is not the only basis for security," acknowledged German diplomat Anton Rossbach. For the Eastern as well as Western countries, each nation's military, political, and economic security depends on the security of the rest. Rossbach therefore made a plea for the advent of "mutual security, or cooperative security," which he sees as the concept of the future. A negotiating framework for the security order of the future still needs to be established; the French are pining for reactivation of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], preferring state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc talks. But the experts, in all their deliberations on the new order, never took their eyes off Germany.

More Questions Than Answers

Given that German reunification is inevitable, European security will basically depend on what kind of Germany emerges. Neutral? Denuclearized? "Minimally" militarized? Integrated into the Atlantic alliance? On these points the experts modestly came forth with more questions than answers.

Meanwhile, the accelerated disarmament process we have been observing will have a number of similar effects on all countries concerned, as General Eyraud has noted: "Military morale will be hit hard, we must expect knee-jerk institutional reactions, there will be problems in recruitment of officers and noncommissioned officers, and the career cadre will lose its sense of mission.

"Moreover, especially in France, there will be the issue of whether to maintain conscription. With regard to the defense budget, it is illusory to expect a decline, because disarmament has its own costs. Career soldiers will have to be paid more: With a smaller force, one loses economies of scale."

Woerner Against Increase in NATO Arms Budget

AU2103115390 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 21 Mar 90 p 1

[Untitled report by C.A.S.]

[Text] Bonn—In the view of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, the Alliance should not demand an annual three-percent increase in the defense expenditure

of its member states. The Western defense ministers should adopt a corresponding recommendation in view of the changes in the East at the Defense Planning Committee session at the end of May. Woerner explicitly recommended this step in an internal letter to the representatives of the partner states in Brussels on 9 March. In addition, the NATO officers are currently revising their maneuver concepts with the objective of significantly reducing the volume of maneuvers.

NATO's Woerner: Nuclear Weapons 'Necessary'

LD2403115390 Hamburg DPA in German 1122 GMT
24 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the view of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, NATO will not totally renounce nuclear weapons in the next disarmament rounds. "A complete renunciation of nuclear weapons in Europe is...out of the question for NATO, for we want to prevent all wars," Woerner said in an interview with BILD AM SONNTAG. "However, a minimum of nuclear weapons is necessary for this."

Woerner further stated that he regards the future of the Warsaw Pact as uncertain in a future European security structure, while NATO would continue to exist. NATO would, however, increasingly turn to political tasks and arms control. Woerner, the first NATO secretary general to travel to Moscow for talks, is to explain the changed role of the Western Alliance there. He wants to spell out the advantages to the Soviet Union of a united Germany belonging to NATO.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Post-CFE Forces Planning Guidelines Emerging

90EN0334A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 90
pp 11-13

[Article by Colonel Henning Bruemmer, section chief, Armed Forces Command Staff: "The Bundeswehr at a Crossroads"—first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] On 7 December 1989, West German Defense Minister Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg explained to the Bundestag the goals of the federal government regarding "further development of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s." The government declaration signaled the conclusion of an extremely intensive planning process, during which the Bundeswehr planning had to re-orient itself because of the significant changes of 1989 and their effect on the future makeup of the armed forces. Colonel Henning Bruemmer, section chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, explains below the main points of the new planning goals.

One of the fundamental indicators was the trend in personnel and finances, which no longer permitted maintaining past plans. Another was the Vienna negotiation session on conventional forces in Europe with far-reaching consequences for the structure of our armed forces. These negotiations are growing ever more dynamic with good chances for success. With this background, the minister of defense ordered the Bundeswehr general inspector to push the Bundeswehr planning so far ahead that political decisions could be reached on the general trends and basic numbers of an assumed Bundeswehr structure through the mid-1990s. The concepts developed by the inspector general and the inspectors are presented here. These were approvingly accepted by the federal security council and the cabinet and finally expressed in the government declaration by the defense minister. Deep cuts in the Bundeswehr of today's makeup will be associated with these decisions.

For the sake of explanation of these decisions, observations on the changed background conditions are made.

New Background Conditions

Personnel

The demographic developments of the 1990s cannot be changed. In 1996, there will only be about 180,000 conscript troops available instead of the current 220,000. This number will further sink to about 160,000 if the proposed extension of the draft length of service to 18 months is lifted and the 15-month draft length of service is maintained by the lawmakers, with a successful conclusion of arms control negotiations. Cutbacks in the numbers of enlisted and career soldiers are also unavoidable, given declining numbers in those age groups and the increasingly tough competition for labor. With significantly higher expenses for limited personnel, Bundeswehr planning is set toward a goal of 240,000 enlisted and career soldiers, about 25,000 less than at the end of the 1990s.

The total number of active soldiers in the Bundeswehr will still be 420,000 by the mid-1990s. If the draft length of service is not extended, it will still be 400,000. Simultaneously holding the number of training slots at 10,000 and the number of available soldiers on standby readiness at 40,000, the total peacetime number comes to 470,000 or 450,000.

Even from these few numbers, it is apparent that the imperative personnel reductions in active soldiers will result in a reduction in the number of active troop units, which will then, however, be better staffed with personnel than today.

Finances

The position of the coalition representatives in the most recent German Bundestag budgetary debates was that the defense budget is not a "quarry" for favorite use in other budgets. Nevertheless, the constantly tighter limits of the 14 budget planning areas in the detailed plan are

unmistakable, and their inner layers are changing. For example, since 1984 the percentage of expenditures for military procurements has dropped from 26 percent to 20 percent. In the same time, the percentage which went to personnel expenditures rose from 42 percent to 44 percent.

This development logically confirmed the intent of giving absolute priority to insuring adequacy of personnel, but also equally logically can only lead to a burden on investments in equipment.

If a moderate budget increase is to be expected for the future—which given price developments actually means stagnation, if not actual reductions—then the limits on hardware investment must be drawn even more tightly. Under these indications, a comprehensive supply renewal for today's equipment will not be possible, so a corresponding matching of structural elements of all the armed services branches is unavoidable.

Also misleading is the oft-cited reasoning that a reduction in personnel must lead to reductions in the financial burden. The envisioned number of enlisted and career soldiers will only be available for the Bundeswehr with the already-mentioned significantly higher expenditures for the attractiveness and quality of service in the armed forces.

Defense Policy/Strategic Military Aspects

In his government statement on 7 December 1989, the defense minister began by laying out the flat changes on the political stage of East-West relations:

"When, in these days, we speak of the condition and mission of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s, we do so under the omen of the most powerful eruption in world politics since 1945." He indicated at the same time the new demands confronting the Bundeswehr planning, along with the traditional specified amounts of personnel and finances.

It would just be speculation at this point to deduce the fundamental effects of the internal defense policy developments in the Warsaw Pact. A look toward the Austrian capital offers much more.

Progress at the Vienna negotiations lead to expectation of some results in 1990 for the area covered by the treaty between the Atlantic and the Urals. Drastic reductions in decisive heavy combat equipment and the establishment of something approaching parity at a lower level of armed forces are foreseen.

After the implementation of such a treaty—for which several years will certainly be needed—the military strategic capabilities which are still given in the Warsaw Pact would enable a large-scale invasion after only a brief preparation period.

The conditions attained (by a treaty) would significantly limit the possibilities of an offensive war, although it would not completely eliminate it. There is currently no

reference point to indicate which lane the development of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine and its armed forces dispositive will run. If Bundeswehr planning takes into consideration a successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations, it also requires consideration that a relationship of parity does not guarantee security, *per se*. A potential always remains that—even with lessening probability—a geographically limited offensive operation would be enabled.

From these considerations, three fundamental requirements arise for the fulfillment of future missions by the Bundeswehr:

- One segment of the armed forces must have quick response, must be flexible, and must be almost completely ready for initial operations without a mobilization;
- Another segment can be reduced to cadres in various levels, in order to be deployed in followup operations after a mobilization and filling out;
- The armed forces must possess overall a measured degree of endurance whereby the size must still be oriented to conditions which will exist after implementation of an arms control treaty.

The determination that only a common, joint allied defense near the borders can signify the best guarantee of protection for our country is, at the same time, connected with the needs listed above.

Technological Aspects

In order to be able to limit the uncertainties over developments of future military doctrines and armed forces dispositions already sketched out above, that is, to contain all possible forms of conflict, the Bundeswehr planning has apportioned a broadly disciplined research and technology program of increased significance.

Defense-related advances in key fields are expected in:

- Information and communications technology;
- Materials science; and
- Energy technology.

The significance of reconnaissance and command and control will increase considerably. With new information and communications technology, capabilities in these fields can be increased. As a result, they will take precedence over all other technological activities.

The developments in materials science, energy, and information technologies especially lead to expectations of further improvements in air defense and anti-tank defense.

Technological testing is pursued as another emphasized mission, to improve troop protection, with new types of materials and their order as well as in the use of new camouflage and concealment measures.

Finally, the use of "intelligent" security technologies should contribute to the sustained support of defensive principles.

Principles and Guidelines for Hardware Planning for the Armed Forces

Persistent adjustment of the growth potential in new technologies in the system complex of "reconnaissance, command, and effect," also with across-the-board application of modular construction:

- Planning unity in the "target analysis, weapons and munitions optimization, and carrier selection" elements;
- Avoidance of specific military performance specifications in favor of technologies that are available on the market (80 percent in time is better than 100 percent too late);
- Alternative solutions through the use of new technologies for improving utility and combat performance of existing weapon systems;
- Increased deployment of computer-supported simulators for training and workplace configurations;
- International arms cooperation, especially where cost reductions, economizing, and standardization can be achieved with high probability;
- Increased utilization of the abilities of the consolidating European market which is developing from competition.

Impacts on Bundeswehr Planning

Conceptual Main Points

The increasing pressure on resources, as well as defense policy developments, demand that the Bundeswehr recognize the consequences in two aspects: It must establish priority points even more clearly than before, and they must be arranged in conceivable defense policy tracks.

The crux of the armed forces mission also lies in the future: to protect or restore the integrity of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to geographically and chronologically constrain any conflict. For future fulfillment of this mission, this means:

- Command, intelligence collection, and reconnaissance will be given first priority, whereby emphasis will be on all possibilities and measures which extend the

warning time. Equally high priority will be given to initial operations. They require highly mobile forces from the Army for timely defense near the border in sections where a breakthrough is threatening. They also require simultaneous deployment of the Air Force for air defense, and of the Navy for defense of Baltic access and sea connections in the North Sea. For all missions, high-profile forces must be available.

- Arms control results limit the armed forces dispositive of an attacker, and impose longer preparation times upon him. It follows that a lesser weight of our own forces can be allotted to lead follow-up operations and to engage enemy forces in the rear areas. This is shown on the one hand on relying to a higher degree on reserve strength of the forces assigned to follow-up operations, for which filling out with reservists must be insured within anticipated preparation times, and on the other hand in the possibility of reducing the expense of engaging enemy forces in the rear areas.
- Changed strategic peripheral conditions make it easier to foresee limited staffing and a high degree of relying on reserve strength of forces intended to protect rearward combat zones and site defenses.

Remaining above all missions is the fielding of a qualitatively and quantitatively healthy personnel roster with primary characteristics of adequate leadership strength, a duty assignment structure which is both appropriate for careers and attractive, and highly qualified training and reserves.

Organization Structure Considerations

Background conditions and conceptual main points find their downfall in the configuration of future structures. Even though the details are not yet determined, the contours in their general trends are set:

The Bundeswehr will continue to consist of the armed forces and the Bundeswehr administration (territorial Bundeswehr command and armaments industry). The basic division of the armed forces into the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the two organizational groups "Central Bundeswehr Military Posts" and "Central Bundeswehr Medical Corps," will be maintained.

The Army will further develop the Army Structure 2000 in an evolutionary fashion. The field army and the territorial army will be more closely tied to one another according to mission reassignment with logistical support, medical corps, and combat support. The field army remains divided into three corps and 12 divisions, whereby the prominent change is that the number of mechanized divisions will be reduced to nine, and three air-mobile divisions will arise.

The cuts caused by limited resources will be most clearly seen in the field army brigades. Only a portion of the 35 brigades can still be maintained in a high state of readiness: This is also required to insure a minimum level of reaction ability. Other brigades, in contrast, will

be transferred to partial reliance on reserve strength, and even complete removal from active duty status. Emphasis in equipment modernization lies in the fields of command, reconnaissance, indirectly guided fire, and denial ability.

Along with the command and support troops, the territorial army should consist of the German/French Brigade, nine home defense regiments, and six home defense brigades. Because of their equipment and presence, deployment options for these combat troops are limited, however.

In the Air Force, the die is already cast in the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty to eliminate the Pershing units in 1991. Beyond that, for conventional tasks the weight will shift further in favor of air defense. This does not preclude that the levels of readiness which are still high today could be reduced under arms control aspects. Such decisions will lie in agreements to be reached with the alliance. Cuts in the number of flying squadrons are foreseen in areas of air attack and air reconnaissance, where the less usable systems' performance cannot be increased or replaced.

The proposed changes in the context of the new Air Force Structure 4 are rounded out by making the command, training, and support organizations compatible.

For equipment requisition, the Air Force is placing emphasis on modernization of the command and reconnaissance equipment, as well as continued strengthening of the air defense, ground support, air weapon systems.

Although the naval forces are not part of the arms control agreements, the Navy will have to reduce the amount of sea-warfare capacity over the next two decades with large cuts, whereby the remaining fleet will experience a considerable qualitative improvement. The numerical cuts will impact most strongly in the Baltic component, whereas the North Sea component is to be maintained substantially as it is now.

Finally, the following applies in general for all three branches of the Armed Forces:

The Bundeswehr will definitely have fewer troop units in the future, but they will have better personnel assigned to them:

- It will maintain an—even if limited—ability of the Armed Forces to react quickly;
- It will be more dependent than before on mobilization; and
- It must more closely incorporate the reservists in training and defense concepts.

The consequence of these trends is that the Bundeswehr will bear the characteristics of a mobilization and training army by the mid-1990s much more than it does today. And so the significance of our reservists will be persistently increased.

Time Frames

As set forth, structural considerations are not yet so clearly defined that this can be calculated down to the man, machine, and military unit. Still, with the decisions of 1989, the most important turns have been made. The planning that is to follow will be pursued so that:

In 1990, the detailed structures—after completion of a series of pending studies—will be presented;

—By 1993, a necessary provisional reorganization will be completed; and then

—By 1996 the actual reorganization can take place.

Major changes in the personnel and duty situation of many soldiers and civilian employees will be tied with the changes. Strict adherence to the time schedule will make it all the more compelling to be able to inform those affected as soon as possible.

Concluding Observations

The Bundeswehr is being confronted with the most fundamental changes since its creation. The grounds and intentions of the reorganization have been named. The Bundeswehr Inspector General, Admiral D. Wellershof, summarizes the current state of planning as follows in a letter to the troops:

"You can all be sure that the new structure of the Bundeswehr will continue to be able to fulfill its mission under future political and strategic conditions. It will also make its considerable contribution to the common defense within the alliance."

It is to be added that the structure will be flexibly arrayed so that when surrounding conditions change again, they will not necessitate fundamentally new structural planning.

The German Armed Forces have provided important prerequisites for the successful security policy of the post-war period which is now coming to a close. This is providing the base for lessening of the size of the Armed Forces, which is now possible. With these planned measures, the solid and realistic foundation for the transition into the 1990s has been provided.

Stoltenberg Comments on Security, Disarmament

AU2003133990 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 18 Mar 90 pp 26-27

[Excerpts from opening speech by Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the "Bundeswehr and Society Forum," organized by DIE WELT AM SONNTAG, in Hamburg on 12 and 13 March 1990]

[Text] Chancellor Kohl outlined our basic position on the security issues of a united Germany in his government statement on 15 February. He stressed that even when duly taking into consideration the security interests of the Soviet Union, a future unified Germany must

not be neutral and demilitarized, but should remain a member of the Western alliance.

He also made it clear that units and installations of the Western alliance should not be deployed on what is GDR territory today and that the security interests of our Eastern neighbors must be taken into account.

A neutral Germany would not contribute to the stability of Europe, but would create uncertainties. The reaction of the new democratic government in Prague testifies to this. To use even stronger words, a neutral Germany with relatively strong armed forces would be seen as a potential factor of irritation and instability by many states.

A neutral and demilitarized Germany would be completely incompatible with the elementary security interests and the responsibility of the government and parliament toward their own people. The integration of our Bundeswehr into the system of collective security in conjunction with the allied armed forces of NATO, also on the territory of the present-day FRG, continues to be of central significance, both in military and political terms, and it will increase our security and the security of our neighbors. It should be clear to everyone that there will be no relapse into a national-state or even nationalist policy.

The questions that concern the security status of the present-day GDR are very sensitive. They will be a particularly significant topic of the upcoming negotiations. I am against the public discussion of the future of the National People's Army, at least by government members, before a government is established in the GDR, which will be given a democratic mandate for the first time since 1932.

The harmonization of political developments and arms control will become a central security-political task and challenge beyond 1990. For this reason, we are striving for the conclusion of the first agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe before the end of this year, and we believe that the chances of achieving this continue to be absolutely positive. This agreement should lead to the reduction of the Warsaw Pact's existing far-reaching superiority and capability to launch offensives. This particularly concerns the Soviet Armed Forces. The process of disarmament has already been initiated in various forms in other countries.

Another goal of this agreement is the essential reduction of the most important weapons systems in the East and West to a lower level. Since George Bush launched his initiative in February, this also includes the setting of ceilings for troops deployed outside the territory of the two superpowers to 195,000 in Central Europe.

At the same time, further arms control prospects for the Vienna follow-up meeting are to be developed in 1990. Apart from the mere discussion of strength, goals and possibilities for the solution to structural problems are to

be developed at the follow-up meetings. In this connection, certain elements of the armed forces will have to be changed so that, in the long run, we will achieve an even more defensive organization of the armed forces in Europe, thus creating a more stable general situation.

In this spirit, we must create, through the mutual comprehensive exchange of information and through comprehensive mutual inspections and verification, a comprehensive system of security-building measures which should prevent the large-scale establishment of troop units with an offensive character in the future. Verification—that is, the idea that the observance of agreements will be ensured in a comprehensive manner, including thousands of military installations in the East and West, between the Atlantic and the Urals—will be a great task in terms of organization and personnel.

At the moment, I have the impression that the term European security system must be filled with specific contents. We are strongly interested in holding early talks on the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe after the conclusion of the first round of talks in Vienna. The first thing that must be achieved here is the elimination of the Soviets' massive superiority. The Soviet Union has very extensive superiority both in the sphere of the so-called substrategic weapons and in the sphere of conventional weapons.

Thus, the West can also reduce the volume of its substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe to a considerable extent if the Soviet Union is willing to take a second step aimed at achieving an essentially lower level. Balance can certainly be ensured with a fraction of the systems that exist in Europe today.

In the sphere of nuclear tube artillery, we want to achieve complete elimination under such an agreement. If German division is actually overcome, and if the political situation in the whole of Europe undergoes far-reaching changes, it will no longer be possible to justify these systems in the future.

It must be equally clear that the complete denuclearization of Europe or Germany would not lead to more stability and security. A denuclearized Europe or Germany would drastically reduce the threshold for political conflicts—which will continue to exist in the future—to escalate into armed conflicts.

Progress concerning arms control, the changes in East-West relations, and the growing together of the two German states will, of course, have an impact on our Armed Forces and security structures. We have taken a far-reaching step with the plan for the Bundeswehr, adopted by the cabinet in December. We were the first within the alliance to plan such a decisive reduction of the strength of its Armed Forces, which was finally adopted by the cabinet. In addition, our plan for the Armed Forces is flexible enough to be able to take into consideration the results of the follow-up meetings. Until February this year, I had a number of friendly and

critical talks with ministers from other NATO countries—not only liberal and conservative ministers, but also socialist ones—who told me that we have set the course too fast before the conclusion of the Vienna agreement, which creates political difficulties for them.

We now base our deliberations on the reduction of the number of active soldiers from 495,000 to 400,000 by 1996.

I must stress at this point that I am concerned about the way some people speak and write in this connection. Some people act as if a reduction by 100,000 men can be achieved in two years' time so that the defense budget can be cut accordingly next year. Not only things, but people are involved here. Not only the defense minister, but also the Bundestag and the informed German public must deal with the fact that we are discussing the fate of nearly 100,000 soldiers. Altogether, a considerably higher number of people will be affected because this will also have an impact on the civilian members.

We have to agree on a suitable timetable and suitable procedures, not only for security-political reasons but also out of consideration for the soldiers, civil servants, employees, and workers—a total of 700,000 persons. These decisive changes that are planned to be carried out by 1996 are aimed at the reduction of those doing basic military service. This reduction will come about because of the low birth rates in certain years anyway. As far as professional soldiers and soldiers who sign up for military service for a specific period of time are concerned, there will only be small changes in comparison with previous plans. This means that the Bundeswehr will become smaller but also more professional and modern. If we reduce the Bundeswehr, this must be accompanied by an increase in quality.

What I am describing here speaks in favor of our long-term plans. Of course, this will give rise to numerous problems. We are currently drafting individual plans for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy on this basis. The new structure and the reduction of the Bundeswehr will naturally also have consequences for the Bundeswehr administration, including about 200,000 civilian employees.

Finally, we will redefine the defense strength of the Bundeswehr. Currently it comprises about 1.34 million soldiers. I share the view of Inspector General Wellerhoff that the number can be reduced.

However, we also know that responsible security policy, despite the improvement of the general political conditions and continuing disarmament, will have to rely on precautionary military measures and the limitation of conflicts.

A new European security structure is only possible on the basis of a guaranteed defense capability within a functioning alliance characterized by solidarity. It is true that we are making progress in the peaceful shaping of the European security architecture—including the

increasing significance of the CSCE meeting—but this is no alternative to our alliance's defense capability, whose details must be newly defined. I consider the fact that so much progress has been achieved during such a short period to be a confirmation that we have pursued the right policy for the past four decades. Thus, we need both creative power and the readiness to take risks. We also need imagination and caution. We must continue to determine our sound basic political principles in a sober and future-oriented manner.

In the future, too, the development and shaping of the European process and the lasting improvement of East-West relations can only be achieved on the basis of the alliance and the continued presence of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. Thus, it would be a far-reaching political and strategic error to question the future of NATO in the face of the increasing erosion of the Warsaw Pact. NATO has never been a military bloc, it has always been a political alliance of democratic states with a special security- and defense- political task.

The political significance of this alliance has become even more obvious recently. The alliance is facing the following tasks now:

First: The maintenance of our defense capability to prevent war in or against Europe. Safeguarding security continues to be the basis and the task of freedom and security policy. This will always involve defense aspects as well.

However, it is becoming increasingly clear that it will be possible to ensure security with considerably fewer weapons. The changes in the international sphere will, of course, also lead to the further development of the strategy and the military structure of the alliance. Our nuclear and conventional Armed Forces will not so much serve as a direct deterrence in the future, but will be used to guarantee and stabilize a system of mutual security in Europe. This must be stipulated in an agreement.

Facts and concepts must be reconsidered. This also applies to the political principle of defense. I learned in talks with my counterparts at the end of last year that countries like Norway and Turkey, which have completely different political structures, consider it fundamentally important that the alliance does not abandon this principle. In their view, the situation in central Europe and Germany will not necessarily change in terms of military geography. They explain why they consider this concept to be important in the future as well. The concept of forward defense must be reconsidered. At least its content must be redefined. I could picture forward defense as the security obligation of the state toward all of its citizens, and thus as the obligation to protect the whole of its territory.

If we interpret the concept of forward defense in this way, it takes on a different content than in the past. In this connection, it would be important to arrive at a joint

basic strategic agreement in Europe, namely, that in our age armed forces can only be defensive.

Second: The shaping, verification, and dynamic continuation of the current arms control process must be ensured.

Third: Summing up the political restructuring of Europe, I would like to stress the following: We must first extend the security- political dialogue beyond the sphere of arms control. We must discuss the vital security issues of the whole of Europe while at the same time involving Northern America. We Germans naturally want to link the settlement of the German question with deliberations for a comprehensive European security concept and arrive at standards on the basis of international law for the whole of Europe. At the same time, we would like to strengthen comprehensive, political, economic, and ecological cooperation with Eastern Europe within this framework.

Fourth: The expansion and consolidation of European cooperation must be seen with a transatlantic perspective. The sharing of burdens will again become a major topic. It has been cautiously mentioned by the U.S. Administration, and more forcefully by the U.S. Congress and the public. If we want to keep U.S. forces—even if the number of their soldiers will be reduced—in Europe, which means that they would continue to retain their complete share of responsibility and participation in security policy, we must be prepared, in relative terms, to increase the European share of defense costs as compared with the U.S. share.

Fifth: In light of global challenges, a joint policy of the West will be even more important in the future. We are faced with regional conflicts in conjunction with religious fundamentalism, and with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons.

There are other problems as well: Drug-trafficking, the ecological dangers of our times, and the increasing problems in the developing countries. Who should tackle these global problems if not the European and North American industrial countries, and maybe also Japan? Who is in a position to do that if not these countries, which also cooperate within the Atlantic Alliance in many spheres? NATO—the driving political force of the new Europe and the Atlantic process, and of partnership, continued cooperation within the CSCE process, more far-reaching steps in arms control, the deepening of West European integration within the EC in conjunction with more openness toward the East—is the institutional framework as it were, within which the division of Europe can and must finally be overcome.

A united Germany is the supporting pillar of development beyond our own borders. Peace cannot be taken for granted, it must be newly shaped and preserved every day. Violent regional conflicts in many parts of the world, including various parts of Europe, testify to this.

There have been numerous predictions that the power factor will no longer play a role in international affairs. Old and new dangers of democracy belie these claims. This does not correspond to human nature either. Our policy will continue to aim at actively preserving peace. Today we are not directly facing violence and massive armed conflicts in Europe. However, they cannot be ruled out fundamentally and for all time. Thus, it would be insincere to promise our citizens a future ideal political world that is free of conflicts.

Europe cannot have a state of peace in a power vacuum. Of course, we have to take into consideration the fact that the Soviet Union will continue to be a world power and a European superpower, and last but not least also a maritime power. We have learned from our historical experience that an ethically responsible security policy must rely on power.

Only a legitimized and controlled power can create and ensure the conditions of freedom by helping to stipulate and enforce rules that allow states to exist side by side in freedom. Power alone is no guarantor of freedom and self-determination, but it is its task to make the external existence of freedom possible. Thus, the strength for self-determination and the recourse to legitimized power are indispensable for the protection of the liberal democracy that we have chosen, and for the protection of human dignity, which is the highest asset according to the Basic Law. This is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.

However, this also means that we cannot basically renounce the possibility of military defense and the application of force to ward off external dangers, or in the event of political or military aggression in or against Europe. The political and ethical values of our democracy legitimate this extreme action on the part of the state to ensure its protection. Thus, being the guarantors and protectors of liberal democracy, our Armed Forces and soldiers are serving the laws and the ethical principles of our Constitution.

Our Armed Forces are and will continue to be a defensive power instrument of a security policy that is based on ethical principles and is enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, the Bundeswehr does not only help ensure our ability to pursue national policies in the spirit of the sovereign shaping of our foreign relations, but also our ability to comply with obligations resulting from international alliances. This makes it clear that the basis for the existence of our Armed Forces is and never was a "hostile image," a "threat scenario," but the "image of the Constitution" of our democracy.

The Bundeswehr is an army of democracy that draws its self-confidence and its self-esteem from the fact that its existence is stipulated in the Constitution. This legitimization also applies to the future armed forces of a united Germany.

Genscher Sees Disarmament as 'Key Issue'

LD2503114490 Hamburg DPA in German 1117 GMT
25 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the opinion of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher Free Democratic Party (FDP), disarmament is "the key issue" in the unification of Europe and Germany. Thorough disarmament moves might remove the Soviet Union's concern that a transfer of power to its detriment might arise in Europe, Genscher said in an interview with South German Radio today.

For this reason negotiations on further disarmament moves should begin immediately after the first agreement on conventional disarmament to be signed in the autumn at the CSCE summit. According to Genscher, the aims of the talks should be defined as an early and drastic reduction of all forces and the formation of structures which are purely defensively oriented.

Genscher also spoke in favor of retaining general conscription even in the event of a drastically reduced Bundeswehr. He thought that the service of peace by the Bundeswehr would continue to be accepted if not only the numerical strength of the Army but also the duration of military service were considerably reduced.

Rhineland-Palatinate Urges U.S. Troop Removal

Secret Government Paper on Sites

AU2603104890 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
26 Mar 90 p 17

[Text] As soon as the United States actually begins its troop withdrawal from the FRG, it should immediately clear seven sites in Mainz and two in Kaiserslautern. A secret paper of the Rhineland-Palatinate government calls for this. Referring to "economic, ecological, and infrastructure-related aspects," the government mentions a total of 10 sites with 23 facilities, which "are to be reclaimed in accordance with the regulations of the supplementary agreement to the NATO troop statutes." Minister President Carl-Ludwig Wagner will travel to Washington this week. The list he will present there includes the sites of Zweibruecken, Bitburg, Hahn, Sembach, and Spandahlem, as well as the 260-hectare general depot, the central store of the U.S. Armed Forces for the whole of Europe in Kaiserslautern, the Mainz-Finthen Airport, the training ground in the Ober-Olm forest near Mainz, and facilities in Bad Kreuznach, Landstuhl, Worms, and Weilerbach. However, a row has erupted in the Mainz cabinet over the civilian use of the U.S. Mainz-Finthen Airport. Economics Minister Rainer Bruederle wants to use the site for "regional air traffic," whereas Interior Minister Rudi Geil wants to establish trade and industrial enterprises there.

Chief on Vacating Bases

LD2703090490 Hamburg DPA in German 2302 GMT
26 Mar 90

[Text] Mainz (DPA)—Rhineland-Palatinate Minister-President Carl-Ludwig Wagner (Christian Democratic Union) [CDU] has asked the United States to withdraw completely from its military bases in Rhineland-Palatinate. Before his departure for Washington, the head of government told *ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG* in Mainz that he expects in his talks with the State Department and Defense Department more clarity about the planned troop reductions.

Since the interests of large areas of Rhineland-Palatinate are directly affected, he will insist that the land government not only be briefed in good time but that it be given a say in the choice of locations and in devising a schedule. Wagner does not exclude the possibility that one or other of the U.S. garrisons might be vacated only in part. However, this should be the "big exception."

An edited version of the interview was prereleased to DPA.

Armed Forces Planning Reduced Troop Strength

LD2603095790 Hamburg DPA in German 0855 GMT
26 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—In view of the changing security political situation Federal Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] has ordered new examinations into low-altitude flights in the Federal Republic. Naval Captain Karlheinz Max Reichert, Defense Ministry spokesman, confirmed today that further substantial relief of the strain caused by the noise made by low flying aircraft is to be examined in connection with the results of the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe. In this case basic agreement with the Allies is necessary.

Reichert also stated that Stoltenberg has ordered the examination in connection with a fundamental examination of the state of readiness and the training concept in the Army and Air Force. The Luftwaffe leadership has been tasked with examining the low flying problem.

The GERMAN PRESS AGENCY (DPA) learned yesterday from a reliable source that low-altitude military flights at a height of 75 meters over federal territory is to be stopped completely by the end of the year. In Bonn it is reckoned that the Armed Forces pilots and their allied partners will in the future only exercise at a height of 300 meters over the Federal Republic. The population will thus be decisively relieved of the burden of noise from low flying aircraft. The seven 75-meter zones are in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, and Hesse. [passage omitted]

In addition, it was learned in Bonn that by the end of the year the strength of the Armed Forces is to be established at "considerably" less than 400,000 men. Over and

above this, by the end of 1990 it will be "a fait accompli" that young men will only be drafted in to the Armed Forces for twelve months. At present compulsory service is 15 months.

FRANCE

Chief of Staff Schmitt on USSR, Disarmament

PM2603110490 Paris *LE MONDE* in French
23 Mar 90 pp 9-10

[Untitled interview with Armed Forces Chief of Staff Maurice Schmitt by Jacques Isnard; place and date not given]

[Text] [Isnard] At a recent colloquium of the National Defense Studies Foundation, you said that you were "writing off" the Warsaw Pact which is disintegrating. This is one less potential enemy for France, if your remarks are taken literally. So what are the actual specific threats now directed against France?

[Schmitt] The remark on which you base your question was part of a speech aimed at emphasizing that it is impossible to draw a parallel between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

The Washington Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 by countries which thought it was necessary to group together to present a united front to Stalin's imperialist enterprises, the latest of which was the blockade of West Berlin, which lasted from 24 June 1948 to 9 May 1949. The Alliance was not directed against the unfortunate countries which were then grouped, willingly or unwillingly, around the USSR within the Warsaw Pact. The goal was to avoid their fate.

What is the present situation? Mr. Gorbachev lucidly observes that the Western model is superior to his, even in the defense sphere, because the economy and defense are closely linked, especially over a long period. I say "even in the defense sphere," because the Soviet leadership deemed fit to devote a very large proportion of their resources to a formidable accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons and in their satellite countries built up disproportionate conventional forces (24,000 tanks for the West and 64,000 tanks in service with an annual production of 3,000 tanks in 1987 for the USSR alone).

That being so, we can only draw up defense concepts and build defense systems by looking well ahead into the future. It is possible to draw up hypotheses on the future of the USSR, its future stability, and that of Eastern and Central Europe. But Western Europe's geostrategic handicaps (its small size and the remoteness of the United States, in particular) will remain.

As Armed Forces chief of staff, I have a duty to look at the facts. There is no doubt—and I welcome this—that the Soviet Union has stopped making aggressive statements. Also, it is showing praiseworthy intentions and

has started taking measures which should encourage a development toward greater security in Europe, but in itself it forms a considerable bloc which extends from the Neman to the Pacific. It will continue to be a big nuclear and conventional military power. It will have less but more modern equipment in accordance with the recommendations made to the Soviet Government by its most lucid military advisers at the beginning of the eighties. This power must be balanced in the West by an adequate deterrent. "A military vacuum invites foreign interference" the president of the Republic recently reminded us in Valmy.

Furthermore, in many countries subject to the internal pressure of fundamentalism, which are suffering great population and economic imbalances, there are large and modern military forces which are not yet included in any treaty. Mr. Shevardnadze himself stressed that on 6 March 1989 when he opened the Vienna conference: "South of Europe and in southwest Asia there are military potentials which are likely to become far superior to ours."

[Isnard] For decades, NATO and France argued that it was necessary for the technological quality of their weapons to compensate for the quantity of armaments in Eastern Europe, which was deemed to be disproportionate. How do you now justify this same effort to achieve sophistication when the USSR and the Warsaw Pact are agreeing to considerably reduce the number of weapons they have?

[Schmitt] France has always preferred to place the emphasis on the quality of its military equipment—performance and reliability—rather than on the quantity, adhering to a reasonable sufficiency in this sphere. This tendency has always been preferred by NATO even if the United States has developed a nuclear arsenal and space research equal to the USSR. The Soviets have equipped themselves with an excessive arsenal (they admit it, see Mr. Arbatov's recent remarks), but, since 1980, their efforts related to the quality of equipment. Their new short-range and long-range mobile surface-to-surface nuclear missiles (SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25), the T-72 and T-80 tanks, the Mig-29 plane, and the Akula submarine, strike me as comparable in every respect to their equivalents in the Atlantic Alliance countries. When the Soviet Union has made the equipment reductions resulting from the Vienna negotiations, it will have—in the area situated west of the Urals—a military force which will certainly be smaller than at present, but equipped exclusively with modern equipment! Moreover, it will also have a similar force east of the Urals.

This is logical, did not Mr. Gorbachev write in PERESTROYKA: "The Soviet Union is doing everything necessary to maintain a reliable and modern defense. It is our duty to our people."

As Frenchmen, we have the same duties to our people. I very sincerely hope that the treaties signed in Vienna will lead to a balanced reduction in conventional equipment

in Eastern and Western Europe. But, unless we accept new imbalances in the future and hence a new destabilization, which strikes me as inconceivable, we will have a duty to keep up in the qualitative sphere.... This does not imply the search for sophistication for its own sake.

[Isnard] In the new European context, in which the East European nations are seeking to restore dialogue with the West and in which a unified Germany on our borders is pushing back the possible threat presented by the military potential of France's neighbors, what is the purpose of the Hades prestrategic nuclear missile and should the number to be built be maintained?

[Schmitt] Let us make things clear. The aim of the Hades missile is to give credibility to the strategic deterrent and to prevent a ground attack. It is not directed against the populations of Central and Eastern Europe. That has never been the case and it is not likely to be the case at a time when policies are changing, when democracy is triumphing, and when confidence is being established! Our weapons are weapons for stabilizing the geostrategic balance. They are weapons of peace and not weapons intended to be used. I am sure that the leaders of those countries can understand that.

This observation enables me to emphasize a very positive development in relations with the East European countries which has emerged over several months. We are establishing contacts based on confidence, which are sometimes friendly and very promising with Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR. That strikes me as normal.

But there are also the facts and the facts are 1,500 short-range Soviet surface-to-surface missile launchers with more than 6,000 nuclear weapons. To this we should add the nuclear-capable planes and long-range missiles which can also be fired at short range and accurately—a fact which is sometimes forgotten. The facts are that the existing conventional forces and especially those which will remain will be modernized.

Thus, the number of tanks deployed west of the Urals which the USSR is demanding for its Army alone—14,000—is three times the German Army's armored potential when it invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941.

Our air-to-surface and surface-to-surface prestrategic weapons, of which we have much fewer than the USSR will continue to have to the west and east of the Urals, give us the certainty that, if there was another change of line in Soviet policy, that daunting conventional potential could not be mobilized. Deterrence by mutual acknowledgment to which General Fricaud-Chagnaud often refers will have served its purpose.

Our defense concept ensures that Hades, like all our nuclear weapons, is a weapon of deterrence. Its specific characteristics, its ability to inflict damage on exclusively military targets of any aggressor in the context of a final warning, strengthen the credibility of the deterrent exercised by our strategic weapons. This concept is

far from being obsolete; quite the reverse, it even seems that some people might soon take it as their inspiration. The existence of the Hades missile, the successor to the Pluton missile, will ultimately contribute to the maintenance of stability in Europe and it can be useful to Europe as a whole, as Mr. Chevenement said.

Finally, should we reassess the number of Hades missiles to be built? Too many uncertainties remain to decide that now. It is a serious and delicate problem which is being tackled in some quarters with haste. However, I emphasize one point: In this sphere—as in the strategic sphere—we are “out of proportion” with other arsenals; we must maintain strictly an adequate level.

[Isnard] The Vienna East-West negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe may reach a conclusion next October. There is talk of a reduction of between 10 and 15 percent by Alliance member countries in the equipment to which the negotiations relate (tanks, armored troop transport vehicles, fighter planes, and helicopters). France will not be spared by this agreement. What practical conclusions do you draw regarding the organization and equipment, in other words the format and missions, of the French Armed Forces?

[Schmitt] France will play its part in the reductions. This share should roughly fall within the range which you indicated provided the proposals for reductions put forward by the Western countries are accepted by the Warsaw Pact countries.

Indeed, the Warsaw Pact countries are currently demanding that levels be set for the artillery and air forces which are markedly higher than the total of weapons held by the Alliance countries. A disarmament agreement would thus allow the Western countries to increase their forces and the Soviet Union to maintain an advantage in its favor if they refrained from doing so. This would be paradoxical and unacceptable. I hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its position and that the percentage reduction which you mention can be accepted for all the equipment limited by the treaty.

The agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe, once implemented, should make it possible to eliminate the considerable imbalances which exist to the benefit of the Soviet Union. We will be able to carry out the reductions which we must make without any major difficulty, probably at the cost of some reduction in the composition of the land and air forces. I note in passing that the Armed Forces 2000 plan, whose implementation has started already, goes in that direction. We are already considering the content of new negotiations on conventional disarmament. During the implementation of the first agreement—and this will take some time because the Soviets have a great deal to destroy—it would probably be appropriate to envisage the implementation of reductions in new equipment. I am thinking of mobile surface-to-air defense equipment, a sphere in which the Soviets have a very marked numerical superiority, and in new elements which make it possible to judge the

reality of a defensive posture. I am also thinking of the level and location of munitions stocks.

Thinking has begun on the air and land forces systems necessary for maintaining the balance in Europe. These forces should not deviate considerably from the Armed Forces 2000 format. But many unknown factors remain regarding the political and military trends which will prevail in Europe in the medium term. My answer cannot therefore be more specific.

[Isnard] In the United States the elements of a new defense philosophy—“Develop and Wait”—are emerging. This means stepping up research and development in the military sphere, only moving on to mass production of equipment if the threat takes shape. Savings are expected from this. Can France be inspired by this doctrine?

[Schmitt] This is precisely the approach which was adopted during the updating of the military programming law which came before parliament in early 1989.

Compared with the rate set by the 1987 law, reductions of Fr45 billion were decided for the 1989-1993 period, and this represents around 10 percent of the equipment spending originally planned and this will have repercussions on the following years.

The emphasis rightly placed on preparations for the future and the technological effort, in other words research and development with a view to a qualitative improvement in equipment, will obviously have an effect on the rate of production which, in the short term, sustains the bulk of “non-expenditure” [non-expenses]. This is a gamble on the future which has been made.

The fact remains that the equipment in service in France will still have to be numerically and qualitatively equal to that in use in the countries which could become threatening or return to being threatening. Our strategy is not *a priori* directed against anybody. Its aim is to deter any potential candidate for aggression or political and military hegemony. Its role is also to ensure the stability of a truly European Europe.

[Isnard] In the future, should not French defense be based—in the name of sufficiency and the defensive posture—on a new “triad”: Strategic missile-launching submarines (for deterrence), a combined forces rapid action force with more “muscle” (to control crises), and the navy, in other words aircraft carriers (to project our forces)?

[Schmitt] Sufficiency and a defensive posture have long been principles governing our defense concept. They alone could not therefore bring about a significant development in the corresponding military tool. The evaluation of the potential medium-term and long-term risks must complement the approach.

It is clear that our strategic and prestrategic forces must be maintained at the required level of adequacy, credibility, and reliability.

It seems equally clear to me that the means of the three armed forces necessary outside Europe for the protection of our interests and our fellow citizens in a context aimed always at maintaining peace, freedom, and stability, must be maintained and even modernized, and I am happy that you referred to the aircraft carriers while stressing that other means deserved to be mentioned.

But although the means of "managing crises," to use an expression which has become fashionable, are entirely necessary outside Europe, we must not forget that crises may also occur in Europe and that, to ensure that they do not escalate, we must prevent those who still have force from being tempted to use it. In Europe we, like our partners, must still have the means of honoring the treaties to which we are a party (the Washington, Brussels, and Elysee treaties), not to mention the future agreements among the 35 which are taking shape.

Finally, it strikes me that the defense of the territory (land, air, and sea approaches) will require our attention more and more.

We must constantly review our situation, but this does not mean change for its own sake. Any change is very costly. In other countries, I now observe increasing understanding and even approval of our defense concept. We must give ourselves time to think, time to look at what situations the current upheavals will produce before deciding to amend the Armed Forces 2000 plan which is now starting to be implemented and which goes in the right direction—a tightening of our general staff structures and an improvement in our forces' operational capabilities. The programming law which commits parliament for 1990 and 1991 will have to be reassessed in 1991. These are deadlines which strike me as reasonable in view of the negotiations under way in 1990 (START, chemical weapons, conventional weapons) and the events which could still take place this year.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

18 APRIL 1990